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State v. Shumway
Citations: 137 Ariz. 600; 672 P.2d 944; 1983 Ariz. App. LEXIS 586Docket: No. 5910-PR
Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; March 17, 1983; Arizona; State Appellate Court
Albert Lee Shumway was indicted on October 21, 1980, for negligent homicide, a class 4 felony, after a fatal car accident on August 25, 1980. During the trial, evidence showed Shumway was driving his Buick station wagon at an estimated speed of 80 to 90 m.p.h. when he swerved into oncoming traffic, nearly colliding with another vehicle before crashing head-on into an Oldsmobile driven by Sue Ellen Henderson, who died at the scene. A breathalyzer test indicated Shumway had a blood alcohol content of .11 percent, and after a four-day trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal, Shumway raised two issues: the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction regarding right-of-way rules for left turns and the court's communication with jurors about blood alcohol levels without his or his counsel's presence during deliberations. The appellate court determined that the second issue warranted a reversal of the conviction, noting that the trial court's response to the jurors about blood alcohol levels was given without consulting the defense and could impact the jurors' deliberations. The state argued that Shumway failed to make a timely objection, which usually waives the issue on appeal, but the court chose to address the merits due to uncertainty about whether Shumway was informed of the communication. Rule 22.3 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure allows for jurors to request additional instructions or testimony after deliberations have begun. The court has the authority to order other testimony or instructions to avoid giving undue emphasis to specific testimony, provided that all parties receive prior notice. This rule aims to prevent the court from influencing the jury’s understanding of the facts, as highlighted in State v. Corrales. Generally, any communication between the trial court and jurors after deliberation has begun is considered reversible error unless the defendant and counsel are notified and allowed to be present. The state argues that if there is no demonstrated prejudice to the defendant, such communication could be viewed as harmless error, citing State v. Mata. However, the court disagrees, noting that in Mata, the trial court’s responses were not prejudicial as they did not provide legal or factual information about the case. In contrast, the current case involved the trial court providing incorrect legal information regarding blood alcohol content, which improperly suggested the significance of that evidence. Consequently, the court concluded that the defendant was indeed prejudiced by these comments, resulting in the reversal of the conviction and remanding for a new trial. Additionally, the court addressed the issue of the defendant's right to an instruction on his theory of the case, specifically regarding the illegal left turn that allegedly caused the accident. The trial court’s refusal to provide the requested instruction based on A.R.S. 28-772 is cited as error, highlighting the importance of informing the jury of applicable laws pertaining to the case. A well-established legal principle states that in cases of criminal negligence, the victim's contributing negligence does not serve as a defense for the accused. However, the victim's negligence can be relevant in determining whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of death. For the victim's negligence to serve as a defense in negligent homicide, it must be proven as the sole proximate cause of the resulting injuries. If the defendant's negligence is found to have caused the death, the defendant remains liable under criminal law, regardless of the victim's lack of due care. In this case, the defendant raised several defenses, arguing that his conduct was not criminally reckless, he was not the cause of the accident, his blood alcohol content did not impair his driving, his speed was appropriate, and the victim failed to yield the right of way. Testimony indicated that the collision occurred while the victim was making a left turn in front of the defendant, who skidded 150.5 feet prior to impact. Given the evidence of the defendant’s excessive speeding and inebriation, it seems unlikely he could convincingly argue that the victim's actions were solely responsible for the accident. The court noted that the jury was not instructed to consider the victim's conduct as it related to proximate cause. The defendant had requested such an instruction, which the court deemed harmless due to the speculative nature of the victim's conduct evidence. However, in the current case, no instructions were given regarding the victim's conduct concerning proximate cause. The only causation instruction provided defined criminal negligence and required proof that the defendant's actions caused the victim's death. Although the evidence supporting the defendant's theory was weak, the court concluded that the trial court should have provided the requested jury instruction. Consequently, the conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial, with an order for the trial court to give the requested instruction.