State v. Hoag

Citations: 165 Ariz. 215; 797 P.2d 1233; 68 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7; 1990 Ariz. App. LEXIS 286Docket: No. 1 CA-CR 89-896

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; August 28, 1990; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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The court addressed whether unauthorized entry into a vehicle constitutes "control" necessary for a conviction of unlawful use of means of transportation under A.R.S. 13-1803. The defendant entered a Volkswagen van through an unlocked door and was observed tampering with a radio, leading to his arrest and a plea to unlawful use of means of transportation. He contended that the evidence did not demonstrate he exercised control over the vehicle as a means of transportation, which should be required for a conviction. The state argued that mere unauthorized presence in the vehicle sufficed for "control."

The court noted that A.R.S. 13-1803 defines unlawful use of means of transportation as taking unauthorized control without intent to permanently deprive. It distinguished this statute from the previous "joyriding" law, clarifying that the essence of unlawful use is the temporary nature of the control. The court emphasized the historical context of the statute, which aims to address irresponsible behavior associated with unauthorized use of vehicles, and questioned whether the legislature intended to broaden the definition of control to include mere presence. Ultimately, the court found that unauthorized entry alone does not meet the threshold for control necessary for a conviction under A.R.S. 13-1803, leading to the reversal of the conviction.

Persuasive precedents from various jurisdictions indicate that mere trespassory conduct does not suffice to establish unauthorized control over a vehicle under relevant statutes. In **State v. Douthitt**, the Oregon court interpreted ORS 164.135, which criminalizes exercising control over a vehicle without the owner's consent. The defendant's actions—entering a parked vehicle and rummaging through the glove box—were deemed insufficient to demonstrate intent to deprive the rightful possessor of possession or to interfere with their use of the vehicle, as there was no intention to operate it.

Similarly, in **People v. Butler**, the New York court held that for a violation of unauthorized use statutes, a defendant must exert some degree of control over the vehicle's interior or mechanisms. The defendant's act of kneeling in a parked vehicle did not indicate any intent or capability to operate the car, thus failing to meet the statute's requirements. The Butler court explicitly noted that the defendant's brief unauthorized presence did not prevent the owner from using the car. This principle was supported by **People v. Murray**, where simply sitting on a motor scooter was not enough to constitute unauthorized use, lacking evidence of control or the ability to operate the vehicle. The overarching rationale across these cases is that "control" must be linked to the use of the vehicle for transportation purposes.

The Arizona statute A.R.S. 13-1803 broadens the scope of prohibited conduct compared to the former A.R.S. 13-672(C) by allowing a defendant to be guilty of unauthorized control of a vehicle without needing to "take" or move it. The legislative intent of A.R.S. 13-1803 is to address conduct that poses risks to the vehicle and its occupants, not to encompass all forms of unauthorized entry. While a defendant can be convicted for unauthorized control without vehicle movement, there must be evidence of intent to use the vehicle for transportation. Previous cases, such as State v. Marquez, affirm that mere presence in a stolen vehicle does not necessitate intent unless there is operational evidence of the vehicle being used unlawfully. The state references State v. Coleman, where intent to control property was inferred from unauthorized entry and circumstantial evidence, suggesting that similar inferences could apply under A.R.S. 13-1803, but the necessary intent must be demonstrated clearly.

Toolate clarifies that unauthorized entry alone does not equate to "control" under A.R.S. 13-1802, as it merely allows an inference of intent to commit theft. The Coleman's case does not establish that unauthorized entry alone satisfies the "control" requirement; it indicates that control can be inferred from unauthorized entry combined with other evidence, such as missing property. The legislature intended "control" under A.R.S. 13-1803 to encompass more than just unauthorized entry, specifically prohibiting the unauthorized control of another's means of transportation when there is intent to use it as such. Simply entering a vehicle without that intent may constitute a different crime, but not a violation of A.R.S. 13-1803. In this case, the defendant lacked intent to operate the vehicle, thus no factual basis for his plea exists. The judgment is reversed, the matter is remanded, and the original burglary charge is reinstated. The analysis also references that sitting behind the wheel with the intent to use the vehicle could violate A.R.S. 13-1803. Additionally, the document notes the absence of case law defining “control” in this context, leading to an examination of the statute's policy and historical background. The distinction between joyriding and theft lies in the temporary nature of deprivation.

The previous "joyriding" statute aimed to address issues related to the temporary theft of vehicles, specifically targeting situations where individuals take someone else's car without permission for a short duration. This conduct poses risks not only to the vehicle but also to the safety of those involved and bystanders due to potential irresponsible driving. The key inquiry is whether the legislature intended to redefine unauthorized vehicle use under the new statute 13-1803, shifting the focus from joyriding to mere presence in a vehicle as the basis for a violation.

Persuasive case law from other jurisdictions suggests that mere trespassing does not suffice for unauthorized vehicle use. In State v. Douthitt, the Oregon court required evidence of intent to deprive the rightful owner of possession or interfere with their use of the vehicle, concluding that simple entry and searching within the vehicle did not demonstrate such intent. Similarly, in People v. Butler, the court ruled that the defendant's unauthorized presence in a vehicle, without any attempt to operate it or interfere with its mechanisms, did not constitute unauthorized use, emphasizing that control must relate to the vehicle's function as transportation.

Further supporting this interpretation, in People v. Murray, the defendant's mere sitting on a scooter without the ability to operate it was not deemed unauthorized use. Collectively, these cases establish that the necessary "control" for a violation must involve an intention to use the vehicle for transportation, raising questions about whether the Arizona statute redefines this concept. The original intent and scope of conduct prohibited under the previous statute remain significant in understanding the current legal framework.

The enactment of A.R.S. 13-1803 expanded the scope of A.R.S. 13-672(C) by shifting the requirement from a defendant needing to "take" a vehicle to only needing to "take unauthorized control over" it, eliminating the necessity for asportation or movement of the vehicle. The statute aims to address conduct that poses risks to the vehicle and individuals involved, as exemplified by the Model Penal Code commentary stating that simply entering a parked vehicle for shelter does not constitute "joyriding." Consequently, while unauthorized control can be established without movement, there must be evidence of intent to use the vehicle for transportation.

In State v. Marquez, the court upheld that mere presence in a stolen vehicle does not suffice for probable cause unless there is intent to use it; the evidence in that case showed the vehicle was in operation, indicating such intent. The state advocated for the interpretation of "control" from State v. Coleman, where the court found intent to control property could be inferred from the circumstances surrounding unauthorized entry and the absence of the victim's property. Coleman suggested that unauthorized entry could lead to reasonable inferences of theft. Thus, while intent for unauthorized control can be inferred in certain contexts, mere entry does not automatically imply intent to use or control a vehicle without further evidence.

The court determined that proof of unlawful breaking and entering can infer intent to commit theft, but not other felonies. Toolate clarifies that unauthorized entry does not equate to "control"; it only supports an inference of intent to commit theft. The case of Coleman emphasizes that control over property requires an unauthorized entry combined with additional evidence, such as the victim's property being missing. The court ruled that under A.R.S. 13-1803, "control" means more than just unauthorized entry; it necessitates intent to use the vehicle as a means of transportation. In this case, the defendant lacked intent to operate the vehicle, leading to the conclusion that there was no factual basis for his plea. Consequently, the judgment and sentence were reversed, the original burglary charge reinstated, and the matter remanded. Judge Patterson participated in the appeal as authorized by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court. The relevant statute, A.R.S. 13-672, outlines that unlawfully taking a motor vehicle with intent to deprive the owner is a criminal offense, punishable by imprisonment or fines. The court noted that liability under 13-1803 could arise if a person sits behind the wheel with the intent to use the vehicle.