Franzi v. Superior Court

Citations: 138 Ariz. 556; 679 P.2d 1043; 1984 Ariz. LEXIS 201Docket: No. 17016-PR

Court: Arizona Supreme Court; March 13, 1984; Arizona; State Supreme Court

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Petitioner Emil Franzi faces an indictment for six counts of perjury and six counts of false swearing, stemming from his grand jury testimony in Pima County related to a contract awarded by the Pima County Board of Supervisors and a subsequent investigation into a congressional campaign. Franzi was granted immunity to testify about campaign law violations but was informed of the consequences of false statements. Following his indictment, Franzi filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court denied, and a partially granted discovery motion. His special action in the court of appeals was met with limited jurisdiction, only granting relief on the discovery matter. Franzi subsequently petitioned for review, contesting the issues that were ruled against him, while the State also sought review of the discovery ruling.

Franzi argues for dismissal based on the claim that the Pima County Grand Jury lacks jurisdiction to investigate federal crimes, asserting that its investigation is therefore void. This raises the question of whether the grand jury's investigative powers exceed its authority to indict. A.R.S. 21-407(A) mandates that grand jurors investigate offenses triable within the county. The court referenced Marston’s Inc. v. Strand, which identifies the grand jury as an independent body with broad investigatory rights. The precedent suggests that a grand jury can investigate beyond its indictment authority, as established in other cases like Samish v. Superior Court, reinforcing that the grand jury's role is to ascertain whether crimes have occurred within its jurisdiction.

A grand jury's investigation is valid even if it later determines that the alleged crime occurred in a different county; this does not invalidate the proceedings but prevents an indictment in that county. The Fifth Circuit has established that a grand jury possesses discretion to conclude that a federal offense may have occurred without returning an indictment, or to deem the conduct as non-criminal. This independence is crucial for protecting citizens’ rights. Investigations can proceed even when no indictable offenses are found. The authority of a grand jury to investigate may surpass its authority to indict, especially if the inquiry pertains to relevant matters. The grand jury can investigate issues beyond its jurisdiction if the investigation could yield information about indictable crimes. Regarding perjury, the Supreme Court has emphasized that false testimony undermines judicial processes and warrants sanctions, regardless of challenges to the government's authority in conducting inquiries. Therefore, a defendant's claims of jurisdictional overreach by the grand jury do not absolve them from consequences for perjury.

Challenging the government's inquiry is permissible, but providing false information is not. Citizens can choose to decline or respond truthfully to questions but cannot lie without consequences. The state does not need to establish the materiality of false swearing under A.R.S. 13-2703(A), and defendants cannot assert grand jury jurisdiction issues during trials for false swearing. Instead, concerns about the grand jury's authority should be raised prior to answering any questions. Witnesses suspecting improper inquiries are entitled to consult counsel and can refuse to answer; the grand jury then determines if a contempt hearing is warranted. This hearing balances the rights of citizens against the grand jury's constitutional functions, allowing the court to curtail frivolous objections.

In the case of Franzi, he contends that his allegedly false statements shouldn't impact the grand jury’s investigation as it lacked authority for federal indictments. However, the state argues his falsehoods could disrupt the investigation by leading to wrongful indictments. Materiality, defined as anything that could influence the outcome of proceedings, is crucial; if Franzi's statements do not pertain to indictable offenses, they do not constitute perjury. The state bears the burden to prove materiality, which is an essential element of the offense. The significance of statements in grand jury proceedings may be clearer than in other legal contexts, as grand juries seek facts to decide on potential charges.

Materiality in legal testimony is defined by its potential to influence or obstruct a grand jury's investigation. A false statement by a witness, irrespective of its direct relevance to the case, may be deemed material if it impacts the investigation's progress. Materiality should be assessed at the time the testimony is given, and there is no requirement to prove actual impediment to the investigation. The determination of materiality is a legal question, with the trial court expected to make the initial assessment. If deemed material, the jury may then evaluate it further; if not, the charge may be dismissed. 

Regarding the constitutional challenge raised by Franzi against the vagueness of the perjury (A.R.S. 13-2702(A)) and false swearing (A.R.S. 13-2703(A)) statutes, it is noted that he lacks standing to contest this issue. Even so, the statutes are not vague concerning Franzi’s actions, as he was informed of the legal consequences of making false statements. The statutes require clear communication that certain actions, such as making false sworn statements on material issues, are punishable, which Franzi was aware of prior to his testimony. Thus, the statutes provide sufficient notice of their applicability and are upheld as not vague.

The statutes provide a clear understanding that individuals are prohibited from making false statements under oath, which is deemed sufficiently understandable by an average person. Franzi argues that the definitions within the perjury and false swearing statutes are overly broad, asserting his standing to challenge these laws based on the overbreadth doctrine. This doctrine allows for the invalidation of laws on First Amendment grounds, even if the challenger has not engaged in protected activity, as it protects against unconstitutional restrictions on expression that might deter others from speaking freely.

Franzi specifically contests A.R.S. 13-2701(2), which defines a “statement” to include representations of fact as well as opinion, belief, or state of mind relevant to the case. The court finds this definition adequate and comparable to the Model Penal Code, which suggests that misrepresentations of opinion or belief can lead to a perjury charge only if they are directly relevant to the inquiry at hand. The decision notes that for a perjury prosecution to be valid, the question posed must clearly address the defendant’s opinion or state of mind, and it cannot be based on an attempt to contest the good faith of factual representations.

While the statute does not prevent inappropriate inquiries, such as those regarding a witness's religious beliefs, it acknowledges the court's role in protecting witnesses from such abuses. Thus, the definition in A.R.S. 13-2701(2) is upheld as constitutional, with the caveat that the superior court can safeguard against misuse of inquiry powers. Additionally, Franzi claims that A.R.S. 13-2702(A), the perjury statute, is overbroad, arguing that the oath under this statute may not be legally required or authorized.

Franzi expresses concern that individuals or groups, such as a self-styled detective, a credit-rating bureau, or the Ku Klux Klan, could administer an oath and potentially lead to perjury charges based on false statements. However, it is clarified that the perjury statute is designed to protect government processes from false testimony. The Arizona Criminal Code Commission asserted that perjury only occurs during official proceedings, which are defined as those before authorized governmental entities. For a statement to be deemed perjury, several conditions must be met: it must be made during an official proceeding, under oath, be false, be believed by the speaker to be false, and be material to the investigation. Consequently, this limits the risk of perjury charges to a specific group of individuals engaged in official proceedings. 

Additionally, Franzi challenges the false swearing statute, asserting it is overbroad. This statute mirrors perjury but does not require materiality, thus broadening the scope of individuals at risk. Nonetheless, it is determined that both statutes are constitutionally sound, serving their intended functions without encroaching on protected speech. The trial court's denial of Franzi's motion to dismiss based on constitutional grounds was upheld. 

Regarding allegations of grand jury procedural violations, Franzi's claims about insufficient jurors voting for the true bill cannot be assessed due to a lack of supporting facts, leading to the presumption that the grand jury acted lawfully.

Franzi argues that his indictment by the same grand jury that heard his alleged perjurious statements violated his procedural rights, citing 17 A.R.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 12.2(a) and A.R.S. 21-211(1), which prohibit witnesses from serving as grand jurors. He clarifies that he is not relying on rule 12.2(d), concerning bias. The court finds Franzi's claim meritless, confirming that the grand jury's role includes investigating all offenses in the county (A.R.S. 21-407(A)). Prior knowledge of cases by grand jurors does not disqualify them from indicting, as established in State v. Watkins. The court cites precedent affirming that a grand jury may indict based on its own knowledge and that hearsay evidence is permissible in grand jury proceedings (State v. Baumann). Franzi also contends that the state failed to present exculpatory evidence, but the court states that prosecutors are not obligated to present all such evidence to the grand jury, which only needs to determine probable cause (A.R.S. 21-413). The court concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Franzi's motion to dismiss, and that the grand jury's processes were in accordance with established legal standards.

No abuse of discretion was found regarding Franzi's indictment. The court ruled that the indictment was sufficient despite Franzi's argument that it failed to assert the grand jury's jurisdiction. Under Criminal Procedure Rule 13.2(a), an indictment must provide a clear statement of facts to inform the defendant of the charges, enabling a proper defense. The court clarified that jurisdiction over the investigation is not a separate element of perjury but is included within the element of materiality, which the state adequately alleged. Franzi did not contest that he was unaware of the charges. The indictment matched the statutory language on false swearing, providing sufficient notice.

In terms of discovery, Franzi requested the entire transcript of the 51st grand jury proceedings. The trial court acknowledged his right to relevant testimony but indicated that some testimony would be reviewed prior to release. The court of appeals confirmed Franzi's right to the grand jury transcripts, citing A.R.S. 21-411(A) and Rule 12.8(c), which mandate that all grand jury proceedings, except juror deliberations, must be transcribed and made available to the defendant. The state did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances to withhold any portions of the transcript, thus Franzi is entitled to all relevant transcripts from the grand jury proceedings that led to his indictment.

Determination is required regarding whether the entire testimony from the 51st grand jury or only portions of it must be produced for the indictment process. The 51st grand jury's investigation, numbered 51 G.J. 43, initially focused on a contract awarded by the Pima County Board of Supervisors to an Arizona company. This investigation subsequently led to another inquiry, numbered 51 G.J. 263, concerning the congressional campaign of a Board member, during which Franzi was interrogated. The indictment against Franzi arose from the second investigation, 51 G.J. 263, but some inconsistent statements were made during the first investigation, 51 G.J. 43. It is determined that Franzi is entitled to the transcripts of the second investigation, and the trial court's order mandating the production of all relevant transcripts from both investigations is upheld, with no abuse of discretion found. The trial court may review the congressional candidate’s testimony prior to its release. The court affirms the trial court's rulings and vacates any inconsistent order from the court of appeals, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.