State v. Korzep

Citations: 164 Ariz. 175; 791 P.2d 1058; 50 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 42; 1989 Ariz. App. LEXIS 375Docket: No. 1 CA-CR 88-914

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; December 26, 1989; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Appellant Roberta Korzep was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to five years in prison following a jury trial. The key issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on "justification" under A.R.S. 13-411, which allows a household resident to use deadly force to prevent certain criminal offenses. The court determined that A.R.S. 13-411 does not apply when one resident uses deadly force against another resident within the same household. Additionally, appellant's request for other jury instructions was denied, which the court also found to be appropriate. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. 

On the night of February 13, 1987, after a night out drinking, an altercation occurred between appellant and her husband, David. Following an episode where David assaulted her, appellant stabbed him with a kitchen knife. Despite her belief that David was alive and angry, she did not immediately call the police. After seeking help from neighbors, they discovered David deceased from a stab wound that had caused significant blood loss. At trial, appellant argued self-defense, citing previous domestic violence incidents, which were supported by witness testimony. She expressed a genuine fear for her life during the incident.

Appellant admitted to stabbing her husband but claimed justification for her actions. During jury instruction discussions, her defense counsel requested an instruction under A.R.S. 13-411, which the state opposed, arguing it was inapplicable and that self-defense instructions under A.R.S. 13-404 and 13-405 were adequate. The trial judge accepted the state's argument, denying the 13-411 instruction while providing the self-defense instruction. After trial, the appellant moved for a new trial, contending the court erred by not including the 13-411 instruction. The trial judge denied this motion but noted evidence existed for a 13-411 instruction due to indications of aggravated assault. On appeal, the appellant maintained that she was justified in her actions under 13-411, while the state defended the trial court's use of 13-404 and 13-405 as appropriate. The court referenced State v. Thomason, which clarified that A.R.S. 13-411 applies strictly to scenarios where a home and its residents are being protected from external threats. The legislative intent behind the statute emphasizes the protection of homes from burglaries and violations. Ultimately, the court concluded that A.R.S. 13-411 did not apply in this case, as the incident involved two residents of the same household, not an external threat. The interpretation adhered to the principle of ascertaining legislative intent, considering the policy driving the statute's adoption.

The Arizona statute A.R.S. 13-411 was enacted primarily to address the rising rates of home burglary, emphasizing the protection of property and residents' lives. The statute allows defense for residents defending their home or its occupants from criminal offenses committed by non-residents. However, it does not extend to situations where a resident is victimized by another resident of the same household, particularly in the context of domestic violence, which often involves criminal acts between residents. The legislative intent, as reflected in the policy statement, focused on protecting against intruders rather than addressing conflicts among household members. Consequently, A.R.S. 13-411 does not provide a defense for a resident using deadly force against another resident in the context of preventing enumerated offenses. The trial court’s refusal to give a justification instruction based on this statute was deemed correct.

Additionally, the appellant challenged the trial court's decision to deny three specific jury instructions related to self-defense. Proposed Instruction No. 11 suggested that the jury should not consider how a similarly sized individual might react in the same situation. Instruction No. 12 argued that the absence of a weapon did not negate a belief in imminent danger. Instruction No. 13 aimed to have the jury consider various factors, including prior actions and the relative size of the individuals involved, in assessing the defendant's belief in the danger she faced. The trial judge declined to provide these instructions, offering instead a general guideline on the use of deadly force in self-defense, which stated that a reasonable belief in immediate danger justifies such force, without requiring actual danger or a duty to retreat.

The trial judge is not obligated to provide jury instructions that are already sufficiently addressed by other instructions, as established in State v. De Nistor. In this case, the jury received instructions that allowed a defendant to use deadly force if a reasonable person in a similar situation would deem it necessary. Factors such as the differences between the appellant and the victim, as well as the absence of a weapon on the victim, were relevant to assessing the reasonableness of the appellant's actions. Proposed Instructions Nos. 11, 12, and 13 were deemed more suitable for closing arguments and were correctly rejected. A review of the record for fundamental error revealed none, leading to the affirmation of the conviction and sentence. Judges Shelley and Retired Judge Froeb concurred, with the latter participating under authorization from the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court. A.R.S. 13-411 outlines the justification for using physical and deadly force in crime prevention, stating that such force is justified if there is a reasonable belief that it is immediately necessary to prevent certain serious crimes, and there is no duty to retreat in these circumstances.