Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; December 7, 1982; Arizona; State Appellate Court
The court addressed the measure of damages owed to Carl Moore following the unlawful forfeiture and sale of his 1969 Chevrolet by the State of Arizona. Moore was arrested on charges related to heroin, leading to the seizure of his vehicle. Forfeiture proceedings were initiated by the Arizona Department of Public Safety, resulting in a court order that forfeited the car to the state, which was later sold at auction for $255. After the sale, Moore successfully appealed the forfeiture, prompting him to seek a determination of liability for damages against the State of Arizona and Maricopa County.
On September 19, 1980, the court awarded Moore $600, reflecting the car's fair market value at the time of seizure. The state contested this judgment on two grounds: that it was not a party to the action and that Moore should only receive compensation equivalent to the amount by which the state was unjustly enriched. The court rejected the state's first argument, clarifying that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office acted on behalf of the State of Arizona during the forfeiture proceedings, thus ensuring the state was a party to the case. It emphasized that the profits from any forfeited property are allocated to the State Treasurer, reinforcing that the state had a vested interest in the action.
Officer Hughes had the authority to initiate the forfeiture petition under A.R.S. 36-1043, which mandates that an officer seizing a vehicle transporting narcotics must file a notice of seizure and intent to commence forfeiture proceedings, without requiring prior authorization from the State Attorney General's Office. Notably, a deputy county attorney signed the petition, further supporting its validity. The state did not claim immunity from liability but contested the calculation method for damages, arguing that restitution should be based on the unjust enrichment principle as outlined in the Restatement of Restitution. The state proposed a calculation of $143.50, derived from the auction sale of the vehicle minus sheriff and county attorney fees.
The state cited the case of Kamienska v. County of Westchester to argue that it acted under color of law and thus could not be liable for conversion. However, the court distinguished this case from the current matter, noting that the original seizure was deemed unlawful, which rendered the officer's actions wrongful despite their good faith. Consequently, section one of the Restatement of Restitution was deemed inapplicable. Instead, section 74, which provides for restitution in cases where a judgment is reversed, and section 154, which outlines the measure of recovery for innocent conversion, were identified as relevant. Arizona law defines the tort of conversion as any wrongful exertion of control over another's property, and intent does not require conscious wrongdoing but rather an exercise of control inconsistent with the owner’s rights.
The State of Arizona’s actions resulted in the conversion of Mr. Moore’s car, entitling him to restitution equal to its fair market value at the time of seizure, consistent with Arizona case law. Citing United Producers and Consumers Cooperative, Inc. v. O’Malley, the court reaffirmed that damages in replevin actions are typically assessed at the time of trial unless the property is not in the defendant's possession, in which case they should be assessed at the time of wrongful taking. The trial court's judgment against the state for the car's fair market value at seizure was upheld. Moore's request for attorney fees was denied under Rule 25 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, as the appeal, although questionable in advisability due to its nominal value, raised legitimate issues regarding state forfeiture statutes and was not deemed frivolous. The court clarified that A.R.S. 12-821, which pertains to negligence and contract claims against the state, was not applicable in this case. The Arizona Constitution mandates compensation for property taken without just compensation, providing an avenue for Moore's remedy. The court found no jurisdictional issues regarding the trial court's authority to order restitution after discovering the sale of Moore's car. The issue of incidental damages was not addressed as it was not raised by Moore.
