Commonwealth v. Szlachta

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; July 27, 2012; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court

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Marion Szlachta was convicted of first-degree murder for the beating death of his housemate, Randy Lee Maleski, on July 8, 2008. At trial, Szlachta admitted to the murder but contested whether it should be classified as first or second-degree murder, arguing that his impaired mental condition impaired his decision-making and understanding of the consequences of his actions. He requested a specific jury instruction regarding mental impairment, which the judge denied. On appeal, Szlachta, now represented by new counsel, claimed this was an error and sought to have his conviction reduced to second-degree murder under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The appeal was denied, and his conviction was upheld. 

Background details indicate that Szlachta moved into a basement room of a home owned by Daniel Bouchard after being evicted from his prior apartment and losing his job as an electrician. He had a history with Bouchard's family and paid rent while helping with household chores. Following the death of Bouchard’s sister, the victim, Maleski, continued to live in the home with Szlachta and Bouchard. In June 2008, Szlachta left the house for several days, leaving a note suggesting he was contemplating violence against Maleski. On the day of the murder, Bouchard left for work and returned to find Maleski dead on the kitchen floor, leading to a 911 call. A police investigation revealed a note in the basement, dated the same day as the murder, implicating others in the crime.

The victim’s baseball bat, typically stored in the living room closet, was found bloodstained next to his body, indicating he had been beaten. Medical examiner Dr. Andrew Sexton determined the victim died from cranial cerebral trauma due to blunt force injuries, specifically noting five head wounds, with a fatal injury to the right forehead. Additional injuries included rib and forearm fractures, suggesting defensive wounds, and contusions on the lower left leg. 

The defendant was located by police in a wooded area near the victim's home, showing signs of struggle with cuts, scrapes, and dirt on his clothes. After being handcuffed and frisked for weapons, he was transported to the police station where he waived his Miranda rights and participated in a two-hour interview. The defendant admitted to attacking the victim with the bat after feeling provoked, stating he struck the victim from behind and continued beating him while on the ground.

After his confession, the defendant was arrested for murder. Forensic testing on his sneakers revealed the victim's DNA in blood stains. The defendant also mentioned leaving a black bag in the woods, which police retrieved; it contained various items including a stained T-shirt and a cellular phone case identified as belonging to the victim. The victim’s broken cell phone was later found by his sister near the area where the defendant was apprehended. 

For the defense, forensic psychologist Dr. Howard Lester testified about the defendant’s long history of alcohol abuse and a past hospitalization after an incident in 2007.

The defendant experienced acute kidney failure, alcohol withdrawal, and cognitive deficits, ultimately diagnosed with Korsakoff syndrome, a brain disease linked to alcohol abuse. Medical recommendations indicated he should not work and required ongoing care, leading him to live with Bouchard after being unable to stay with his sister due to restrictions on smoking and drinking. The defendant expressed bitterness over losing his apartment and job, which were significant aspects of his life. Living with Bouchard was problematic due to an unfinished basement room, provocations from Bouchard, and Bouchard's violent tendencies. 

On May 30, 2008, the defendant attempted suicide by driving into a tree, resulting in a hospital admission where he was diagnosed with recurrent major depressive disorder and alcohol dependence. Upon discharge, he returned to Bouchard's home, continued drinking, and neglected prescribed treatment. After the victim's death on July 8, 2008, the defendant was unable to articulate the reasons for his attack but acknowledged feelings of anger and frustration towards the victim. 

Dr. Lester, the testifying psychologist, concluded that the defendant was incapable of appreciating the consequences of his actions at the time of the incident due to significant impairments from his emotional state and judgment. During closing arguments, defense counsel acknowledged the defendant's responsibility for the act but emphasized the need to evaluate his degree of responsibility, suggesting that mental health issues stemming from long-term alcohol abuse and depression should lead the jury to consider a verdict of second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder.

Defense counsel requested jury instructions regarding the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, referencing Commonwealth v. Urrea and Commonwealth v. Gould. They specified that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill, intended to cause grievous bodily harm, or was aware that his actions would likely result in death. The jury should consider the defendant’s mental impairment when evaluating the evidence related to the manner of death, the means used, victim suffering, and injuries sustained, as these factors are associated with extreme atrocity or cruelty. The judge indicated he would instruct the jury on mental impairment according to the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide but first outlined the elements of first-degree murder. The judge instructed that credible evidence of mental impairment should be considered when determining the defendant's knowledge and intent related to the charges. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the judge's instruction lacked specificity in guiding jurors on how mental impairment relates to the analysis of extreme atrocity or cruelty, asserting that it did not adequately address the defendant's capacity to make decisions or understand the consequences of his actions.

The defendant argues that the judge's instructions did not require the jury to consider his mental capacity regarding the factors needed to determine if the Commonwealth proved extreme atrocity or cruelty in the first-degree murder charge. The defendant claims this omission significantly impaired his defense, asserting that his conviction should be overturned. However, the court disagrees. When a defendant objects to a judge's omission of a requested instruction, the court assesses whether an error occurred and if it prejudiced the defendant. To secure a conviction for first-degree murder based on extreme atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the defendant acted with malice aforethought during an unlawful killing. Malice can be inferred from the use of a dangerous weapon. 

The court references prior cases, noting that a defendant's mental impairment may be considered by the jury when evaluating if the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, as established in *Gould*. The court explains that jurors should be allowed to weigh the defendant's mental state alongside his actions, as this can influence the degree of murder. The instruction sought by the defendant closely mirrored language from *Gould*, which suggested that the jury should assess any reduced mental capacity's impact on the defendant's decision-making abilities. However, the court clarifies that while the judge accurately outlined the Cunneen factors, the precise wording from *Gould* was not mandated. The judge also instructed the jury in accordance with the Model Jury Instructions regarding mental impairment. The court emphasizes that it is not necessary for jury instructions to match the defendant's exact requests. The defendant's reference to *Commonwealth v. Rutkowski* is deemed inappropriate, as that case involved different considerations of mental impairment relevant to intent and knowledge, not extreme atrocity or cruelty.

The judge's failure to instruct the jury on considering evidence of mental impairment regarding whether the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty was deemed an error requiring reversal. However, in this case, the judge correctly instructed the jury to consider such evidence for that determination. The defendant requested a reduction of his conviction to second-degree murder under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, but after reviewing the trial record, the court found no basis for reducing the conviction. The judgment is affirmed. The jury did not find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation, nor did the Commonwealth pursue a felony-murder theory. The defendant's former landlord had previously rented an apartment to him but moved his possessions out under the belief that the defendant would live with his sister after leaving the hospital. Consequently, the defendant sought new housing and contacted Bouchard. During the trial, an electronically recorded interview of the defendant, where he expressed his desire to apologize to the victim, was presented. Forensic testimony indicated that the DNA profile from a sneaker matched the defendant with an extreme statistical likelihood, and the T-shirt DNA indicated the defendant matched the major profile while the victim potentially contributed to the minor profile. The statistical probability of a match for the minor profile was similarly low.