Air Plum Island, Inc. v. Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities
Docket: No. 06-P-736
Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; September 26, 2007; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court
The appeal involves a dispute over adverse possession of a 9.1-acre parcel, the runway segment of Plum Island Airport. The plaintiff, Air Plum Island, Inc. (API), operated the airport from 1966 to 2000, while the defendant, Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities (SPNEA), has owned the parcel since 1971. API filed a lawsuit in 2000, claiming ownership through adverse possession, but SPNEA contended that API's use was permissive under a commercial lease. After discovery, both parties sought summary judgment; the Superior Court favored SPNEA and denied API's motion, prompting API's appeal.
Key facts include that the airport operates on a 41-acre tract running from Newbury to Newburyport, adjacent to the Plum Island Turnpike. Originally, sisters Agnes and Amelia Little owned most of the land, leasing some to Warren Frothingham, the airport's founder. In 1966, API, formed by Richard Hordon and associates, acquired the airport's assets, including a 6.5-acre parcel. API executed short-term leases with the Little sisters from 1966 to 1970, during which it extended the runway. A long-term lease was established on December 8, 1970, granting API a 20-year tenancy with renewal options, specifying rental terms and allowing for construction and improvements on the leased premises. The lease defined the premises precisely, including a sketch attached as Appendix A, indicating boundaries and landmarks relevant to the property.
The eastern boundary of the leased premises is marked by "Land of Air Plum Island, Inc." The accompanying sketch lacks specific reference to the runway parcel but includes notes highlighting that scale, bearings, and distances are approximate; the size and location of buildings are also approximate; Point 'A' is identified as a stone bound marking the Newburyport-Newbury line; and the sketch may not accurately reflect the dotted boundary lines. The lease includes land south of points B and C necessary for airport operations, regardless of dotted boundaries. On March 29, 1971, API filed a notice of lease with the Essex South registry, describing the leased premises starting and ending at the turnpike border stone, also noting land southerly for airport purposes. The eastern boundary is specified as extending 1,110 feet to point B.
In 1971, the Little sisters sold a 270-acre tract to SPNEA, retaining a life estate, which ended with the last sister's death in 1986. Hordon acquired interests from API associates in 1972 and 1976, subsequently transferring the Frothingham parcel to trusts controlled by his wife. From 1971 onward, API operated the airport without issues, constructing hangars in 1973 and 1988 without consulting the Little sisters or SPNEA. After a blizzard in 1978 damaged the runway, API secured a loan from the Small Business Administration, using the Frothingham parcel as collateral. Throughout the lease, API paid taxes on the runway and airport parcels.
In 1984 and 1985, SPNEA and Amelia Little sought to reclassify the airport property as recreational land, requiring Hordon’s endorsement as lessee, which he provided. The disputed runway parcel lies within this reclassified land. A survey from 1993 to 1998 confirmed the ownership of airport land: the 6.5-acre Frothingham parcel is owned by Hordon’s wife's trust, the 9.1-acre runway parcel belongs to SPNEA, and the 24.7-acre western airport parcel is also owned by SPNEA. A subsequent survey in 1999 reaffirmed these findings.
The relationship between API and SPNEA deteriorated from 1998 to 1999, primarily due to disruptions caused by crafts fairs held by API at the airport, which alienated local residents and officials. Following tensions, SPNEA's trustees voted on September 15, 1999, not to renew API’s lease, set to expire on December 31, 2000. Reconciliation attempts failed, leading SPNEA to seek new lessees for the airport property in October 2000. In response, API filed a lawsuit claiming ownership of the runway parcel through adverse possession, asserting that its long-term use of the area met the legal requirements for such a claim. SPNEA contended that the lease permitted API's use of the runway, thus negating any adverse possession claim.
The legal framework for review involved examining the motion judge's decision on summary judgment de novo, focusing on the lease terms. The court recognized that the interpretation of a clear written lease is a legal question suitable for summary judgment, where ambiguity does not automatically preclude this outcome. API bore the burden of proving its claim of adverse possession by demonstrating actual, open, exclusive, and nonpermissive use for twenty years. The court noted that terms like 'nonpermissive' and 'hostile' are crucial in evaluating whether the true owner was notified of any adverse use.
The analysis of the 1970 lease was central to the case, with the motion judge concluding that API's occupancy was permissive under the terms of the lease, a finding with which the court agreed. Consequently, API's use did not satisfy the requirements for adverse possession, as occupancy compliant with a lease negates such a claim.
API's argument for adverse possession hinges on a sketch from the lease that labels the area east of the airport as 'Land of Air Plum Island, Inc.' and interprets a note extending the lease to land 'lying southerly' of specific points as referring solely to a grass runway directly south of the airport parcel. API contends its use of the 9.1 acres was openly nonpermissive from 1971 to 2000. The sketch, created by API, introduces ambiguity, as written documents are generally interpreted against their drafter. The ambiguity arises because API failed to clearly distinguish its 6.5-acre Frothingham parcel from the adjoining runway, despite having specific deed descriptions. Notes accompanying the sketch highlight the imprecision of distances, with Note 4 extending to areas necessary for runway use, indicating that the entire runway parcel lies southeast of the specified points B and C.
Further clarification is derived from the conditions at the lease's execution, where the runway parcel encompassed 1,250 feet and the Frothingham parcel accounted for the remaining 500 feet of the paved runway, supporting the interpretation that 'necessary and convenient for runways' includes the entire runway area. Additionally, API's initial correspondence regarding the lease indicates an awareness of land ownership and the urgency to secure a lease for airport operations, reinforcing the context of the lease formation and its implications.
Negotiations for the original short-term lease of 1966 initiated discussions surrounding the airport's operational continuity, particularly regarding the inclusion of the runway parcel in the lease. The correspondence indicates that API deemed the existing lease essential for the airport's operations, and it was impractical for any lease to exclude the runway parcel. The analysis of the parties' conduct reveals that API's actions were cooperative and compliant with the lease terms, undermining claims of adverse possession. API consistently paid real estate taxes for the entire airport, responded to tax adjustment requests, and made authorized alterations to airport structures. After a significant blizzard, API repaved the runway as permitted by the lease. Notably, API reaffirmed its tenant status in communications related to tax reclassification, which obscured any distinction between the airport and runway parcels from SPNEA. The accumulation of these factors suggests that API’s use was permissive rather than hostile, leading to the conclusion that the motion judge's interpretations were correct. The judge found no genuine issue of material fact, resulting in the affirmation of summary judgment in favor of the record owner. SPNEA, a nonprofit focused on historical preservation, had not located the original lease documents by the time of litigation in 2000. The judge emphasized that the nature of occupancy and the relationship between the parties are critical in determining adverse possession claims, which were not substantiated in this case.
