United States v. William Ramos, United States of America v. Richard Ramos

Citations: 12 F.3d 1019; 1994 WL 2259; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 973Docket: 92-6849, 92-7087

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; January 21, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Richard and William Ramos both pled guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine, receiving 120-month prison sentences. They appealed the district court's denial of two motions to suppress evidence from searches conducted in Alabama and Texas. The court upheld the denial of the Texas search suppression and Richard Ramos's attempt to withdraw his guilty plea. However, it found error in the district court's conclusion that William Ramos had abandoned his expectation of privacy regarding a briefcase found during the Alabama search.

William Ramos was the tenant of record for two condominiums in Orange Beach, Alabama, where he lived with his brother Richard. William signed a lease for Unit 408, which was later transferred to Unit 606 due to prior rental commitments. Both leases specified check-in and check-out times. Unit 606 was scheduled for cleaning by D.J.'s Cleaning on January 1, 1992, after being vacated. Cleaners arrived at 10 A.M. to find the current tenants still present, prompting a call to their supervisor. The cleaning crew later returned with the supervisor around midday.

Tenants had not vacated their unit when Anding arrived, leading Meyer to instruct cleaners to pack the tenants' belongings into garbage bags for cleaning. The cleaners faced challenges distinguishing between tenant and owner property after the owner's closet was opened. They discovered two dollar bills, each containing a "white powder substance," and a locked briefcase in the master bedroom. Williams, an employee, attempted to open the briefcase but could only see napkins bundled with rubber bands through an unlocked side. Unable to identify the contents or determine ownership, Anding informed Kathy Fleming at Meyer about the potential presence of drugs or money in the briefcase. Fleming directed the cleaners to leave the items undisturbed.

Gail Harris, the rental manager, reported the briefcase to state police, suspecting it contained cocaine. Trooper Warren Stewart inspected the briefcase, found suspicious plastic bags, and conducted a field test on a powdery substance that tested positive for cocaine. He secured the briefcase, contacted Agent Michael Kirk from the DEA, and later obtained a search warrant to conduct a more thorough search of the unit.

Subsequent to the discovery, William Ramos and co-defendant Christine Adkins were indicted for possession and conspiracy related to cocaine. After pleading not guilty, they filed motions to suppress evidence found in the briefcase. During the suppression hearing, William claimed ownership of the briefcase. The district court ruled that the tenancy arrangement allowed the owner or their agent to enter the property to check on it after the lease expired. The court concluded that William had abandoned his privacy rights regarding the briefcase by failing to check out on time and that the actions taken by the cleaning staff and police were appropriate. Consequently, the court denied the motion to suppress, stating there was no invasion of privacy rights in the briefcase. A summary Order reflecting the denial was subsequently entered, without addressing the merits of the motion.

The district court determined that Appellants had abandoned the briefcase, leading to a finding that they lacked standing to challenge the legality of the Alabama search. Consequently, the court did not address the legality of that search. After denying the motion to suppress evidence from the Texas search, William and Richard pled guilty to conspiracy, explicitly reserving the right to appeal the denial of their suppression motions. On appeal, they contended that the district court wrongly denied their motion to suppress evidence from the Alabama search. 

The review of suppression motion rulings involves mixed questions of fact and law, with factual findings assessed under the clearly erroneous standard and legal applications reviewed de novo. The concept of abandonment is a factual issue, and its determination hinges on whether the individual relinquished their interest in the property, thereby losing a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the search. Intent regarding abandonment can be inferred from various objective factors.

While the Appellants must prove a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched areas, the government bears the burden of proving abandonment. A person may only seek suppression if their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search or seizure, as these rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously. Richard failed to provide evidence at the hearing to support his claim of a privacy expectation in the briefcase, which was rented in William's name. Testimony indicated that Richard's name was not on any rental documents, and William claimed ownership of the briefcase. Thus, the district court's finding of abandonment regarding Richard was deemed unnecessary.

The government contends that William forfeited any expectation of privacy in Unit 606 due to his failure to check out on time. The district court characterized the tenancy as "very definite limited," yet William's prior five-month lease for Unit 408 is relevant. Although his contract for Unit 606 was only two months, his earlier agreement suggests a greater expectation of privacy than a transient rental. The court acknowledges that a longer-term rental provides more privacy rights than a nightly hotel stay, referencing multiple precedents that affirm Fourth Amendment protections in such contexts. 

The critical issue is whether William relinquished his interest in Unit 606 at the time of the search. The government cites United States v. Savage, where the court ruled a defendant lost privacy rights after failing to check out on time and returning the key, but this case differs significantly. Unlike Savage, William had a longer lease and did not surrender his key before the search, indicating a continued interest in the unit. His relationship with Unit 606 was more consistent and personal than that of the defendant in Savage, establishing that he retained a legitimate expectation of privacy at the time of the search.

Meyer’s cleaners and personnel had the right to be in William's unit after check-out time, a right even conceded by William’s counsel for Trooper Stewart. However, the drugs seized by Stewart were found in a locked briefcase, and the district court incorrectly decided that William had abandoned his expectation of privacy regarding the briefcase. Case law emphasizes that a briefcase holds significant personal items and warrants a high expectation of privacy, akin to personal clothing. While a briefcase can be abandoned, the determination of abandonment depends on specific facts. In prior cases, abandonment was found when property was left with acquaintances for extended periods or discovered in trash, indicating a lack of privacy expectation. Conversely, attempts to protect property during a stop indicate retention of privacy. The nuances of Fourth Amendment rights necessitate careful consideration of the circumstances surrounding each case. In this instance, despite William's brief delay in leaving the condominium, he did not forfeit his privacy rights in the locked briefcase.

William initially signed a five-month lease for Unit 408, with a check-out time set at 10:00 A.M. He was reassigned to Unit 606 on November 1, 1991, with assistance from cleaners at D.J.'s to move his belongings. The record does not clarify if William was late in vacating Unit 408, although testimony indicated that tenants often did not check out on time. When this happened, personal belongings would be packed and stored until the tenant could be reached. William had reasonable grounds to believe that, should he be late vacating Unit 606, the cleaners would handle his belongings similarly.

The government argued that William, having been the tenant under two leases with the same checkout time, was aware of the implications of missing this deadline. However, the rental agreement did not specify consequences, aside from stating the time would be "strictly enforced." Possible consequences could include losing his dwelling or incurring rent liability. Given that the date in question was New Year's Day, it was plausible for someone to hold over without intending to abandon their possessions. Therefore, a four-hour overstay did not equate to abandoning a reasonable expectation of privacy in a locked briefcase under his bed.

William contacted the Meyer office the following day, further supporting that he did not abandon his privacy expectation. Consequently, he had standing to contest the legality of the search by Trooper Stewart, which the district court had not previously considered. The district court correctly denied the motion to suppress evidence from the Texas search and refused Richard Ramos's request to withdraw his guilty plea. The finding that Richard abandoned the briefcase was unnecessary, as he had not demonstrated a legitimate expectation of privacy.

The judgment regarding Richard Ramos is affirmed. However, because the district court mistakenly concluded that William abandoned his expectation of privacy, the judgment concerning William Ramos is vacated and remanded for further consideration of the remaining issues related to his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the Alabama search.