Allred ex rel. Allred v. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico
Docket: No. 16812
Court: New Mexico Court of Appeals; May 28, 1997; New Mexico; State Appellate Court
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their claims against the University of New Mexico Board of Regents and associated defendants due to alleged violations of discovery rules. They contend that they did not intentionally fail to provide truthful responses, did not repeatedly hide discoverable information, and argue that Joshua Allred, as the real party in interest, should not face dismissal for any alleged transgressions. Additionally, they assert that information regarding a non-witness expert is not subject to discovery and that the district court's dismissal was based on Rule 1-037 NMRA 1997 rather than summary judgment. The case originated in April 1992 with a medical malpractice complaint related to the birth of the Plaintiffs' twin sons, one of whom has cerebral palsy. Throughout the proceedings, issues arose regarding the Plaintiffs' failure to provide expert testimony, leading to several motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants. The Plaintiffs sought extensions to respond to these motions, and the court ultimately allowed their attorney to withdraw and granted them additional time to respond.
In March 1993, Plaintiffs' second counsel identified Dr. Keel, who authored a July 14, 1992, anonymous evaluation letter, and retained him as an expert witness. On May 4, 1993, they produced this letter in response to summary judgment motions. Subsequently, on May 13, 1993, the UNM Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for sanctions, alleging misrepresentations by the Plaintiffs concerning the letter. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the UNM Defendants and Thompson but denied their motions for dismissal and sanctions, stating that while it found Plaintiffs' conduct inappropriate, it did not condone or endorse it. Plaintiffs successfully appealed the summary judgment decisions.
On August 6, 1992, the Plaintiffs responded to a request for document production, which included a request for any x-ray films they possessed. In May 1993, a CT scan of Joshua’s brain was conducted by a medical provider in Oklahoma, but the Plaintiffs did not supplement their document production response. After the summary judgments were reversed, Plaintiffs answered Thompson’s interrogatories on June 7, 1995, failing to list any Oklahoma health care providers or raise objections concerning the CT scan. Two weeks later, during Larry Allred’s deposition, they revealed the CT scan and its normal results, although Larry did not bring the film as required. At Diana Allred’s deposition, Plaintiffs objected to questions about the CT scan, claiming work product privilege and asserting a promise made to the health care provider regarding non-involvement in the lawsuit. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs must disclose information about the CT scan despite their objections.
Plaintiffs' co-counsel informed the district court that a CT scan was conducted at the request of Plaintiffs' former counsel. The court stated that a plaintiff's promise not to use certain information does not prevent the court from ordering discovery. The court indicated that if the plaintiffs refused to disclose information related to the CT scan, it would not allow any damages issues related to that scan to be presented to a jury. The court emphasized that such information is discoverable if the plaintiffs allege that their condition is due to the defendants' fault. Following this ruling, Plaintiffs declined to answer questions regarding the CT scan, intending to file a motion for reconsideration. Defendants warned that they would seek dismissal if the plaintiffs did not provide the requested information. On July 5, 1995, the UNM Defendants filed a motion for sanctions and dismissal based on the plaintiffs' discovery violations. Subsequently, on July 14, Thompson filed a similar motion. On July 20, Plaintiffs moved to reconsider the ruling on the CT scan, claiming it was performed after the court had granted summary judgment and while the case was under appeal. The district court held a hearing on July 25 and later issued a letter opinion granting the motions to dismiss and denying Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider regarding the CT scan's discovery. On August 7, Plaintiffs filed another motion to reconsider the dismissal of claims, but on August 15, the court dismissed the claims against the UNM Defendants and denied the motion to reconsider the discovery ruling, issuing no findings of fact or conclusions of law. Another hearing was held on August 22 regarding the motions to reconsider.
In September and October 1995, Plaintiffs appealed a dismissal order against the UNM Defendants and a denial regarding discovery related to a CT scan. In December 1995, the district court issued a letter opinion granting Thompson’s motion to dismiss, citing a troubling pattern of the Plaintiffs seeking reconsideration of unfavorable rulings while presenting previously available evidence and arguments. The court noted ongoing contradictions in evidence, failures to comply with discovery requirements, and insufficient information for defendants to prepare for trial. Key findings included:
1. The attorney work-product privilege was asserted too late during Diana Allred's deposition.
2. The Oklahoma City imaging study was not disclosed timely, violating prior discovery requirements.
3. Non-disclosure of imaging study information would prevent any related damages from being presented to the jury.
4. The CT scan results were discoverable and should have been produced.
5. Plaintiffs failed to disclose Dr. Keel’s evaluation letter or seek a timely ruling regarding its discovery.
6. There was a consistent failure to supplement interrogatories on time.
7. Non-compliance with reasonable discovery requests deprived defendants of fair trial preparation.
8. Plaintiffs' conduct indicated a willful disregard for discovery rules and court rulings.
9. Good cause existed for granting Dr. Thompson’s motion.
During a hearing on January 9, 1996, the district court modified the language regarding willfulness. Plaintiffs appealed the order on January 16, 1996, and the appeals were consolidated by the court.
Rule 1-037 NMRA 1997 outlines sanctions for a party's failure to comply with discovery orders. Specifically, Rule 1-037(B)(2) allows district courts to impose various sanctions, including: limiting a disobedient party’s ability to support or oppose claims, striking pleadings, staying proceedings, dismissing actions, or entering judgments by default. Sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and a dismissal will only be reversed if the court's judgment reflects a clear error after considering all relevant factors.
Rule 1-037(D) extends these sanctions to parties that fail to appear for depositions or answer interrogatories. Such failures cannot be excused based on objections to discovery unless a protective order has been applied for. The Supreme Court has indicated that even oral rulings can justify sanctions under this rule. The application of Rule 1-037 encompasses false answers to interrogatories, failure to supplement answers, and refusal to answer discoverable questions during depositions.
In previous cases, the requirement for willfulness, bad faith, or fault has been established as necessary for imposing certain sanctions, particularly when denying an opportunity for a hearing on the merits. Willfulness is defined as a conscious or intentional failure to comply, distinct from accidental noncompliance. Courts have upheld sanctions based on findings of willfulness, as evidenced in cases where parties acknowledged their failures or did not seek extensions for compliance.
In Sandoval v. United Nuclear Corp., the court reversed the termination of workers’ compensation benefits imposed as a sanction for the plaintiff's failure to appear for a deposition. The plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, argued his inability to comply was due to his status as an excludable alien, making it impossible for him to enter the United States. He proposed alternative methods for his deposition, such as conducting it in Mexico or answering written interrogatories. The court had previously mandated that findings regarding willfulness were necessary for imposing sanctions under Rule 1-037(D). On remand, the trial court acknowledged the plaintiff's knowledge of the deposition but did not establish that his failure to appear was willful or in bad faith. The appellate court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that the plaintiff's absence could not be deemed willful under the circumstances.
Subsequent cases, such as Bishop v. Lloyd McKee Motors, reiterated that severe sanctions like dismissal require evidence of intentional noncompliance with discovery orders. In Bishop, the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failing to be available for depositions, despite his prior request for a protective order and a motion to stay due to military obligations. The court reversed this dismissal, citing the absence of a finding of willful noncompliance.
In Lopez v. Wal-Mart Stores, the court determined that the trial court incorrectly found the plaintiff willfully failed to produce requested records, as the plaintiff had actually complied before the dismissal was issued. This ruling reinforced the principle that dismissals or evidence preclusions cannot occur when noncompliance with discovery orders stems from circumstances beyond the party's control.
The district court determined that the Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with discovery requests and their misrepresentations constituted a pattern of disregard for discovery rules and court rulings, but it did not classify this disregard as willful. This finding, made in the order dismissing claims against Thompson, also applies to the dismissal of claims against the UNM Defendants, as Thompson joined their motion to dismiss based on the same conduct. The court acknowledged that prior cases, such as Sandoval v. UNC and Bishop, require a specific finding of willfulness before default or dismissal without a hearing on the merits. However, it interpreted 'willfulness' in a broader context, equating it with willfulness, bad faith, or other fault, emphasizing a conscious or intentional failure to comply. The court asserted that the precedent cases did not intend to limit the definitions of willfulness or bad faith to exclude other recognized faults. Furthermore, since Sandoval v. UNC was not authoritative and followed a non-precedential unpublished opinion, it did not establish strict limitations. The cases indicated that findings of willfulness must either be clear in the record or require more explicit court findings supported by substantial evidence. The court will liberally interpret findings to uphold a district court's decision. Although the district court refrained from using the term 'willful', it did not imply that the Plaintiffs' non-compliance was unintentional, suggesting the reluctance was more about legal interpretation than a factual determination of intent.
The district court found that Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to timely supplement answers to interrogatories and did not comply with Defendants’ reasonable discovery requests. The court mandated disclosure of CT scan information, warning that non-compliance would bar Plaintiffs from recovery. The findings indicated that Plaintiffs' non-compliance was a conscious choice rather than accidental, supported by misrepresentations about expert location, neglecting to seek protective orders, and failing to disclose CT scan information after being denied reconsideration. Plaintiffs’ assertion of good faith regarding discovery objections was deemed insufficient; non-action cannot be justified by claims of objectionable discovery. The court distinguished this case from precedents where compliance issues were due to inability or lack of a hearing. Despite potential questions of bad faith, the evidence confirmed intentional refusal to comply with the court's orders. Plaintiffs argued that dismissal against Joshua Allred, who was not directly involved, was unjust, but failed to provide legal support for this claim. The court concluded that dismissal, while extreme, was justified given Plaintiffs' refusal to comply with discovery rules, affirming the district court's dismissal of their claims against the UNM Defendants and Thompson.
