Clark v. Curran

Citations: 118 Ariz. 111; 575 P.2d 310; 1978 Ariz. LEXIS 160Docket: No. 13112-PR

Court: Arizona Supreme Court; January 13, 1978; Arizona; State Supreme Court

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A petition for adoption of J. B. Clark, Jr.'s three sons was initiated by James Austin Curran and Carolynn Ann Curran, which Clark opposed by refusing to consent and filing a habeas corpus petition for custody. On November 18, 1975, the court approved the adoption of Tom and Philip but denied it for Joe, simultaneously granting custody of Joe to Clark. Clark's motion for a new trial was denied, and he subsequently appealed the court's decision regarding Tom and Philip. The Court of Appeals reversed the adoption order and granted Clark's habeas corpus petition for the two boys. 

Clark is the natural father of Joseph, Thomas, and Philip, born during his marriage to Edith Clark (now Edith Caballero). Following their divorce in 1966, custody was awarded to the mother, with visitation rights for Clark. Due to financial difficulties, the children were often placed with Clark and his wife until the mother took them back and placed them in the custody of the Texas State Welfare Department. Subsequently, the children were sent to the Currans' home in Arizona with the mother's consent. The Pima County Superior Court appointed the Currans as guardians in September 1973, and they later sought to adopt the boys. Clark was not notified of the custody proceedings before the adoption petition, but he opposed the adoption once notified. The appellees argued that Clark's appeal should be dismissed as untimely under the relevant juvenile court rules.

Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court governs all matters in the Juvenile Court, which includes adoption matters as per A.R.S. 8-101(6). Appellees argue that A.R.S. 8-122, which states appeals in adoption matters follow the provisions for appeals from the Superior Court, has been superseded by the Juvenile Court rules. However, the court finds no conflict between A.R.S. 8-122 and the Juvenile Court rules, noting that adoption matters are not included in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court as outlined in Article VI, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution. Consequently, appeals in adoption cases are subject to civil case rules, and the appellant's notice of appeal was timely filed.

The appellant claims a violation of due process due to lack of notice in guardianship and temporary adoption proceedings, arguing these proceedings undermine his parental rights. The court determines these preliminary matters do not affect the case's merits, as their purpose is to assess the fitness of prospective adoptive parents and the child's suitability for placement, not to terminate parental rights. Appellant was provided notice and a full hearing, thus due process was not violated.

Additionally, the appellant argues the original adoption petition lacked required elements under A.R.S. 8-109(A)(8), asserting the adoption is void due to insufficient notice regarding neglect and the necessity of consent. Although the original petition had defects, the court finds these were remedied by an amended petition asserting the petitioners' position that consent from the father was not needed due to past neglect. The case cited by the appellant, Lee v. Superior Court, is distinguished by the presence of a full hearing in this instance, where the natural parent was heard in an adversarial context, unlike the circumstances in Lee.

Defects in the original adoption petition were rectified through an amendment. The appellant contends that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction due to ongoing jurisdiction claimed in Texas under a divorce decree. However, the appellant did not pursue contempt actions in Texas, and no Texas court made a ruling on the matter. Adoption and custody proceedings are distinct, though related; Arizona courts have jurisdiction over adoption when the child is present in the state, as outlined in A.R.S. 8-102, and can terminate the parent-child relationship under A.R.S. 8-532(A). Previous cases clarify the difference between lack of jurisdiction and nonexercise of jurisdiction, particularly when a child's presence is obtained through wrongful means. In this case, the children were brought to Arizona with their mother's consent and Texas authorities' approval, not to deprive the appellant of parental rights. The mother's actions aimed to secure a suitable placement for the children due to the appellant's failure to provide support, making the placement with the appellees legitimate.

The Juvenile Court had statutory jurisdiction and properly exercised it. The appellant also challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting findings of neglect. Appellate courts defer to trial courts' findings unless unsupported by reasonable evidence. Although no formal petition or judgment for terminating the parent-child relationship was filed, the father's alleged neglect justified waiving his consent under A.R.S. 8-106(C). This statute allows courts to waive consent if it serves the child's interests, provided all adversely affected parties are notified and the court makes written findings. The court's power to waive consent must align with statutory provisions regarding parent-child relationships and respect constitutional parental rights, with the child’s best interests incorporating parental rights considerations.

Parental rights cannot be terminated without proven unfitness. In this case, the trial judge applied the termination standard outlined in A.R.S. 8-533. Despite some disputed evidence, substantial evidence indicated the appellant's parenting was below acceptable standards, particularly his lack of effort to obtain employment and failure to pay child support. Although the appellant had custody of the children at times, he required the mother to take them without providing financial support. The trial court found that the child Tom was neglected, having been deaf from birth and not receiving necessary medical assistance until he entered the school system. The appellant made no reasonable efforts to support Tom or learn sign language for communication. The evidence supported the trial court's conclusions of neglect as defined by statute. Consequently, the trial court properly waived the appellant’s consent and allowed the adoption of Tom and Philip. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated, and the Superior Court's judgment was affirmed. Additionally, the appellant's notice of appeal was deemed untimely based on Rule 25's 15-day deadline.