Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Cargill v. Harvard University
Citations: 60 Mass. App. Ct. 585; 15 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 539; 804 N.E.2d 377; 2004 Mass. App. LEXIS 251Docket: No. 01-P-917
Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; March 8, 2004; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court
The appeal centers on determining the 'essential functions' of a job under G. L. c. 151B. 4(16, which prohibits discrimination against qualified handicapped individuals. To prove a violation, the plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) they are handicapped as defined by the statute, (2) they are a 'qualified handicapped person' capable of performing essential job functions, either without accommodation or with a reasonable accommodation that does not impose undue hardship on the employer, and (3) the handicap caused the alleged discriminatory action. In this case, the plaintiff, Jean Boise Cargill, is recognized as handicapped due to rheumatoid arthritis and possesses the necessary qualifications for her role as lead reference librarian at Harvard's Herbaria collection. The primary dispute relates to whether two physically demanding tasks—paging/retrieval and shelving—are essential functions of her position and whether reasonable accommodations for these tasks were considered by Harvard. The determination of essential functions requires a detailed factual analysis, adhering to established legal standards and evidentiary criteria. The Superior Court's grant of summary judgment was found to be erroneous due to significant and genuine disputes regarding whether paging/retrieval and shelving are essential functions of the reference librarian role and whether reasonable accommodations could be made without imposing undue hardship on Harvard. The lower court failed to apply the correct legal standards and evidentiary criteria in its decision-making process. A detailed factual background was provided, emphasizing the responsibilities of the reference librarian, particularly in assisting scholars with their research needs. Cargill, the lead reference librarian, along with a small team, had duties that did not explicitly include paging/retrieval and shelving. The library's layout necessitated substantial physical activity, which Cargill, due to rheumatoid arthritis, was unable to perform regularly. Paging and retrieval processes varied based on patrons' stack privileges, with most requests not requiring immediate action, often allowing for flexibility in response times. Shelving involved daily activities of returning materials to their respective places in the library. The inquiry into whether these tasks are essential to the librarian's job requires careful consideration of the physical demands and the specific context of Cargill’s job performance. Cargill worked for the Herbaria at Harvard for eleven years, eventually becoming the lead reference librarian. Throughout her tenure, her rheumatoid arthritis did not significantly hinder her work. However, by early 1996, the condition had worsened, causing severe pain and exhaustion, particularly when she had to carry and shelve heavy materials. Cargill raised concerns with various Harvard officials about the physical demands of her job, seeking accommodations to lessen the burden of lifting and climbing stairs. During a series of meetings from January to October 1996, Cargill highlighted her difficulties, particularly at a January staff meeting where the head librarian, Judith Wamement, noted that shelving was not being completed quickly enough. Cargill requested that more shelving tasks be assigned to student and part-time workers, but this suggestion was not accepted. In a February 1996 meeting with Wamement, Cargill discussed her performance goals and mentioned her intention to meet with Harvard's disability coordinator. At a subsequent performance review later that month, Wamement reiterated the necessity of clearing the shelving cart by day's end, insisting Cargill stay late if needed. Cargill proposed shelving in the morning instead, but Wamement dismissed this idea, adding a handwritten note about timely shelving to Cargill's performance plan, indicating that this task was now emphasized despite it not being included in the original evaluation form. On February 16, 1996, Cargill met with Marie Trottier, Harvard's disability coordinator, leading to Dr. Mark Robbins, her physician, submitting a letter on March 5, 1996, diagnosing her with rheumatoid arthritis and requesting workplace accommodations to limit lifting to ten pounds and prolonged standing. Despite these requests, including discussions with a human resources official, by April 1996, no accommodations had been proposed by Harvard, which maintained that Cargill was required to perform certain tasks. Instead, Harvard suggested she consider short-term disability leave, which Cargill accepted, beginning to receive benefits on April 24, 1996, until October 24, 1996. During her leave, Cargill continued to seek accommodations, expressing her frustration in a July 15, 1996 letter to Harvard. Harvard responded on August 8, 1996, treating her letter as a new request for accommodation despite the previous communications and Dr. Robbins's letter. Subsequently, on September 6, 1996, Harvard requested further medical information from Dr. Robbins regarding Cargill's condition and accommodation needs, despite having received prior information. On September 17, 1996, the doctor reaffirmed the diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis and clarified his limitations in providing specific accommodation recommendations for Cargill, stating that he typically does not observe patients in their work environments. He noted that Cargill experiences intermittent disease flare-ups affecting her ability to lift, carry, walk, or stand, with her capabilities varying daily based on joint condition. While acknowledging that Cargill could not perform physically demanding tasks consistently, he indicated she could walk short distances, climb stairs, and perform some limited lifting. The doctor concluded that Cargill could engage in predominantly sedentary work involving limited walking and standing. In contrast, Harvard interpreted Cargill's requests for desk-based work and her acceptance of long-term disability benefits as evidence that she could no longer fulfill the essential functions of her role. A reasonable observer might infer from both the physician's and Cargill's letters that she could perform academic tasks from a desk. However, Harvard did not respond to the doctor's letter, and the communication between Cargill and Harvard effectively ended. Subsequently, a letter from Harvard on October 24, 1996, stated that Cargill's application for long-term disability benefits did not reveal any reasonable accommodation to allow her to perform her job functions, leading to the termination of her position as Reference/Archives Librarian. The term "essential functions" is not explicitly defined in General Laws c. 151B, but its interpretation is informed by Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) guidelines and federal case law. The Supreme Judicial Court recognizes the MCAD guidelines as significant, despite lacking legal force, and interprets essential functions as those necessary for achieving a job's principal objectives. Similarly, federal courts define an essential function as a fundamental job duty, excluding marginal functions. Guidelines indicate that the employer's judgment regarding essential functions should be evaluated alongside relevant guidelines and the overall context of the job. The federal regulation outlines reasons for a function being essential, including its necessity for the position's existence, limited employee availability for that function, or specialization requiring specific expertise. Criteria for evaluating whether a function is essential include the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, time spent on the function, consequences of not requiring the function, terms of collective bargaining agreements, and the work experience of current and past job incumbents. Regulatory guidelines necessitate that a fact finder conduct an individualized inquiry to determine the essential functions of a job. This inquiry must consider the specific job characteristics and the functions performed, particularly for roles involving multiple tasks, such as the reference librarian position at the Herbaria. The determination of essential functions should go beyond job descriptions to reflect the actual operations of the enterprise. In reviewing a summary judgment involving the lead reference librarian position, the appellate court must assess whether all material facts, particularly regarding the essential functions of paging/retrieval and shelving, have been established favorably to the nonmoving party, Cargill. The individualized inquiry is crucial to protect individuals with disabilities from discrimination while balancing employers' legitimate concerns. However, the summary judgment for Harvard overlooked this necessary inquiry, as conflicting evidence suggests that paging/retrieval and shelving may not be essential to the librarian's primary objectives. The record includes contradictory employment documents, deposition testimonies, and expert evidence indicating that these tasks are not fundamental to the role within a university library system. The job description emphasized academic research and reference activities, further complicating the determination of essential functions. The job description for the reference librarian requires an advanced degree in library science with coursework in botany, experience managing archives and rare books, proficiency in online database searching, and at least two years of academic service. Cargill meets these qualifications with a doctorate in biology and a master's in library science, along with substantial library experience. The essential functions of the position appear to focus on academic research and oversight of specialized library collections rather than physical tasks like paging, retrieval, and shelving, which are not explicitly mentioned in the job description. This contrasts with lower staff roles, where these tasks are clearly defined. After Cargill's departure, the job description was updated to include lifting requirements. Notably, the performance review form used for Cargill did not include paging and shelving as key responsibilities, and these tasks were only added in writing during a review after her disability became an issue. Consequently, a reasonable fact finder could determine that the primary functions of the position were academic in nature, making the physical tasks marginal. However, Harvard argues that its assessment should be given significant weight and cites a 1993 salary survey where Cargill indicated engagement in lifting and carrying objects. The questionnaire aimed to establish a unified salary structure for university staff by July 1994 and contained fifty-three pages of questions relevant to various university entities. While the relevance of question no. 44 regarding physical activities is debated in court, Cargill argues that her response does not definitively classify paging, retrieval, and shelving as essential functions. Cargill asserts that her checked responses regarding carrying and lifting do not exclusively pertain to library tasks and that these tasks occupy significantly less than the twenty-five percent of her time suggested by Harvard. Further, Cargill challenges Harvard's interpretation of the job description for a reference librarian, arguing that the terms used are not synonymous with 'accessing.' The record shows substantial conflicting evidence, including expert testimony from Dr. Gerald Miller, who stated that paging and shelving are not essential functions of a reference librarian and that such tasks are typically assigned to nonprofessional staff. This expert opinion remains uncontested. Due to these unresolved factual disputes, Harvard's motion for summary judgment cannot be granted, as the determination of essential functions is ultimately the responsibility of the fact finder. Reasonable accommodation is a critical element in assessing employer obligations under disability discrimination laws. The statute mandates that employers must make reasonable accommodations for qualified handicapped individuals unless they can demonstrate that such accommodations would impose an undue hardship. A court must evaluate if the employer's judgment regarding accommodations is well-informed and considers all risks and alternatives. In this case, the court found that no such evaluation took place prior to summary judgment. The burden of proving an inability to accommodate lies with the employer, but this is only invoked after the plaintiff shows a reasonable accommodation is possible. Cargill provided sufficient evidence suggesting potential accommodations, such as the use of student workers and shelving carts, indicating that summary judgment was not appropriate. The Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (MERA) claim was also addressed, with the court affirming that MERA does not create an independent right for discrimination claims that fall under G.L. c. 151B, which offers the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. Cargill's claims against Harvard included two counts under G.L. c. 151B—failure to provide reasonable accommodation and discriminatory termination—and a third count under MERA. The judgment regarding the G.L. c. 151B claims was vacated, while the dismissal of the MERA claim was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. Rheumatoid arthritis leads to painful joint inflammation, restricting movement and is characterized by progressive and irreversible symptoms, though remissions may occur. Cargill, diagnosed with the disease in 1969, began working at Herbaria in 1985, progressing through various library positions until becoming the lead reference librarian in 1991. The Superior Court judge issued three decisions regarding Harvard's summary judgment motion. Initially, Harvard received summary judgment on two handicap discrimination claims under G. L. c. 151B, while the MERA claim was denied. In a subsequent decision, the judge reversed the summary judgment on the c. 151B claims, allowing for a trial on all counts. However, in the third decision, all prior rulings were vacated, and Harvard was granted summary judgment on all counts based on the judge not having received Harvard's opposition to Cargill's motion for reconsideration. The Herbaria's libraries are accessible by elevator, except for the Farlow Reference Library, which has multiple levels connected by stairs. Wamement assumed that once Cargill scheduled a meeting with Harvard's disability coordinator, accommodations would be managed by that coordinator. Despite a diagnosis from Dr. Robbins indicating a need for accommodation, Harvard requested further details on the proposed accommodations, leading to uncertainty regarding the communication with Dr. Robbins. Cargill's short-term disability benefits ended after six months, but she was granted long-term disability benefits after adjustments for her supplemental security income (SSI) payments. Massachusetts courts interpret G. L. c. 151B by considering federal case law related to unlawful discrimination statutes unless there is a reason to deviate from those interpretations. The term "essential functions" is defined by 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(1) as the fundamental job duties of a position, excluding marginal functions. A job description for a reference librarian position requires an M.L.S. degree, experience in libraries, and skills related to botany and archives management, emphasizing academic support for library users. The role involves assisting users, managing archives, overseeing reading room activities, and representing the library on university committees. A previous job description for a lower position noted that providing reference assistance was a primary objective, suggesting that similar functions would also be central to the higher reference librarian role. Harvard argues that its assessment of essential job functions should be given deference. However, the Supreme Judicial Court in Labonte v. Hutchins, Wheeler ruled that the determination of essential functions is not solely the employer's judgment. While the employer's perspective is important, it is one of several factors considered, particularly in the presence of potential discriminatory motives. Additionally, a section of a salary survey titled "Position Environment/Physical Demands" aimed to evaluate the physical requirements of the role, listing various movements and categorizing them by frequency. Cargill, the employee in question, indicated that carrying and lifting tasks were required "occasionally." Harvard highlighted that the survey specifically asked about the physical effort necessary to perform the essential functions of the position. The referenced material challenges the assertion that "paging/retrieval and shelving" are essential functions under G. L. c. 151B, emphasizing that the mere inclusion of these terms in a job description does not establish them as undisputed material facts. It critiques the judge's characterization of Cargill's lack of objection to the job description revisions as a 'concession' since these changes occurred after she disclosed her disability and requested accommodations. A document related to Cargill's previous role as assistant reference librarian suggested that accessing materials would take about one hour, but translating "accessing" to "paging/retrieval and shelving" does not inherently confirm their essential status. Essential functions must be determined beyond just job descriptions, as outlined by MCAD guidelines, which state that reasonable accommodation should address work-related barriers related to an individual's handicap. The guidelines propose various accommodations which could be relevant to Cargill, such as modifying work schedules or re-assigning non-essential functions. The employer is also encouraged to work with the employee to identify appropriate accommodations if the employee is unable to suggest one. Although documentation confirming the disability and need for accommodation was provided, it appears that the accommodation process stalled thereafter. The employer's responsibility to identify reasonable accommodations has been reaffirmed in the case of Calero-Cerezo v. United States.