Roger Matthew Walters v. Manfred Maass, Superintendent
Docket: 92-35226
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 8, 1993; Federal Appellate Court
Roger Matthew Walters, the petitioner-appellant, was convicted in 1987 for attempted kidnapping, attempted rape, and attempted sodomy after attempting to lure a 13-year-old girl into his vehicle. This followed a previous conviction in 1981 for similar crimes against another 13-year-old girl. After the Oregon Supreme Court upheld his convictions, Walters sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which was denied, prompting his appeal.
Walters contended that the admission of evidence regarding his 1981 crimes violated his right to a fair trial. The court referenced Oregon Evidence Rule 404(3), which permits the admission of prior crimes for proving intent and other relevant factors. The court found that the evidence was admissible as the 1981 and 1987 offenses were nearly identical, and the trial court appropriately instructed the jury regarding its limited purpose. The court determined that the admission of this evidence did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.
Additionally, Walters argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on all charges. Under Oregon law, a conviction for attempt requires proof of a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. The court reiterated that a substantial step must advance the criminal purpose and be corroborated by the defendant's actions, allowing a reasonable observer to conclude that the act was intended to commit the crime. The court affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting Walters' claims of unfair trial and insufficient evidence.
Under Oregon law, enticement can be considered a 'substantial step' toward a criminal attempt, as established in Walters, 311 Or. at 85-86. Evidence indicated that Walters sought to lure a girl into his truck by inventing a story about a lost dog, offering her money, and proposing a ride after she declined the monetary offer. These actions, alongside Walters' previous conviction, strongly suggested his intent to advance his criminal purpose. Therefore, when viewed favorably for the prosecution, a reasonable jury could find the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, in line with Jackson v. Virginia.
Walters contended that the enhanced dangerous offender sentence violated his equal protection rights and the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. Oregon's dangerous offender statute necessitates a jury determination of whether a defendant's conduct 'seriously endangered the life or safety of another.' This requirement was met in Walters' trial, and his claims of equal protection violations were unsubstantiated. He was not subjected to retroactive application of a new law, nor was his punishment greater than what was available at the time of his offenses. Any alleged errors were deemed state law issues and not federal constitutional violations appropriate for habeas corpus claims.
The district court's decision to deny Walters' petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed, with a concurrence expressing concern that Oregon's legal interpretations might verge on penalizing mere thoughts. Nonetheless, it acknowledged that the evidence of Walters' actions still aligned with the necessary actus reus requirement for criminal attempts under state law.
Sufficient evidence supports a finding of enticement under Oregon law, leading to the affirmation of Walters's convictions. Federal habeas courts do not reassess state law determinations but focus on constitutional violations. Circuit Judge Poole dissents, arguing that the evidence does not support Walters's convictions for attempted first-degree rape and sodomy. Walters was convicted of attempted first-degree kidnapping, rape, and sodomy after a jury trial and received consecutive sentences as a dangerous offender due to prior convictions. He contends the evidence is insufficient for all counts. Under Oregon law, an attempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant took a substantial step toward committing the crime, which must both advance the criminal purpose and strongly corroborate it. Mere preparation does not suffice for a substantial step. The distinction between preparation and a substantial step lies in the degree of action taken, where the conduct must be necessary to the crime's consummation and demonstrably aligned with the intent to commit the charged crime. Walters claims the evidence fails to establish his intent or that he took a substantial step toward the crimes of kidnapping, rape, and sodomy.
Walters' intent is evidenced by three main actions: (1) his previous use of a ruse involving a fictitious German shepherd in 1981 to abduct, rape, and sodomize a thirteen-year-old girl, (2) his ongoing attempts to lure the current victim into his truck with the same ruse, and (3) his act of following the victim home. These actions support the conclusion that he took a substantial step toward first-degree kidnapping, and thus, his conviction for attempted first-degree kidnapping is affirmed.
However, the more complex issue arises regarding whether his attempt to entice the victim into his truck constitutes a substantial step toward committing rape and sodomy, given that the only evidence of his intent to commit these crimes stems from his past offenses in 1981. If Walters had committed unrelated crimes in 1981, it would weaken the connection between his current enticement and the charged crimes. The enticement does not sufficiently corroborate a clear intent to commit rape or sodomy, as it does not naturally lead to those crimes.
In this case, the only action taken by Walters was the attempt to lure the victim, which may suggest an intent for some form of sexual assault but does not strongly indicate a specific intent for rape or sodomy. Therefore, his actions do not constitute a substantial step toward these crimes, leading to the recommendation to reverse his convictions for attempted rape and sodomy due to insufficient evidence. The document notes that Oregon's criminal attempt statute allows for the same conduct to support multiple charges, but in this instance, the evidence does not establish a substantial step toward the sexual offenses.
