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Commonwealth v. Kendall

Citations: 451 Mass. 10; 883 N.E.2d 269; 2008 Mass. LEXIS 205

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; March 28, 2008; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court

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The court examined whether Clinton Kendall was entitled to a jury instruction on the necessity defense for a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OUI) after he drove his injured girlfriend to the hospital. Despite the jury finding him guilty and sentencing him to two years of probation, the Appeals Court upheld the District Court's decision, stating that the evidence did not sufficiently support a necessity defense. The case arose after Kendall and his girlfriend, Heather Maloney, consumed alcohol at a pub and later at a restaurant. Upon returning to his trailer, Kendall accidentally caused Maloney to fall and injure her head, leading to significant bleeding. Lacking a phone and unable to summon help from nearby neighbors or a fire station, they decided to drive to the hospital. After being arrested, Kendall's breathalyzer indicated a blood alcohol level of .23 percent. The trial judge denied the request for a necessity instruction, reasoning that Kendall had access to nearby resources to seek help, which did not justify his decision to drive under the influence. The court ultimately affirmed the trial judge's decision.

During closing arguments, defense counsel did not address the OUI charge, leading the defendant to appeal the judge's refusal to allow a necessity defense and jury instruction on this defense. The defendant contends that the judge incorrectly asserted that legal alternatives existed to address the danger posed to Maloney, whose serious wound required immediate action. The judge’s decision is criticized for relying on hindsight rather than the jury's judgment. In OUI cases, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's alcohol consumption impaired their ability to safely operate a vehicle, without needing to demonstrate actual unsafe driving. The necessity defense, which can negate criminal liability under certain conditions, requires that the harm avoided by breaking the law outweighs the harm caused by the violation. This defense is valid only if four conditions are satisfied: 1) a clear and imminent danger must exist; 2) the defendant’s actions must effectively abate the danger; 3) no legal alternatives must be available; and 4) the legislature must not have prohibited the defense. If sufficient evidence for necessity is presented, the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury instruction on necessity is warranted only if the defendant presents evidence fulfilling the four conditions, which would allow for a reasonable doubt regarding whether the OUI conduct was justified due to necessity.

A necessity defense instruction is warranted only if the defendant presents evidence supporting all conditions of that defense. In the case at hand, the defendant failed to demonstrate that no lawful alternatives existed to address the medical emergency posed by Maloney’s serious head wound. Although time was critical, the defendant did not attempt to seek assistance from nearby individuals or establishments before driving under the influence. The court emphasized that the defendant must be aware of available legal alternatives and cannot justify illegal actions if options exist. The lack of evidence supporting the necessity defense led the judge to deny the request for jury instruction on that basis. The judgment was affirmed, with the defendant also facing charges of assault and battery, which resulted in a not guilty verdict on one charge, while the jury acquitted him of the other. The review standard applied was whether the judge's decision constituted prejudicial error, given the defense counsel's objections.

G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1)(a)(1) does not indicate that the Legislature has limited the defense of necessity for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. No Massachusetts court has excluded this defense, nor have the parties cited any contrary cases. The dissent's argument neglects the requirement that evidence must be presented to establish the four conditions necessary for a necessity defense, as outlined in Commonwealth v. Pike. Without demonstrating the absence of effective legal alternatives to mitigate a clear and imminent danger, a defendant cannot claim this defense. For example, if a defendant had a phone but chose to drive an intoxicated person to the hospital instead of calling for help, a jury should not evaluate the necessity of that choice without foundational evidence of no alternatives. The court emphasizes that a defendant must show that there were no viable legal options before being entitled to a jury instruction on necessity. In this case, the defendant failed to present any such evidence.