Moose v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations: 43 Mass. App. Ct. 420; 683 N.E.2d 706; 1997 Mass. App. LEXIS 189Docket: No. 96-P-596

Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; August 26, 1997; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court

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Garret Moose initiated a negligence lawsuit against the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and coaches Paul Slovinski and Halston Taylor, claiming damages for injuries he incurred while pole vaulting. Moose alleged negligence in both coaching methods and the equipment provided during practice. A jury found all parties negligent: Moose at 15%, MIT at 45%, Taylor at 25%, and Slovinski at 15%, attributing the defendants’ negligence as the proximate cause of his injuries. The jury awarded damages totaling $615,000, which were reduced to $522,750 after accounting for Moose's negligence. MIT’s liability was limited to $20,000 due to its status as a charitable organization. The defendants subsequently sought judgment notwithstanding the verdicts or a new trial, but their motion was denied. They appealed, arguing errors in excluding evidence and in the damage award's apportionment and interest calculation. The appellate court's role is to assess whether any reasonable inference could support the jury's findings, without weighing evidence or credibility. The facts established that pole vaulting requires a vaulter to run with a pole, plant it in a vaulting box, and use the momentum to clear a bar, landing on a cushioned pit. Slovinski was the pole vaulting coach, while Taylor oversaw the track program, ensuring equipment safety and the welfare of the athletes.

In January 1991, the plaintiff, a senior at MIT majoring in aeronautical engineering and a member of the men’s track and field team, was practicing pole vaulting under the supervision of coach Slovinski at MIT's indoor facility. On January 21, 1991, he sustained injuries after executing a vault, landing improperly when his heels caught the edge of the landing pit, causing him to fall and strike his head on the concrete track surface. The landing pit, which was purchased in 1980 and measured thirteen feet long, was insufficient as it was only minimally compliant with NCAA requirements. There were no safety pads at the back or sides of the pit on the day of the accident, despite the availability of supplemental padding and past practices of using pads. Both Slovinski and Taylor, another coach, were aware of the risks associated with the inadequate pit setup and had observed previous accidents involving vaulters.

On that day, Slovinski instructed the plaintiff to use a lighter training pole, which was deemed inappropriate for his weight, increasing the risk of a “blow through” injury. The plaintiff was directed to combine techniques and perform full vaults with a running approach of fifty feet at half his normal speed. After observing the plaintiff's landing patterns, which indicated he was landing improperly, Slovinski failed to make necessary adjustments to the training pole or the plaintiff's approach run. Proper coaching protocols dictate that a coach should monitor a vaulter's entire run and intervene if the vaulter is running too fast, a practice that had been followed by other coaches in the past. However, Slovinski did not intervene during the plaintiff's final approach until after he had already completed a significant portion of the run.

Slovinski observed the plaintiff running at a speed he deemed excessive for a pole vault and anticipated a poor landing but did not instruct him to slow down or abort. After vaulting approximately thirteen feet, the plaintiff landed awkwardly, striking his head on the hard track surface and losing consciousness. Following the incident, he was diagnosed with a skull fracture and brain contusions at Massachusetts General Hospital. Slovinski later expressed remorse for not reminding the plaintiff to control his speed, stating it was a mistake he felt responsible for. 

On appeal, the defendants argued they were entitled to judgments notwithstanding the verdicts, claiming there was no evidence suggesting they should have foreseen the plaintiff's dangerous landing. However, the law stipulates that only the risk leading to harm must be foreseeable—not the exact circumstances of the accident or the severity of the injuries. The court referenced Luz v. Stop & Shop, Inc. and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, emphasizing that liability could exist even if the exact manner of injury wasn't foreseen, as long as the actor's conduct significantly contributed to the harm. 

The court concluded that the risk of injury was foreseeable given the inadequate safety of the landing pit's location and the plaintiff's inappropriate use of equipment. Consequently, the denial of the defendants' motion for judgment was upheld. Additionally, the defendants sought a new trial, arguing that the jury's verdict was against the evidence's clear weight and that the judge’s comments during a sidebar constituted an abuse of discretion. The court noted that a judge's decision to grant or deny a new trial is discretionary and will only be overturned if an abuse of discretion is evident, asserting that the judge must not disregard the jury's reasonable judgment.

A judge should grant a new trial only if the verdict is overwhelmingly against the evidence, suggesting bias or misapprehension. In this case, the defendant's motion for a new trial was based solely on evidence favorable to them, disregarding contrary evidence. The jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, indicating no bias or prejudice influenced the decision. The defendants argued that the judge's comments during a sidebar indicated he believed the plaintiff would receive no damages, suggesting an abuse of discretion in denying the new trial motion. However, there was no evidence the judge maintained this view by the trial's end. Additionally, the defendants claimed the damages awarded were excessive and based on speculative lost earning capacity, as well as the improper exclusion of evidence regarding the plaintiff's expulsion from MIT. The appellate court will not overturn a judge's decision on excessive damages unless the award is grossly disproportionate to the injury, and a new trial is justified only if a miscarriage of justice is evident. The plaintiff suffered significant injuries, including a fractured skull and brain contusions, requiring extensive hospitalization and rehabilitation.

The treating physician testified that the plaintiff, hospitalized after an accident, experienced multiple cognitive and sensory impairments, including hypersensitivity to sound, light sensitivity, and difficulties with logic, word finding, and information organization. He was discharged on February 8, 1991, and returned to MIT, where he continued to pole vault but struggled with complex physical activities due to motor coordination issues. Post-discharge, the plaintiff faced ongoing challenges such as hypersensitivity to sound, loss of smell and taste, reduced scanning ability with his right eye, exhaustion during classes, and difficulty absorbing material. Visual problems like double vision and blurry vision, particularly while reading, were also reported. During a May 14, 1991, examination, his doctor noted persistent issues with concentration, word finding, and changes in personality, including increased irritability and rage attacks, all consistent with his head injury. The plaintiff suffered a lost earning capacity of $25,000 per year, leading to a projected lifetime lost earning capacity of $1,309,835, discounted to present value. The judge found no abuse of discretion in the jury's $615,000 damage award, determining it was not disproportionate to the proven injury.

The plaintiff was expelled from MIT on May 6, 1991, for theft of approximately $40,000 in computer equipment prior to his accident. The judge excluded evidence of the thefts but allowed the defense to present that the expulsion was for disciplinary reasons unrelated to the accident, which could affect the plaintiff's employment prospects. The defense argued that the plaintiff's inability to complete his degree and secure employment as an aeronautical engineer was due to the expulsion. As the defense could present their argument without prejudice from the judge's ruling, the exclusion of theft-related evidence was deemed appropriate.

Lastly, the defendants contended that the judge erred by not amending the judgment to apportion the damage award and subtract prejudgment interest related to lost earning capacity, arguing that such interest compensates for the loss of use of money.

In Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., the court addresses the issue of prejudgment interest in relation to damages for future lost earnings. The defendants argue that since the plaintiff did not experience a loss of use of his money until after the judgment, prejudgment interest should not be awarded. In contrast, the plaintiff cites Carey v. General Motors Corp. to assert that prejudgment interest can apply to future lost earning capacity, which the court views as a present loss, although its extent considers future losses. In tort cases for personal injuries, future lost wages are treated as already incurred losses, making them eligible for prejudgment interest under G. L. c. 231, § 6B. Conversely, in discrimination cases under G. L. c. 151B, future income reductions are considered not yet incurred losses. The judge's denial of the defendants’ motion is upheld.

Additionally, expert testimony from Earl Bell indicated the necessity of using supplemental padding around vaulting pits, particularly to prevent serious injuries. He criticized the safety practices regarding the pit's proximity to the hard track surface and the lack of adequate padding. There was a factual dispute regarding the pole used by the plaintiff, who testified he was using a thirteen-foot pole suited for lighter athletes while weighing 175 pounds at the time of his injury. The court defined a "blow through," a situation where a vaulter using an inappropriate pole ends up landing improperly, contributing to the injury.