Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; February 6, 1990; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court
Plaintiffs own five residential properties in Edgartown, Martha’s Vineyard, which they rented during the 1986 summer season to unrelated individuals. They filed five complaints for judicial review under G. L. c. 40A. 17, challenging the zoning board's determination that their properties operated as 'transient residential facilities,' violating Edgartown zoning by-law provisions, and the subsequent cease and desist orders. The zoning by-law defines 'transient residential facilities' as hotels, motels, inns, or similar entities with more than four guest beds but does not define 'lodging house,' a key term in the case.
A Superior Court judge initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs regarding the definition of 'lodging house.' However, the zoning board appealed, arguing the judge's interpretation was too narrow. The appellate court found the judge's interpretation incorrect but did not accept the board's alternative interpretation. It clarified the meaning of 'lodging house' within the zoning regulations and concluded the plaintiffs violated these regulations.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument regarding the protection of G. L. c. 40A. 6 for prior nonconforming use. The facts revealed that four single-family residences and one duplex were situated in R-5 or R-20 residential districts, where transient residential facilities are prohibited in R-20 and allowed in R-5 only with a special permit, which the plaintiffs did not obtain. In R-20 districts, only limited leasing is permitted, while R-5 allows for boarders or room leasing with a special permit.
Despite leasing the properties for the 1986 summer season, the plaintiffs were aware that additional occupants, often college students, shared the rent. The health inspector noted that the number of occupants observed ranged from six to twelve in the properties.
Plaintiffs acknowledged occupancy levels in their dwelling units that exceeded allowed limits, with at least ten individuals in one unit and fewer in others. They claimed that only named lessees occupied the remaining properties, although one lease listed five additional occupants. For five of the six leases, plaintiffs admitted that occupancy by more than four unrelated individuals was intended. In 1986, Edgartown's building inspector and health agent established regulations defining group houses, which included properties renting to more than four additional persons as "transient residential facilities." Following an inspection, the inspector ordered plaintiffs to stop operating in violation of these regulations. The plaintiffs' appeals to the board of appeals were unsuccessful, leading them to seek relief in Superior Court.
The judge interpreted "lodging house" based on Massachusetts law, determining that a "lodger" lacks a real estate interest, and concluded that since the leases granted tenancy interests, the properties did not constitute "lodging houses." He ruled that the properties were not used as such during the lease terms, and the issue of the cease and desist orders was no longer relevant in 1990. However, the judge's error lay in focusing solely on the leases without considering whether the tenants were using the properties as "lodging houses." It was determined that for zoning compliance, the tenants were effectively acting on behalf of the owners. Therefore, interpreting the zoning by-law contextually, the tenants' use of the property aligned with the definition of "lodging houses."
Owners anticipated that tenants would enter into agreements with others to provide temporary living space for compensation. The term 'lodging house' encompasses such arrangements, where a 'lodger' has no property interest but the right to occupy a space while the owner retains possession. The Supreme Judicial Court emphasizes that a 'lodger' is characterized by a lack of real property interest and a contractual relationship with the owner. The statutory definition of 'lodging house' aligns with this understanding. The by-law suggests a prohibition on uses not expressly allowed in a zoning district without a special permit, thus indicating that having more than four boarders may require such a permit.
Zoning regulations focus on property use rather than legal relationships. The anticipated occupancy from the leases may differ from standard use in single-family homes. The board proposes that renting to more than four unrelated individuals constitutes a 'transient residential facility,' violating zoning laws. However, rentals in R-5 and R-20 districts may still be permissible as 'single family detached dwellings.' The by-law does not clearly restrict rentals to related individuals, allowing for multiple unrelated occupants to share a dwelling as a family-like unit. Thus, tenants numbering more than four are not automatically classified as 'lodgers.' The plaintiffs argue that if their properties are deemed 'lodging houses,' such use predates a 1982 zoning amendment regarding 'transient residential facilities,' thus granting them protection under G. L. c. 40A. 6.
Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating entitlement to protection under the statute, specifically by proving prior lawful use. A current nonconforming use is protected if it aligns with the original use's "nature and purpose," maintains similar quality and character, and does not adversely affect the neighborhood. The plaintiffs failed to establish this entitlement under G. L. c. 40A. Their evidence included a single affidavit indicating that one property was rented to five tenants in the summer of 1982, with a total of ten occupants, but provided no details for other properties or their previous uses. The plaintiffs did not show that any prior use, which would now be unlawful under the current by-law, was lawful before November 1982, nor did they present the applicable zoning by-law from that time. Even if the prior by-law were assumed to be similar to the current one, the plaintiffs could not prevail without evidence that tenants had agreed to allow more than four unrelated persons to reside in the properties. The zoning by-law prohibits more than four boarders in an R-20 district and requires special permits for boarders in an R-5 district. Thus, prior uses that would now violate the 'transient residential facilities' provisions were illegal. As a result, four of the five judgments for the plaintiffs are vacated, affirming the zoning board of appeals' decisions, while the judgment in the remaining case is affirmed due to a lack of demonstrated violations. The document also notes minimum lot sizes for R-20 (half acre) and R-5 (5,000 square feet) districts, along with regulations concerning "group houses" in Edgartown.
Group houses, where owner-occupants or primary renters lease beds to over four additional individuals, are classified as transient residential facilities under Edgartown Zoning By-laws (Section 11-19), which includes hotels, motels, and lodging houses with more than four guest beds. Such group houses are treated as lodging houses and subject to corresponding regulations. The zoning regulations outline the permissibility of transient residential facilities across various zoning districts. The term "lodging house" specifically refers to accommodations for four or more unrelated individuals and includes fraternity houses and dormitories but excludes certain licensed facilities such as nursing homes.
The summer lease for 85 Seventh Street indicates four lessees, with no evidence of more than two additional residents. The determination of what is reasonable regarding occupancy may depend on the dwelling's size. A zoning ordinance limiting unrelated individuals in residential areas was upheld in the Supreme Court case Belle Terre v. Boraas, although subsequent rulings require municipalities to avoid overly restrictive definitions of "family." State court opinions vary on the legality of such restrictions, with some aligning with Belle Terre and others opposing them. Without a change to the zoning by-law, the presence of more than four tenants sharing a lease will be evaluated based on whether they function as a cohesive household. The application of this standard can be challenging. Furthermore, Massachusetts General Laws c. 40A. 6 stipulates that zoning ordinances do not apply to lawful existing structures or uses unless there is a significant change or extension.
