Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; January 15, 1981; Federal District Court
A motion to dismiss the indictment has been filed by defendant Rafael Vincente de la Rosa Sanchez, citing systematic exclusion of Hispanics and blacks from grand juries in the District of Massachusetts, under the Jury Selection and Service Act (28 U.S.C. 1867) and the Constitution. Sanchez, along with co-defendant Alice L. Boyd, was indicted on August 19, 1980, for federal bribery and conspiracy violations, with a superseding indictment occurring on September 24, 1980. The court previously granted a motion to inspect grand jury records on November 7, 1980, and the current motion was submitted on December 18, 1980, supported by a sworn statement of facts on January 5, 1981. Defense counsel indicated additional evidence would focus on whether Portuguese individuals are classified as Hispanics in grand jury representation but the court decided against holding an evidentiary hearing, deeming the classification issue non-dispositive.
The government opposed the motion on three grounds: 1) it was untimely under 28 U.S.C. 1867(a); 2) the grand jury selection process adequately represents Hispanics and blacks; and 3) there is no evidence that the selection process for forepersons leads to underrepresentation of these groups. Timeliness is assessed under 18 U.S.C. 1867(a), which requires challenges to be filed within seven days of discovering grounds for such motions. Although the defense counsel filed late, the court found it hard to determine when the seven-day period began, thus being reluctant to declare the motion untimely. Regardless, any untimeliness did not affect the constitutional challenge.
To establish a prima facie case of a substantial violation of the Jury Selection and Service Act, the defendant must demonstrate: exclusion of a distinctive or cognizable group from the jury selection process, systematic exclusion of that group, and that this exclusion led to a jury pool that is not reasonably representative of the community.
The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a grand jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. This right, while rooted in the Fifth Amendment for federal prosecutions, shares similarities with the Sixth Amendment's guarantees regarding jury selection. To establish a prima facie case of violation, a defendant must demonstrate three elements: (1) the excluded group is a "distinctive" community group; (2) their representation in jury selections is not fair relative to their population size; and (3) any underrepresentation results from systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.
In this case, the defendant, Sanchez, is tasked with proving these elements. It is acknowledged that both Hispanics and blacks are distinctive groups within the Eastern Division of the District of Massachusetts. Data presented shows that from 1978-1980, the percentage of Hispanic grand jurors (1.45%) and those summoned (4.25%) exceeded their representation in the voting-age population (1.01%). For blacks, their community presence (2.70%) closely matched their percentage among summoned grand jurors (2.87%) and those actually serving (2.03%), indicating only a minor discrepancy.
Even if a statistical underrepresentation were assumed for these groups, Sanchez has not provided evidence to support the claim of systematic exclusion. Unlike the cases of Taylor and Duren, where specific exemptions were made, the jury selection process in this District does not treat Hispanics and blacks differently. The process is conducted randomly through a computer system based on voter lists, ensuring that all potential jurors, regardless of race, are treated equally.
The excerpt addresses the requirements for selecting grand jury forepersons under the Fifth Amendment and the Jury Selection and Service Act, emphasizing the necessity for selection from a fair cross-section of the community. The defendant must prove a prima facie case of violation, which involves demonstrating underrepresentation of distinct groups. Data presented showed that no Hispanic or Black forepersons were appointed in the last 18 grand juries, with statistical expectations indicating such appointments should occur. Despite concerns regarding the selection process, it is ultimately deemed valid under federal rules, and there is no evidence of intentional exclusion of these groups by district judges. The government argues that as long as the grand jury is selected from a representative cross-section, challenges to foreperson selection are unfounded. The court finds that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of a fair cross-section violation, leading to the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. Co-defendant Alice L. Boyd has raised separate issues related to the Jury Selection and Service Act, while co-defendant Manuel Bello has not filed any motions. The defendant, being Hispanic, lacks standing to challenge the exclusion of other groups on equal protection grounds, as outlined in relevant case law. The complexity of proving discriminatory intent further complicates equal protection claims.
Systematic exclusion under fair-cross-section guarantees does not require proof of discriminatory intent, as established in United States v. Test. The government's classification of Portuguese individuals as part of the Hispanic population aligns with the defendant's definition from Social Security Administration form SS-5, which includes various Spanish ancestries. The term "Hispanic" is defined by Webster's as relating to the culture or people of Spain or Portugal, originating from the Latin term for Spain, "Hispania." The defendant did not provide any statistical analysis to support their claims, which would typically involve modeling data with a binomial distribution to assess the likelihood of the grand jury's composition occurring by chance, as referenced in Castaneda v. Partida.
