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Juliano v. Simpson
Citation: 461 Mass. 527
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; February 21, 2012; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court
The court considered whether to expand social host liability under common law to include underage hosts who do not serve alcohol but allow underage guests to consume it on their premises. It ultimately declined this expansion, stating that liability applies only when a host serves alcohol or controls its supply. The case involved Rachel Juliano, a 16-year-old injured in a car accident after attending a party hosted by 19-year-old Jessica Simpson, where 19-year-old Christian Dunbar consumed alcohol he brought with him. Initially, Juliano and her parents sued Dunbar and Jessica's father, Peter Simpson, later adding Jessica as a defendant, claiming negligence for allowing underage drinking at her home. The Superior Court dismissed most claims against the Simpsons, ruling that the evidence did not support social host liability, and the plaintiffs appealed this decision. The appellate court reviewed the case de novo, considering the summary judgment record favorably for the plaintiffs. Relevant facts include that Jessica hosted the party while her father was away, and Dunbar arrived with alcohol, which he consumed during the event. Jessica did not serve alcohol and was present throughout the evening, intervening when an uninvited guest misbehaved. Before 11 p.m., an argument between Dunbar and Juliano outside a residence garnered the attention of several guests, including Jessica, who intervened. After a brief altercation, Jessica offered to drive both men home due to concerns over Dunbar's emotional state and Juliano's alcohol consumption. Despite Jessica's offer, Dunbar insisted on driving, and they left the party around 11 p.m. Shortly after departure, their vehicle collided with a utility pole, injuring both Dunbar and Juliano. The plaintiffs contend that common-law social host liability should apply, citing G. L. c. 138, § 34, which prohibits supplying alcohol to individuals under twenty-one. However, the statute is criminal in nature, without any explicit provision for a private right of action or civil liability. Legislative intent, as indicated by the statute's text and history, does not support such a claim, as the purpose of the law is to enhance criminal penalties against underage alcohol provision. Additionally, Massachusetts does not adopt negligence per se, meaning a statutory violation does not automatically establish a breach of duty in tort claims. Instead, such violations serve as evidence of negligence, requiring pre-existing duty of care to support a tort claim. Thus, for the plaintiffs' claims to advance, it must be determined whether Jessica had a common law duty concerning her guests' alcohol consumption. This duty is evaluated based on societal values and policies. The court has previously recognized social host liability, but only in cases where a host either serves alcohol or controls its supply, demonstrating caution in expanding that duty. A social host is not liable for injuries from a drunk driving accident involving a guest unless the host served alcohol or made it available to the guest. In *McGuiggan*, it was established that a host who serves drinks without evidence of intoxication at the time is not liable for subsequent accidents. However, a social host can be held liable if they knew or should have known a guest was intoxicated and still permitted them to drink, leading to negligent driving that injures a third party. This marked a departure from the common-law view that the intoxicated person's actions were solely to blame. In *Langemann v. Davis*, a mother was not liable for injuries caused by a partygoer who consumed alcohol brought by another guest, as she did not provide alcohol herself. This principle was reinforced in subsequent cases, such as *Alioto v. Marnell* and *Wallace v. Wilson*, where liability was denied because the hosts did not supply alcohol. In *Ulwick v. DeChristopher*, an underage host was similarly found not liable since he did not control the alcohol supply. Overall, the decisions clarify that liability arises only when a host actively serves or provides alcohol to guests. In Cremins v. Clancy, the court addressed whether a host could be held liable for allowing an underage guest to consume alcohol at his residence and in his vehicle, which led to an accident caused by the guest. The court rejected liability, stating that the host lacked sufficient control over the alcohol supply to prevent underage drinking. Although the host created an environment for drinking and considered the beer as belonging to both himself and his guests, he was not obligated or equipped to effectively manage the alcohol consumption of his guests. The court emphasized that a social host cannot be expected to prevent guests from consuming their own alcohol, contrasting this with a host who provides alcohol, akin to a bartender who can refuse service to intoxicated individuals. The ruling reflected broader policy considerations, noting the practical difficulties of imposing a duty on social hosts to monitor their guests' drinking habits, which could potentially lead to counterproductive enforcement actions. The court also highlighted previous decisions where liability was not imposed on defendants who did not provide alcohol but were aware of drinking on their premises. Ultimately, the court maintained that expanding social host liability was inadvisable due to the unclear scope of such liability and the absence of clear societal norms supporting it. Legislative actions indicated a lack of community consensus on this issue, with only a few states imposing social host liability under specific circumstances. A state's highest court has only once imposed a common-law duty for social hosts regarding underage drinking, while at least four other states have rejected liability based on property control. The plaintiffs argue that underage drinking and driving is a significant societal issue, supported by legislative penalties against those who facilitate such behavior, including jail time and criminal records. Despite these arguments, public policy concerns from previous social host cases influence the scope of common-law tort liability. The court finds insufficient justification to alter existing tort law, thus declining to expand the duty of social hosts. Consequently, counts five and six of the plaintiffs’ fifth amended complaint were dismissed correctly, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. The plaintiffs have submitted five amended complaints, with the fourth and fifth being relevant to this appeal. The fourth amended complaint included claims of negligent conduct against the defendants, with a Superior Court judge granting summary judgment on all claims except for negligence against Jessica. The fifth amended complaint, filed later, included claims that were dismissed, with final judgment entered in June 2010. The statute in question penalizes the furnishing of alcohol to individuals under 21, with a maximum fine and imprisonment. Although Jessica was not prosecuted, it was acknowledged that she could have been. The plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of social host claims against Peter. In reviewing the case, the court treated the plaintiffs as the nonmoving party. Testimony revealed that Dunbar acquired alcohol from a package store, but details were unclear, and he later pleaded guilty to serious offenses related to driving under the influence, with an expert estimating his vehicle was traveling excessively fast when involved in an accident. The statute was amended in part due to a 1996 incident where a teenager, influenced by alcohol from a high school graduation party, died in an accident. The adult host was acquitted under G. L. c. 138, § 34, which did not prohibit providing a location for minors to drink. However, liability could arise if it was proven that the alcohol supplier's negligence contributed to the driver's intoxication. The principle of social host liability has been applied beyond social settings; employers can be liable for third-party injuries only if they control alcohol supply. This principle also extends to private carriers allowing passengers to consume their own alcohol, leading to fatal accidents. Courts are hesitant to impose liability on social hosts for guests who injure themselves, reasoning that guests should be responsible for their own actions. Policy considerations suggest that nonliability could deter drunk driving more effectively than imposing liability. This reasoning applies to intoxicated guests under twenty-one as well. Legislative attempts since 2003-2004 to introduce civil liability for those violating the statute have been rejected, indicating a preference for the existing liability framework.