Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Town of Shrewsbury v. Munro
Citations: 2 Mass. App. Ct. 362; 312 N.E.2d 219; 1974 Mass. App. LEXIS 650
Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; June 14, 1974; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court
The plaintiff town is pursuing recovery of costs incurred by its municipal light department for the temporary removal of electric wires, requested by the defendant, to facilitate the movement of a building. After winning in District Court, the defendant moved the case to Superior Court, where it was decided in favor of the defendant. The key argument against the plaintiff's recovery is based on G. L. c. 166. 39, which the defendant claims imposes a statutory duty on the town to bear the expense of wire removal. However, the court concludes that this statute does not apply to municipalities with electric plants, based on established rules of statutory construction. The term "company," used multiple times in G. L. c. 166. 39, is interpreted not to include municipalities unless explicitly stated by the legislature. The court analyzes the language and intent of related statutes, noting that "company" is not used when referring to cities or towns in G. L. c. 166. 38. It highlights an inconsistency that would arise from including municipalities under this definition, suggesting that such an interpretation was not intended. The court's decision is supported by the legislative history of the provisions, which originally applied only to telegraph companies and did not encompass municipal entities. Thus, the court affirms that G. L. c. 166. 39 does not impose a duty on a municipally owned electric plant. The 1882 Public Statutes marked the consolidation of earlier laws, specifically Gen. Sts. c. 64. 15 and St. 1869, c. 141, into Pub. Sts. c. 109. 16 and 17. By 1883, legislation was enacted making provisions for telegraph and telephone lines applicable to electric transmission for lighting, with an exception for Pub. Sts. c. 109. 16, which is a precursor to G. L. c. 166. 38. The sections from Pub. Sts. c. 109. 16 and 17 were incorporated into R. L. c. 122. 27 and 28, respectively, and were intended to apply to electric light and power companies alongside telecommunication companies. Legislative history indicates these sections were not meant to apply to wires owned by municipal entities, supporting the interpretation that G. L. c. 166. 39 does not extend to municipally owned electric plants, which are distinctly mentioned in G. L. c. 166. 38. Furthermore, an examination of G. L. c. 164. 66 and 71 reveals that these sections do not influence the application or interpretation of G. L. c. 166. 39. The enduring language in the statutes for over ninety years reinforces this conclusion. The judgment order is reversed, and the case will proceed in the Superior Court as per the outlined opinion. A person seeking to move a building or requiring wire disconnection must submit a written request to the relevant company’s office at least seven days prior or, if no office exists, mail it ten days in advance. If the company fails to act, the local inspector or selectmen may remove the wires, with costs recoverable from the company. Intentional damage to infrastructure belonging to electric or street railway companies incurs penalties. The statute specifies that both incorporated and unincorporated entities engaged in electricity transmission must comply with these regulations. Historical cases, such as A. M. Richards Bldg. Moving Co. v. Boston Elec. Light Co., affirm the applicability of earlier statutes to privately owned electric companies. Amendments in 1911 shifted the obligation for wire removal from individuals to the companies, and subsequent changes in 1958 are deemed irrelevant for this context. Historical legislative references illustrate the evolution of these laws.