Garcia v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London

Docket: No. 25,985

Court: New Mexico Court of Appeals; January 26, 2007; New Mexico; State Appellate Court

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The appeal addresses liquor liability insurance coverage in a wrongful death claim against a decedent's estate, focusing on the adequacy of a demand for defense under the policy and the implications for the insurer if a defense is not provided. The court concludes that: 1) wrongful death claims are permissible against a decedent's estate in probate court; 2) the liquor liability insurance policy covers such claims; 3) there are factual disputes regarding whether the estate made a sufficient demand for defense under the policy; and 4) if it is determined that a demand was made, the insurer cannot invoke policy defenses. Consequently, the court reverses the summary judgment for Underwriters at Lloyd’s and Burns Wilcox, while affirming the judgment in favor of Insurance Exchange, Inc., which had no contractual obligation to the estate. The background indicates that the Plaintiff, representing the Perfetti Estate, sued the defendants for breach of contract, bad faith, and violations of insurance laws, leading to the appeal of the summary judgments. The appellate court reviews the summary judgment de novo, considering evidence favorably for the Plaintiff and emphasizing the cautious application of summary judgment as a remedy.

On April 23, 1999, Patrick Garcia died after being struck by a vehicle driven by Sally Padilla, who had been served alcohol at the Red Carpet Bar in Belen. Anthony Perfetti, owner of the bar, died in a separate car accident on November 14, 1999, prompting the filing of a probate case for his estate. The estate's Personal Representative published a 'Notice to Creditors' on December 2, 1999, requiring claims to be submitted within two months to avoid being barred. Victoria Garcia, representing Patrick Garcia's estate and his minor children, filed a wrongful death claim against the Perfetti Estate on January 5, 2000, seeking damages of at least $3,000,000, alleging that Padilla was served alcohol despite being visibly intoxicated.

The Personal Representative did not respond to the claim or take necessary actions to administer the estate, such as filing an inventory of assets as required by NMSA 1978, 45-3-706(A). Consequently, the district court removed the Personal Representative on April 18, 2001, appointing a Special Administrator to oversee the estate's administration until a new Personal Representative could be appointed. The Special Administrator was granted authority to obtain an accounting of estate assets and manage distributions. In May 2001, the former Personal Representative's counsel reported that the estate's records were incomplete and that the only known insurance policy did not cover dramshop liability, only fire-related matters, with further insurance details available from Insurance Exchange in Albuquerque.

Plaintiff's attorney sought to ascertain Mr. Perfetti's insurance coverage related to the April 23, 1999, accident resulting in Mr. Garcia's death. On May 9, 2001, the attorney contacted the Insurance Exchange, requesting a copy of the insurance policy for the Red Carpet Bar and summarizing the accident details along with a claim filed in the Perfetti Estate, asserting that the claim was deemed admitted due to lack of denial by the Personal Representative. He requested the Insurance Exchange to treat this correspondence as a formal claim and notify the company accordingly.

On June 14, 2001, Underwriters received actual notice of the claim through their attorneys. The Insurance Exchange subsequently forwarded the claim to Burns Wilcox, the agent for Underwriters, who informed Underwriters’ attorneys in New York. New York counsel requested a copy of the May 9 letter and its enclosures, which they received that same day. On June 29, 2001, New York counsel communicated with Underwriters about the claim, noting that Perfetti, the deceased, was an insured under the policy. The only potential defense mentioned was late notice, requiring Underwriters to demonstrate "substantial prejudice" due to the delay.

The letter also highlighted complications arising from the removal of the Personal Representative and her replacement by a Special Administrator, who has limited authority in probate matters. Additionally, New York counsel informed the Special Administrator that Underwriters accepted notice of the claim per the insurance policy for the period June 8, 1998, to June 8, 1999, but reserved the right to disclaim coverage later if late notice were found to cause prejudice. No other rights were reserved at that time. Counsel urged the Special Administrator to formally notify Plaintiff of the disallowance of the claim as required by New Mexico probate statutes, warning that failure to do so could adversely affect the rights of the Perfetti Estate under the policy. On August 14, 2001, Underwriters’ counsel followed up, expressing concern over not receiving the 'Notice of Disallowance' and reiterated the recommendation for its issuance to Plaintiff and for a copy to be sent to Underwriters.

On September 21, 2001, New York counsel recorded a conversation with the attorney for the Special Administrator regarding the status of a claim, concluding that only a probate judge could deny such a claim. Following this, on September 25, 2001, counsel informed Underwriters that, based on New Mexico probate statutes, no action was required from them in the probate proceedings, as the probate court lacks jurisdiction over tort claims. Consequently, the Garcia Estate needed to file suit against either the Red Carpet Bar or the Perfetti Estate to trigger Underwriters' duty to defend.

On September 28, 2001, the Special Administrator’s attorney reiterated that the Special Administrator could not defend against claims or deny them, as that authority rests with the court during formal administration. The Perfetti Estate was managed by the district court, which issued a final order on September 16, 2002, allowing Victoria Garcia a $3,000,000 unsecured claim against the estate. Due to insufficient assets post-payment to secured creditors, the claim was deemed valid but unpayable by the estate.

The district court subsequently approved an assignment of insurance policies related to the claim, permitting Garcia to pursue these claims directly against the insurance companies, as they had not responded to notifications. The Special Administrator was authorized to assign all rights to the relevant insurance policies to Garcia, who then filed the current action.

Underwriters argue that the wrongful death claim filed in the Perfetti Estate does not activate coverage under the insurance policy. However, the court disagrees, determining that the issue requires interpretation of the Probate Code statutes, which will be reviewed de novo. The court cites the case In re Estate of Baca, emphasizing that statutory interpretation is a matter of law. Additionally, the court will interpret the insurance policy based on the principles outlined in City of Santa Rosa v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., which states that insurance policies are assessed de novo, focusing on the common meanings of terms and the objective expectations of a reasonable insured. The court will not impose ambiguity where none exists and will uphold clear policy language as reflective of the parties' intent.

The analysis begins with the New Mexico Probate Code, originally enacted in 1975, which mandates a liberal construction to further its purposes, particularly to simplify laws concerning decedent affairs and ensure an efficient estate settlement process. These principles are central to the court's evaluation in this case.

A 'claim' under the Probate Code, as defined by NMSA 1978, Section 45-1-201(A)(6) (1995), encompasses liabilities of the decedent or protected person, including those arising from contracts, torts, and other sources, as well as estate-related liabilities incurred post-death or after conservatorship appointment. However, it excludes estate or inheritance taxes and disputes over asset titles. The plaintiff's wrongful death claim against the Perfetti Estate fits this definition. Relevant case law, including Wolder v. Rahm, indicates that a claimant may file either in probate or a separate tort action, but if a claim is filed in probate and rejected without a hearing request, it is barred from subsequent litigation. In re Estate of Rice confirms that probate courts can consider tort claims filed against a decedent’s estate. Additionally, Brown v. Monticello State Bank establishes that claims rejected in probate proceedings may not be relitigated. The Personal Representative's publication of a 'Notice to Creditors' on December 2, 1999, required claims to be submitted within two months, and the plaintiff appropriately filed their wrongful death claim on January 5, 2000. NMSA 1978, 45-3-801(B) outlines the process for notifying creditors, while NMSA 1978, 45-3-804(A) details how claims may be presented. A personal representative may approve or disallow claims, with failure to act within sixty days leading to an automatic allowance of a claim per NMSA 1978, 45-3-806(A).

If a personal representative denies a wrongful death claim, the Probate Code requires the claimant to file a petition for allowance in district court or initiate proceedings against the representative within sixty days of receiving the notice of disallowance. The district court has the authority to allow claims that are timely presented and not barred. Notably, notice must be provided to involved parties during this process. The Rules of Civil Procedure govern the proceedings, allowing for a jury trial if requested, ensuring a resolution of disputed factual issues. This process aims to expedite estate settlements, enabling the district judge to address disputed claims and prioritize payments efficiently. Historically, court orders allowing claims carry the same weight as judgments, which confirms their finality unless appealed. The allowance or rejection of claims is treated as a judicial act, binding and conclusive until overturned, a principle consistent across both historical and current Probate Code interpretations.

Plaintiff retains multiple avenues for pursuing her claim against the estate of the decedent, as outlined in the Probate Code. She can initiate proceedings against the personal representative in any court with jurisdiction, aiming for payment of her claim. Generally, claims arising before the decedent's death must be presented within one year post-death. However, if a claim is covered by insurance, this time limitation does not apply, allowing the claim to proceed to establish liability up to the insurance limits. A judgment from a separate wrongful death action against the estate would effectively endorse the claim.

The insurance policy in question obligates the insurer to cover damages from injuries linked to the selling or serving of alcoholic beverages, and it grants the insurer the right and duty to defend against related lawsuits. The wrongful death claim qualifies as a 'suit' under the policy definition, which includes any civil proceedings alleging damages related to an insured injury. The district court, acting in probate for the Perfetti Estate, possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims, confirming that the wrongful death claim filed by Plaintiff constitutes a legitimate proceeding for damages under the insurance policy.

The wrongful death claim filed in the Perfetti Estate is deemed a 'suit' under the Underwriters insurance contract, thereby triggering Underwriters' duty to defend as specified in the 'Insuring Agreement.' Underwriters contends it has no duty to defend, arguing that the Perfetti Estate did not request a defense and even opted against making a claim under the policy, believing the wrongful death claim did not activate coverage. However, upon reviewing evidence favorably for trial, it's concluded that actual notice of a claim can trigger the duty to defend, even without a formal request. The ruling references varying judicial interpretations, suggesting that while some courts mandate a specific event for duty initiation, others recognize that actual notice suffices. This interpretation aligns with the precedent set in Cincinnati Cos. v. West American Insurance Co., where the court found that an insurer's duty to defend is activated by actual notice of a lawsuit, provided the insured has not intentionally declined the insurer's involvement. Actual notice is defined as information sufficient for the insurer to locate and defend against the suit, particularly when the insurer is better positioned to understand the policy's scope and responsibilities. This principle ensures that insurers cannot evade their obligations due to the insured's lack of knowledge.

Permitting actual notice to serve as a demand aligns with the interests of both insured and insurer, consistent with New Mexico law. New Mexico appellate courts have not specified any formal requirements for a 'demand' prior to the insurer's duty to defend. In the case of State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Price, it was established that reasonable minds could differ on whether communications from the insured constituted a demand for defense, leading to the reversal of a directed verdict in favor of the insurer. Letters from the insured indicated awareness of a lawsuit and suggested the possibility of settlement, demonstrating knowledge on the insurer's part regarding the ongoing litigation. Although formal suit papers were not provided, the circumstances allowed for differing interpretations regarding the sufficiency of the demand and the good faith of the insurer, making these matters suitable for jury consideration. In applying Price to the current case, it is determined that an issue of fact exists, particularly surrounding whether a defense was demanded. The plaintiff's attorney informed the insurer of coverage about seventeen months post-claim, and the insurer acknowledged receipt of the claim, confirming awareness of the lawsuit's relevance to their policy coverage.

Underwriters contends that the Perfetti Estate intentionally chose not to accept a defense from Underwriters, citing an ambiguous letter from the Special Administrator’s attorney. This letter might be interpreted as either rejecting Underwriters' defense or merely commenting on the limitations of the Special Administrator’s duties, without affecting the obligation to defend. Relevant case law, such as Towne Realty, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., illustrates that ambiguous communications can be construed as requests for defense despite disclaimers. Underwriters also provided affidavits from the Special Administrator and her attorney indicating that the Perfetti Estate did not wish for Underwriters to defend them. However, the determination of intent is ultimately for the fact finder to resolve, as established in Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. Supply, Inc., which asserts that conflicting documents and affidavits preclude summary judgment. Additionally, Doña Ana Sav. Loan Ass’n v. Dofflemeyer emphasizes that stated intentions do not settle the matter, and Maxey v. Quintana reinforces that intent is a jury question influenced by witness credibility, suggesting that factual issues require a trial rather than resolution at the summary judgment stage.

A rule tying the duty to defend an insurer to actual notice of a claim is supported by sound policy considerations. The court in Cincinnati Cos. emphasized that insurers are best positioned to understand their coverage obligations and that the insured should benefit from premiums paid for defense against covered claims. Concerns that this rule might create an automatic duty for insurers to engage in litigation are deemed unfounded; insurers can simply contact the insured to determine if assistance is desired. If the insured does not want help or is unresponsive, the insurer is relieved of its duty to defend. The policy encourages insurers to fulfill their contractual obligations rather than allowing them to default based on the insured's lack of formal notice. 

The argument that notice must come solely from the insured is rejected; actual notice can originate from any source, including communications from third parties. In this case, Underwriters had actual notice of the claim, triggering its duty to defend. The critical issue is whether the Perfetti Estate was forgoing defense from Underwriters, which is fact-specific and should be determined by a jury, thus making summary judgment inappropriate. Additionally, Underwriters claims that the Perfetti Estate violated several policy conditions, including failing to provide timely notice of the injury and claim, disallowing the claim, and cooperating in the investigation and defense.

An insurer that fails to defend against a claim after receiving a demand faces significant consequences, including the loss of the right to argue that the insured breached policy provisions. This principle is supported by precedent, indicating that if an insurer unjustifiably refuses to defend a claim covered by the policy, it cannot claim substantial prejudice due to the insured's alleged breach. In this case, Underwriters unilaterally decided not to engage in probate proceedings, believing the court lacked jurisdiction over tort claims, which they argued would not affect the merits. However, a district court later ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, awarding a claim of three million dollars.

The central issue is whether Underwriters unjustifiably failed to defend after the Perfetti Estate's demand; a negative answer would allow Underwriters to invoke policy defenses, while a positive answer would bar such defenses. Additionally, claims against Insurance Exchange are contingent on the existence of a contractual relationship with the Perfetti Estate. Evidence shows that Insurance Exchange had no contract with the defendants, acted solely as an agent to submit insurance applications, and is not mentioned in the insurance policy. As a result, summary judgment in favor of Insurance Exchange was upheld, while the summary judgment for Underwriters and Burns Wilcox was reversed. The order concludes with agreement from the presiding judges.