Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. City of Somerville
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; April 4, 2008; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court
The consolidated cases involve the cities of Melrose and Somerville and their ability to regulate billboards and signs for commercial advertising on Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) facilities through local zoning ordinances. The MBTA sought a court declaration that its commercial advertising is exempt from local zoning laws. In response, the cities questioned the applicability of local zoning ordinances to MBTA property and the authority of the Outdoor Advertising Board to issue permits for such advertisements. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. intervened as a plaintiff in the MBTA's case.
The Superior Court ruled that the advertisements were not subject to the cities' zoning regulations, prompting the cities to appeal, leading to direct appellate review by the higher court, which affirmed the lower court's decision.
Key facts include: the MBTA is a political subdivision with the authority to manage mass transportation services and facilities. It has collaborated with Clear Channel and Titan Outdoor LLC to erect advertisements in Melrose and Somerville without seeking local permits. The parties acknowledge that the advertisements would violate local zoning ordinances if applicable. The cities have issued cease and desist orders concerning these advertisements, which could hinder the MBTA's revenue generation from them. The Outdoor Advertising Board determined it lacked jurisdiction over the advertisements in question.
A statement of agreed facts that includes all material facts for determining the rights of the parties is classified as a 'case stated,' allowing for review of both fact and law on appeal (Caissie v. Cambridge). The standard for reviewing summary judgment is to assess whether, in favor of the nonmoving party, all material facts are established, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.). A summary judgment ruling will stand if based on undisputed material facts and correct in law (Commonwealth v. One 1987 Mercury Cougar Auto.). In this case, there are no disputed material facts, and the facts have been considered favorably toward the cities. The cities contest the trial judge's finding that advertisements on MBTA facilities are exempt from local zoning ordinances, arguing that the MBTA’s enabling statute (G. L. c. 161A) only exempts services, equipment, and facilities, not advertisements. The statute grants the MBTA board exclusive authority to determine the nature of its services and facilities, which includes decisions about advertising on its properties. Therefore, the MBTA is exempt from local zoning laws regarding these advertisements. The cities argue that the MBTA should still comply with their zoning ordinances, asserting that such regulations would not impede the MBTA’s core function of mass transportation. Nonetheless, statutory exemptions do not completely shield an entity from regulation, especially if the regulation serves an important purpose without significantly impacting the entity’s governmental functions (citing Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth. and other cases).
Zoning ordinances significantly impact the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority's (MBTA) ability to provide mass transportation services, as established by G. L. c. 161A. The MBTA generates income from commercial advertising on its properties, which is crucial for offsetting operational costs. The statute mandates that the MBTA maximize revenues from non-transportation sources, including commercial advertising, to avoid fare increases and maintain financial stability. The MBTA faces projected deficits of $7.2 million for fiscal year 2006 and $4.7 million for fiscal year 2007. Somerville's zoning regulations and potential cease and desist orders threaten the MBTA's revenue-generating capabilities, particularly from the anticipated $132,500 annually from the Somerville signs and over $750,000 from advertisements in Melrose. Given these facts, the effects of the zoning regulations are deemed more than negligible, leading to the conclusion that the MBTA is exempt from such municipal regulations concerning commercial advertising.
The determination made eliminates the necessity of addressing the preemption issue. The cities' argument for the board's jurisdiction over Melrose advertisements, based on regulations governing advertisements on common carriers, is unfounded as the MBTA, being a public corporation, typically does not qualify as a 'common carrier.' An exception exists for tort liability under G. L. c. 161A. 38, where the MBTA is liable like a street railway company; however, this case does not involve torts, and therefore, the MBTA is not classified as a common carrier in this context.
Melrose claims the board has jurisdiction over advertisements since its regulations require permits for any signs erected by authorities or governmental units. However, the MBTA property in Melrose is not deemed a public way or private facility, which limits the board's regulatory authority. The board's conclusion aligns with the presumption that regulatory actions do not exceed statutory boundaries.
Somerville argues that the board should only issue permits compliant with local zoning regulations, citing G. L. c. 93D. 3 and G. L. c. 93, 29. The analysis shows that the MBTA is exempt from local zoning regulations, making the local ordinances inapplicable. Consequently, the board acted within its authority by issuing permits that did not conform to local zoning ordinances.
Judgment is affirmed regarding the necessity of prior approval for proposed signs by the board due to their proximity to Interstate 93, thereby falling under the federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965. Clear Channel and the MBTA acknowledged that the proposed signs would be visible from I-93, requiring compliance with applicable regulations. The record indicates that previously approved permits were for double-sided billboards measuring 48 by 14 feet, totaling 672 square feet per advertisement, exceeding the 250 square feet limit set by Somerville's zoning ordinance. Noncompliance issues also arise concerning the height of the advertisements.
Titan and the MBTA did not seek board approval for the Melrose Signs, arguing these are on public property and not subject to the federal act, claiming they are not within the specified distance from the interstate or visible from it. The Melrose Signs are described as freestanding, double-sided, supported by vertical poles, measuring approximately 46 inches in height and 40 square feet in area, containing twelve advertisements.
Furthermore, the Melrose Signs violate art. VII of the Melrose zoning ordinance, which regulates business signs. The ordinance permits one pole sign per street frontage with specific size, height, setback, and illumination requirements. Titan erected three commercial advertising signs at Cedar Park Station, also supported by vertical poles, but the location is classified as a 'BC' local business district, where regulations limit the number of signs per business or establishment.
The MBTA may be required to remove at least one of its three signs to comply with Melrose zoning ordinances, despite the parties not specifying how the signs violate these regulations. The legislature likely did not intend to exempt an entity like the MBTA from regulations applicable to it, as established in relevant case law. The zoning statutes do not explicitly apply to authorities such as the MBTA. General Laws c. 161A grants the MBTA broad powers to engage in commercial advertising, indicating that such activities are a legitimate source of revenue. However, compliance with zoning ordinances would necessitate reducing or eliminating signs, which could adversely affect advertising revenues. Concerns were raised about potential immunity for state agencies in revenue-raising activities; however, the decision does not extend this far. The MBTA remains subject to some regulations, particularly regarding advertising revenue, which is authorized by the legislature and has a reasonable connection to its core functions.
