Chace v. Curran

Citations: 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258; 881 N.E.2d 792Docket: No. 06-P-1452

Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; February 25, 2008; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court

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Defendants, health care providers, appealed a Superior Court decision denying their motions to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint, which alleged intentional falsification of medical records. The core issue was whether these allegations constituted viable fraud actions despite the dismissal of underlying medical malpractice claims as untimely. The court affirmed the decision, finding that the plaintiffs could proceed with their amended complaint. 

Background details include that Sharon Judkins gave birth to Andrew Chace on September 22, 1995, during which complications arose, necessitating an emergency Caesarian section. Andrew required resuscitation due to oxygen deprivation. The plaintiffs initially filed a negligence complaint against Dr. Shannon in 2001, alleging the delivery caused permanent disabilities. In 2004, during discovery, Nurse Galvin revealed inaccuracies in the medical records prepared by defendants Curran and Taylor, leading the plaintiffs to file new claims in June 2004, including negligence and fraud.

The initial motions to dismiss by Curran and Taylor were granted for negligence based on the medical malpractice statutes of repose. However, claims of fraudulent concealment and intentional misrepresentation were dismissed without prejudice, allowing for amendments. Upon filing an amended complaint, the defendants again sought dismissal, reiterating that the claims were barred by the statutes of repose. A subsequent judge denied these motions, determining that the amended claims were separate from the negligent treatment claims and thus not subject to dismissal under the cited statutes. The court highlighted that intentional torts, as alleged, are not precluded by the malpractice statutes. A single justice permitted the defendants to file interlocutory appeals.

The plaintiffs' malpractice claims against Curran and Taylor were dismissed as untimely, but they have since amended their complaint to include claims of “fraudulent concealment” and “intentional misrepresentation-fraud.” These new claims assert that the defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs on September 22, 1995, and made false statements and omissions in Andrew's medical records regarding his resuscitation, specifically omitting a failed breathing tube attempt and a period without oxygen. The plaintiffs argue that these misrepresentations misled them into believing that the resuscitation was conducted properly, thus preventing them from filing a timely malpractice suit.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs are attempting to circumvent the medical malpractice statutes of repose by labeling their claims as intentional torts. The legal framework cited includes Joslyn v. Chang and the Massachusetts General Laws concerning medical malpractice, which apply regardless of how the claims are labeled since they fundamentally address improper medical treatment. However, the court acknowledges that the amended complaint may present viable claims that fall outside the statutes of repose. The fraudulent concealment claim aligns with G. L. c. 260. 12, which allows for tolling of the statute of limitations if fraud is demonstrated. Despite past unsuccessful attempts to toll the statute through this provision, the plaintiffs now seek to maintain these claims as separate causes of action, referencing McNulty v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. to support the existence of actionable fraudulent concealment, although prior allegations were deemed insufficient in establishing fraud.

Plaintiffs’ claims for fraudulent concealment and intentional misrepresentation are fundamentally similar, asserting that defendants knowingly made false statements about the resuscitation effort to induce plaintiffs to act, leading to detrimental reliance by allowing statutes of limitations to expire. The intentional misrepresentation claim also includes a fiduciary duty to disclose the potential cause of action. Non-disclosure can constitute fraud if one party has a duty to disclose material facts, as supported by case law and the Restatement of Torts. Both claims imply a fiduciary relationship requiring defendants to inform plaintiffs about facts relevant to a cause of action regarding alleged substandard care in resuscitating Andrew.

The court concludes the amended complaint presents viable claims distinct from medical malpractice, asserting that the fraudulent conduct resulted in a pecuniary loss unrelated to personal injury or pain suffered by Andrew. Plaintiffs seek damages for the lost opportunity to file a timely action, focusing on compensation for pecuniary loss rather than personal injury. The distinction is critical, as damages for misrepresentation differ from those under the medical malpractice act.

To prevail, plaintiffs must establish all elements of their claims, which do not evaluate the quality of care but rather whether defendants concealed the true nature of their treatment, preventing plaintiffs from seeking legal action. If plaintiffs fail to prove fraudulent concealment, the quality of care is irrelevant. Conversely, if fraud is proven, the quality of care becomes pertinent only for determining the damages associated with the fraud.

The malpractice claim in this case is deemed secondary to the fraud allegations, differentiating it from prior cases where fraud was used to extend the statute of repose for malpractice claims. Here, the malpractice claim is absent, and without proof of fraud, the defendants' care quality is irrelevant. The defendants argue that the amended claims are merely about record-keeping issues within negligent medical treatment, but the court disagrees. Unlike previous cases where record-keeping errors were integral to healthcare delivery, the plaintiffs are alleging intentional concealment of a cause of action based on a fiduciary duty, not record-keeping failures. The amended complaint lacks a causal link between the alleged inaccuracies in medical records and the personal injuries suffered, indicating that breaches of record-keeping standards do not pertain to the defendants' liability.

Additionally, the case is distinguished from Johnston v. Stein, where the plaintiff's claim was rooted in medical malpractice due to misrepresentation leading to unnecessary surgery. In contrast, the plaintiffs here do not allege that any treatment decision was based on misinformation from the defendants. The core issue revolves around misrepresentation and concealment of facts with the intent to hide errors, not medical treatment errors themselves. Consequently, the fraud claims do not necessitate a medical malpractice tribunal's evaluation, which focuses solely on medical aspects of malpractice claims. The court confirms that since this is not a malpractice claim, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide on the case's progression. Statutes of repose are emphasized as definitive, effectively abolishing remedies rather than merely barring actions.

Plaintiffs are permitted to pursue alternative theories of liability despite statutes of repose designed to protect health care providers from lengthy claims. These statutes do not prevent valid claims regarding fraudulent behavior that enabled the use of such protections. The court finds it illogical for the defendant to assert that the plaintiffs' primary claim is medical malpractice, especially since the defendant's alleged fraud undermines that claim. The plaintiffs successfully demonstrated actionable claims, leading to the affirmation of the denial of the defendants' motions to dismiss. Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to secure a separate final judgment or appellate review related to dismissed negligence counts. The court disregards an unpublished memorandum cited by the defendant's counsel, adhering to its policy against considering such documents. Even if the unpublished decision were considered, it would not alter the outcome. The court acknowledges the increased accessibility of rule 1:28 decisions and modifies its prohibition against their citation, allowing them to be cited for persuasive value but not as binding precedent. Litigants must include the full text of any cited rule 1:28 decision as an addendum to their briefs until a proposed rule regarding citation practices is finalized. Additionally, General Laws c. 231. 60D stipulates that claims by minors against health care providers must be initiated within three years, with specific provisions for minors under six years old.

General Laws c. 260, § 4 restricts actions for malpractice against healthcare providers to a period of three years from when the cause of action accrues, with a maximum limit of seven years from the act or omission causing the injury, except in cases involving the retention of a foreign object in the body. Curran contends that the motion judge's legal conclusions lack reasonable support from the record, emphasizing that a motion to dismiss under Mass. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6) must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true unless converted to a summary judgment motion. The court finds the judge’s decision adequately supported under the applicable standard of review.

General Laws c. 260, § 12 allows for the exclusion of time prior to the discovery of the cause of action if the liable party fraudulently conceals it. The court assumes, without deciding, that nurses have a similar duty as other medical providers to disclose information. Key issues include the defendants' duty to disclose their negligence and whether any misrepresentations were made to dissuade the plaintiffs from filing suit within the limitations period. The plaintiffs' responses to these alleged failures are also significant, distinguishing this case from earlier medical malpractice claims.

Additionally, the court contrasts this case with Lambley v. Kameny, where issues of standard care were central to the malpractice claim, and with Fishman, which discussed the "trial within a trial" concept for proving damages in a legal malpractice case. The document notes the distinction from Twombly v. Leach, where expert testimony on standard care was necessary for assessing the appropriateness of a medical provider's disclosures during emergencies. The court refrains from commenting on how evidence regarding these issues should be presented in the fraud trial's damage phase.