Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; October 24, 2003; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court
Gilíes Dube, the plaintiff, sustained permanent impairment in his right arm from a motorcycle accident in 1985. He worked for Middlesex Corporation from 1989 to 1995 and alleges employment discrimination under G. L. c. 151B, § 4(16) after not being rehired in spring 1996 following a seasonal layoff. Middlesex contended that Dube quit before the season ended, justifying the non-rehire. A Superior Court judge granted summary judgment to Middlesex, concluding Dube could not prove he was laid off for non-legitimate reasons. The judgment was affirmed, but on the basis that Dube did not qualify as a “handicapped person” under G. L. c. 151B, § 1(17).
Dube's injury involved a severe motorcycle accident resulting in multiple fractures and nerve damage in his right arm, leading to limited motion and reduced strength. Despite these challenges, he resumed work in construction, including various roles that required physical exertion. Dube transitioned through several jobs, including a role at Erickson Construction, where he found that using his arm improved its strength. He left a sales position due to insufficient physical activity for his arm and continued working in construction after his tenure at Middlesex.
During his depositions, he acknowledged no significant difficulties with basic functions such as walking or seeing, although he could not fully raise his arm or throw a baseball. He could operate a truck under certain conditions and had passed relevant driving tests. His claim of being handicapped is based on the limitations of his right arm, specifically affecting his ability to operate a two-stick truck; however, he indicated that he could drive a single-stick truck with accommodations.
In August 1994, during a performance review, Middlesex proposed adding an armrest to Dube's truck for comfort, which was subsequently installed but removed by Dube due to discomfort. He claimed to have requested its reinstallation multiple times, but it was not replaced until 1995. Dube also sought assignments limited to single-stick trucks and manual labor in construction but was not assigned exclusively to either.
Under G. L. c. 151B, a “handicap” is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities, and a “qualified handicapped person” is one capable of fulfilling job functions with reasonable accommodation. The evidence does not support a reasonable inference that Dube's major life activities are substantially limited, as he admitted to performing strenuous physical labor despite limitations in his right arm.
Federal case law requires that to demonstrate a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must show an inability to work in a broad class of jobs. Dube’s situation is compared to cases where individuals with injuries were not considered disabled because they could still perform other job functions. Dube has not shown a substantial limitation in his ability to work for Middlesex or in subsequent employment, and his claims do not indicate significant restrictions in a range of jobs, leading to a conclusion that his inability to perform one aspect of a job does not constitute a substantial limitation.
Dube lacks a "record of such impairment" as defined in § 1(17)(h), which aims to prevent discrimination based on a history of disability requiring substantial limitation of a major life activity. His existing impairments do not exceed the limitations already recognized, which are insufficient to classify him as disabled. Dube provided no evidence that his damaged arm significantly limits any major life activities. His assertion that he was “regarded as having such impairment” is unsupported by the summary judgment record. Although he requested accommodations from Middlesex for his arm injury, the provided accommodations did not indicate that Middlesex viewed him as disabled based on any misconceptions about his limitations. Instead, Middlesex acknowledged his injury and attempted to accommodate him, countering any claims of discrimination based on stereotypes about disabilities.
Regarding Dube's retaliation claim, he asserts that his termination was retaliatory in response to his accommodation requests. However, he became aware of his termination in spring 1996, which is when he could have filed a retaliation claim. His complaint references retaliation only in a general manner, stating that he believes he was discriminated against due to his handicap in violation of G. L. c. 151B. This claim was not sufficiently developed in the Superior Court, as pointed out by the defendants in their motions, and Dube's mere assertion that the judge overlooked this claim does not constitute a valid argument in support of it.
The Superior Court judge's failure to address the retaliation claim is attributed to the plaintiff's omission of the issue in prior court proceedings, resulting in a waiver of any related claims of error. There is no substantiated evidence supporting a retaliation claim. The plaintiff, Dube, sought accommodations from 1992 to 1995 and faced supervisor discontent in 1994 when he escalated his request for reassignment. Despite this, he was rehired for the 1995 season, during which he successfully transferred back to construction with the help of a newly promoted supervisor. These circumstances do not indicate ongoing animosity linked to the 1994 events. Furthermore, no adverse employment actions occurred close in time to Dube's 1994 complaint; the failure to rehire him occurred in spring 1996, nine months after his last accommodation request. The evidence is insufficient to suggest retaliation based on prior complaints. Dube's other claims are not addressed, as they hinge on demonstrating his status as handicapped under the statute, which he cannot establish. The judgment is affirmed, emphasizing that accommodating an employee should not imply a stipulation of disability for the employer, as it could dissuade the hiring of individuals with minor limitations and lead to excessive litigation. Additionally, mere temporal proximity between events does not suffice to demonstrate causation for a retaliation claim, especially when events are separated by a significant duration.
