Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; April 14, 2004; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court
The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint in the Superior Court, which alleges tortious conduct by the defendant during their romantic relationship. She claims that approximately eight months after their involvement began, the defendant revealed he had undergone a vasectomy, causing her emotional distress and claiming she had been misled into the relationship, particularly regarding her desire to become a biological mother. The complaint includes allegations of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and assault and battery.
The relationship began in June 1996, with both parties in their early forties and previously divorced. The plaintiff expressed a desire to have a family, to which the defendant responded reassuringly, suggesting a fortune teller's prediction of his future children. After becoming intimate in September 1996, the plaintiff was devastated when the defendant disclosed his vasectomy in February 1997, leading to claims of major depressive disorder, medical expenses, and negative impacts on her business.
Regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court outlines the necessary elements for recovery: negligence, emotional distress, causation, physical harm with objective symptoms, and that a reasonable person would experience distress under the circumstances. The court emphasizes the requirement of a duty of care, which the plaintiff failed to establish in the context of a dating relationship, leading to the conclusion that her claim does not warrant relief.
In terms of fraud, the plaintiff's assertion centers on the defendant's alleged misrepresentation of his ability and willingness to father children as a means to induce her to remain in the relationship. The court notes that evaluating this claim would necessitate understanding the emotional dynamics and expectations within the romantic relationship, highlighting the complexities involved in determining liability based on such personal matters.
No established jurisprudential standards apply to the circumstances presented. The court's ruling in *Stephen K. v. Roni L.*, 105 Cal. App. 3d 640 (1980) serves as a persuasive reference. In that case, the court dismissed a tort claim where the plaintiff sought damages based on reliance on the defendant's assurances regarding birth control, which resulted in an unintended pregnancy. The court noted that the claim, framed as misrepresentation, merely sought judicial oversight over private agreements between consenting adults regarding their sexual conduct. The court emphasized that such claims arise from intensely private matters that should not be adjudicated by courts. Consequently, even if the defendant acted deceitfully, the court refused to establish a standard of conduct applicable to the relationship's intimate nature, concluding that the plaintiff could not state a claim for relief.
Regarding the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff contends that the defendant's concealment of his vasectomy would have prevented her from continuing the relationship, as she was nearing the end of her childbearing years. To succeed, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) intent or knowledge that emotional distress was likely; 2) extreme and outrageous conduct; 3) causation of the distress; and 4) severe emotional distress beyond what a reasonable person could endure. The plaintiff's affidavit asserts that the defendant misled her about his ability and desire to have more children, which she only learned was false in February 1997. Additionally, the defendant's inquiries about her pregnancy and comments about his first wife indicated he shared her goals for the relationship. There was no discussion of birth control methods, and while the plaintiff used birth control pills, she did not inform the defendant.
The plaintiff believed that she and the defendant shared mutual goals in their relationship; however, the defendant's actions did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the plaintiff reacted strongly to learning about the defendant's vasectomy, his inquiry about her feelings and their continued intimate relationship until the plaintiff ended it upon discovering his interest in another woman indicated a lack of reckless or malevolent behavior. The court emphasized that many personal grievances, while emotionally impactful, do not warrant legal remedies. The plaintiff's claim that the defendant’s failure to disclose his vasectomy constituted fraud negating her consent to sexual relations was also rejected; the court found no intent on the defendant’s part to induce sexual intercourse by mentioning a fortune teller's prediction about children. Furthermore, the plaintiff's feelings of having wasted time due to her biological clock did not constitute a battery. Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not demonstrate the required extreme and outrageous conduct, affirming the summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff had initially filed her claims in June 1999, which included negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but the court dismissed the first two counts and allowed the possibility of a summary judgment on the latter.
An amended complaint including assault and battery claims was filed on November 22, 1999. In October 2001, a Superior Court judge granted summary judgment for the defendant regarding claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery, based on the defendant’s motion under Mass. R.Civ. P. 56. The plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim refers to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation is only justifiable if the misrepresented matter is material. Materiality is defined as when the maker knows or has reason to know that the recipient considers the matter important, even if a reasonable person would not. Liability for deceit arises when a fraudulent misrepresentation causes pecuniary loss due to justifiable reliance. The excerpt references a feminist perspective on misrepresentation, noting that courts have not limited fraud claims to economic damages concerning emotional injuries. The plaintiff's allegations, including claims of stalking and damaging property, were found insufficiently intolerable to constitute actionable conduct. Amatory torts have been abolished, and public policy no longer supports monetary damages for emotional distress resulting from broken promises. The claims labeled as 'assault and battery' were clarified as constituting battery, with a distinction made that assault involves a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful contact. The plaintiff’s reliance on the case of Barbara A. v. John G. was deemed misplaced, as it involved a valid claim for battery due to false representations affecting consent, unlike the current case which does not align with public policy considerations.
