Gloria S. Stowe v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services
Docket: 93-7034
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; December 1, 1993; Federal Appellate Court
Unpublished opinions may now be cited if they have persuasive value on a material issue, provided a copy is attached to the citing document or furnished to the Court and all parties during oral argument. Gloria S. Stowe, the plaintiff-appellant, appeals the district court's judgment, which upheld the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of her application for supplemental security income benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1381a. Stowe's initial application was denied on January 1, 1990, and after a remand for further evaluation and a second hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) again found no disability. The Appeals Council denied further review, making the ALJ's decision final.
Stowe argues that the Secretary's decision lacked substantial evidence and was based on an improper hypothetical question to the vocational expert. Judicial review is limited to assessing whether substantial evidence supports the Secretary's decision, which is defined as evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. The Secretary employs a five-step evaluation process to determine disability under the Social Security Act. The ALJ found that Stowe retained the capacity for sedentary work despite her claims of disabling pain, which were deemed not wholly credible and likely exaggerated, aligning with the framework established in Luna v. Bowen and Social Security Ruling 88-133. Stowe, a 40-year-old with limited work history, alleges disability due to nerves, headaches, and arthritis since April 1989.
The ALJ concluded that the claimant's ongoing medication for arthritic pain did not correlate with any "detectable clinical findings" to substantiate her claim of disabling pain, which would prevent her from performing sedentary work as indicated by a vocational expert. The assessment of disabling pain requires examination of medical records and the evaluation of the claimant's credibility, as subjective complaints alone are insufficient for establishing disability. The claimant did not provide medical evidence supporting her claims of disabling pain. Although Dr. William G. Martin diagnosed her with seronegative rheumatoid arthritis and recommended she refrain from work until her condition improved, Dr. Gordon Strom later noted that there was no supporting evidence of significant inflammatory arthritis.
To qualify as disabling, pain must severely impede the ability to engage in substantial gainful employment. The ALJ's findings regarding the claimant's pain were well-supported, as her testimony of incapacitating pain lacked medical validation and was inconsistent with her reported activities. The claimant also argued that her "post-traumatic stress syndrome" prevented her from performing sedentary work. Following an evaluation, Dr. Theresa Garton diagnosed her with posttraumatic stress disorder but observed only minor depressive symptoms and no psychosis. The Secretary must follow specific procedures to assess mental impairments, which include determining the existence and impact of any mental disorders on the claimant's functioning. In the original hearing, Dr. Randy L. Crittenden, a psychologist, testified that the claimant's depression and anxiety appeared situational rather than indicative of significant impairment, suggesting she could manage her emotions even in distressing situations.
The individual is deemed capable of performing simple tasks in small groups but not alone or in public, with a recommendation to avoid complex instructions. Assessments indicated moderate restrictions in daily activities and social functioning, with infrequent concentration limitations and minimal episodes of work-related deterioration. Although a brief letter from "Jim Dandridge, Intern" suggested the claimant was not emotionally suited for full-time work, the ALJ found no supporting medical qualifications or treatment involvement from Dandridge, thus justifying the disregard of this opinion.
The claimant argued that the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert were deficient, alleging they did not adequately account for her impairments. However, legal precedents dictate that an ALJ must only include impairments accepted as true, and a hypothetical is only improper if clearly insufficient. The ALJ's cumulative hypothetical addressed the claimant's capacity for sedentary work, leading the vocational expert to assert that she could perform entry-level jobs such as a teacher's aide or cashier. When the expert was asked to consider the claimant's pain complaints as credible, he indicated that such pain would render her unable to work.
Despite the inclusion of the pain claims in the hypothetical, the ALJ found the claimant's pain allegations not credible and was not required to incorporate them into the hypothetical. The vocational expert's opinion, based on unsubstantiated claims, was not binding on the ALJ. Ultimately, the ALJ's reliance on the vocational expert's testimony concerning substantiated impairments was deemed appropriate and free from error.
Claimant requests the court to overturn its ruling in Diaz v. Secretary of Health, Human Servs., asserting a misunderstanding regarding vocational experts in social security cases. However, one panel of the court cannot overrule another panel's decision, as established in United States v. Zapata. The court's conclusion in Diaz, which stated that any error in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert was negligible due to the expert's comprehensive knowledge of the claimant's disabilities, is consistent with circuit precedents on hypothetical questions. The Secretary's determination that the claimant is not disabled under the Social Security Act is upheld by substantial evidence, leading to the affirmation of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma's judgment. The order holds no precedential value except for the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Additionally, the claimant's counsel introduced an unsupported sixth step in the Secretary’s evaluation process, which has been dismissed as frivolous due to the repetitive nature of similar arguments in past cases. Counsel is warned that continued persistence in this regard may result in sanctions.
