Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; March 31, 2008; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court
The court addresses the legal threshold for determining when police encounters with the public necessitate constitutional justification, referencing *Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782 (1996)*. In this case, the Commonwealth appeals the suppression of a firearm discarded by a defendant fleeing from police. During a police encounter, Officer Cooley observed the defendant, who was on a bicycle, react to gestures from another individual before pedaling away. The officers, without activating lights or sirens, followed the defendant in an unmarked vehicle, attempting to initiate a conversation. The defendant, displaying signs of panic, accelerated and fled, ultimately discarding his bicycle and running. Officer Tarrantino then observed what appeared to be the handle of a gun as the defendant ran and subsequently witnessed him throw the firearm onto a roof.
The judge ruled that the police had no justification for stopping the defendant at the time of the firearm's disposal. The Commonwealth contends that either no seizure occurred or, if one did, it was justified. The court aligns its decision with *Commonwealth v. Sykes, 449 Mass. 308 (2007)*, concluding that no constitutional stop occurred before the defendant abandoned his bicycle. By the time he began to run, police had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified their actions. The similarities between this case and *Sykes* are significant, leading to the reversal of the suppression order and the affirmation of the legality of the officers' pursuit.
The dissenting opinion's criteria for differentiating the case from Sykes are not materially significant. The officers' response to a 911 call about drug activity parallels their questioning of individuals known for firearm-related crimes in this case. The defendant's 'panicked look' is more indicative of suspicion than the vague backward glances noted in Sykes. While the defendant in Sykes 'clenched his waistband' earlier, this timing difference does not affect the legal assessment of whether the defendants exhibited behavior justifying police inquiry. Both defendants abandoned their bicycles to evade police contact, which is a key factor. Additional suspicious behavior in this case includes the defendant moving away from a group after a hand gesture from a known individual and intentionally abandoning his bicycle. By the time the defendant discarded his bicycle, police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, supported by the precedent that nervous, evasive behavior contributes to this suspicion. The defendant's flight from the police, prior to any inquiry or pursuit, further established reasonable suspicion and did not result from inappropriate police actions. Therefore, the totality of the defendant's actions justified the police's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court reversed the order allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and statements and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court acknowledged discrepancies in the spelling of Officer Tarrantino's name and noted the Commonwealth's failure to provide transcripts for appellate review, complicating the assessment of the judge’s findings. The dissent's suggestion that the defendant was unaware of police presence during his evasive actions was deemed unpersuasive, as the objective nature of his conduct is what determines reasonable suspicion, not his subjective state of mind.
