Galef v. Buena Vista Dairy

Citations: 117 N.M. 701; 875 P.2d 1132Docket: No. 14492

Court: New Mexico Court of Appeals; May 16, 1994; New Mexico; State Appellate Court

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A judgment was originally obtained by Plaintiff against Defendant Weatherly in California on August 1, 1977. Plaintiff sought to domesticate this judgment in Dona Ana County by filing a suit on March 2, 1987. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on January 30, 1989, recognizing the California judgment. To enforce this 1989 judgment, Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 3, 1992, requesting a charging order against Weatherly’s 25% interest in Buena Vista Dairy. Defendants moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, which was denied, leading to their answer and subsequent summary judgment motion by Plaintiff. Defendants raised equitable defenses of laches and estoppel, but the district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on January 5, 1993. Defendants appealed, but the court affirmed the ruling.

Regarding the statute of limitations, Defendants argued that the 1992 action was barred since it was based on the 1977 California judgment, exceeding the 14-year limit. Plaintiff contended that the 1989 judgment converted the California judgment into a New Mexico judgment, thus allowing a new 14-year period from 1989. The court clarified that the 1987 action to domesticate the California judgment was valid under New Mexico law, as it was initiated within the applicable limitation period, either under California law or within the 14 years from the original judgment date. The court reinforced that a judgment from one state must be domesticated in another state to be enforceable, and since the period for the California judgment had not expired, Plaintiff's actions were compliant with Section 37-1-2 of New Mexico statutes.

The 1989 judgment transformed the 1977 California judgment into a distinct New Mexico judgment, with New Mexico's statutes of limitations starting from 1989. To enforce a judgment from another state, it must be recognized as a judgment in the receiving state, adhering to its laws. The relevant New Mexico statute (NMSA 1978, 39-4A-3) does not apply here. Once a foreign judgment is filed with the district court clerk, it holds the same effect as a district court judgment, subject to similar legal processes.

The statute of limitations relevant to the 1992 action for a charging order to satisfy the 1989 judgment could be interpreted in multiple ways. One perspective is that the 1992 suit is governed by New Mexico's execution statute (NMSA 1978, Section 39-1-20), which parallels provisions in the Uniform Partnership Act regarding charging orders. This view posits that the 1992 request functions similarly to a writ of execution. Recent case law indicates that a judgment creditor has a fourteen-year window to revive a judgment and can execute within seven years after the judgment's entry or revival. Thus, since the charging order was sought within that seven-year period from the 1989 judgment, this limitation is satisfied under this interpretation.

Alternatively, the 1992 suit could be classified as an action based on any judgment from a New Mexico court per Section 37-1-2. This argument is bolstered by the procedural nature of the action, as it followed civil action protocols, including the filing of a complaint and the defendants' response. The nature of a writ of scire facias, which allows for the defendant to respond, further supports this classification.

Plaintiff's suit for a charging order was timely filed within fourteen years of the 1989 judgment, satisfying the statute of limitations under Section 37-1-2. Alternatively, since the proceeding for a charging order did not resemble an execution after judgment or an action based on a judgment, Section 37-1-4 applies, which has a four-year limitation period. Thus, the 1992 action for a charging order was also timely. The court holds that the domestication of the foreign judgment in 1989 transformed it into a New Mexico judgment, triggering the state's statutes of limitations. 

Regarding the defenses of laches and estoppel raised by Defendants, the court notes these defenses were not clearly articulated in their answer. Even if assumed to be sufficiently raised, the only supporting fact was the claim that Plaintiff delayed collection for ten years. However, mere delay does not constitute laches or estoppel without evidence of lack of knowledge or prejudice. Defendants failed to present facts showing they were unaware of Plaintiff's intent to enforce the judgment or suffered any injury from the delay. Consequently, no viable defenses were established, and summary judgment for Plaintiff was appropriate.

Defendants claimed that Plaintiff's action was barred due to staleness, suggesting that the delay resulted in the unavailability of witnesses and documents, and that Defendant Weatherly relied on this inaction. However, the court disagreed, stating that simply labeling a claim as "stale" does not adequately demonstrate factual prejudice or loss of evidence. Defendants were required to substantiate their defenses of laches and estoppel with factual evidence rather than conclusory statements. The court affirmed that to counter a motion for summary judgment, Defendants needed to provide evidence establishing genuine issues of material fact regarding their affirmative defenses. Merely pointing to the delay was insufficient, as all elements of an affirmative defense must be proven. The court concluded that Plaintiff's action for a charging order was not barred by the statute of limitations and that Defendants failed to present material facts to support their equitable defenses, affirming the trial court's summary judgment.