David J. Kohl v. Joseph M. Casson, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as County Attorney of Jefferson County, Nebraska County of Jefferson, a Body Politic and Corporate of the State of Nebraska Mitch Siebe, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Police Officer for the City of Fairbury City of Fairbury, a Body Politic and Corporate of the State of Nebraska Lewis J. Mason, in His Official Capacity as City Councilman of the City of Fairbury, Nebraska Marvin Engel, in His Official Capacity as City Councilman of the City of Fairbury, Nebraska Joe Jelinek, in His Official Capacity as City Councilman of the City of Fairbury, Nebraska Gene Siefford, in His Official Capacity as City Councilman of the City of Fairbury, Nebraska Dan Stanton, in His Official Capacity as City Councilman of the City of Fairbury, Nebraska Harley Brown, in His Official Capacity as City Councilman of the City of Fairbury, Nebraska Marvin Moerer, in His Official Capacity as City Councilman of the City of Fairbury, Nebraska Chris

Citations: 5 F.3d 1141; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24734Docket: 92-3366

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; September 28, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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David J. Kohl brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple defendants, including the city of Fairbury, the county of Jefferson, and various officials in their official and individual capacities, including County Attorney Joseph Casson and Police Officer Mitch Siebe. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted for the city, county, and all defendants in their official capacities, but denied for Casson and Siebe in their individual capacities. Kohl appealed the dismissal of the official capacity claims, while Casson and Siebe cross-appealed the denial of their individual capacity dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court accepted Kohl's factual allegations as true while evaluating the dismissal motion.

At approximately 1:41 a.m. on February 22, 1990, Duane Juhl, the owner of Tooley's bar, reported to the Fairbury Police that $3,000 in cash and checks had been stolen from his van parked outside The Stable restaurant. Juhl noted seeing a customer leave the restaurant who had also been at his bar earlier and was driving a brown van with Kansas plates. The police identified the customer as David Kohl, who was registered at the Holiday Motel, where his room showed no signs of occupancy the previous night. 

Kohl subsequently traveled to Lincoln and Omaha seeking work before checking into a Cedar Falls hotel. There, he paid for his stay with cash from a large roll of bills, raising suspicion. Officer Mitch Siebe, after consulting with County Attorney Casson, prepared an affidavit for Kohl's arrest on theft charges. A warrant for his arrest was issued, and Kohl was apprehended on February 26, with $1,998.87 in cash seized at the time. This money was retained by the police, preventing Kohl from posting bail and leading to his continued detention.

Kohl faced felony theft charges in Jefferson County, but both the county and district courts ruled that there was insufficient probable cause for the charges, resulting in his release and the return of his property. During his detention, Kohl was involved in a minor altercation, leading to a new assault charge, which required him to post bail for release. Initially, Siebe refused to release Kohl's seized money, citing legal advice, but later complied when instructed by Casson, allowing Kohl to post bail.

On August 31, 1990, the district court quashed the charge of assault against Kohl, determining that he was not lawfully confined due to a lack of probable cause for his arrest related to the Juhl theft. Subsequently, Kohl filed a section 1983 action in federal court, claiming violations of his constitutional rights due to unlawful seizure and detention without probable cause by Siebe and Casson. He also asserted that the city and county failed to adequately train their police officers regarding the necessity of probable cause, alongside state law claims for violations of the Nebraska Civil Rights Act, common law false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, negligent training, and deprivation of procedural due process rights under the Nebraska Constitution.

The district court dismissed the claims against the city, county, and other defendants in their official capacities, stating that Kohl failed to demonstrate a pattern of unlawful arrests or show that the city and county had prior notice of police misconduct. However, the court denied the motion to dismiss the claims against Siebe and Casson individually, affirming that Kohl sufficiently alleged a section 1983 claim against them and that the question of their qualified immunity needed further factual development. The court then entered a final judgment for the city and county under Rule 54(b), allowing for an appeal alongside the ruling on Siebe and Casson's immunity.

Casson argued on cross-appeal that he was entitled to absolute immunity under section 1983 for actions related to Kohl's arrest and prosecution. Kohl's complaint included three claims against Casson in his individual capacity. The first claim of malicious prosecution was dismissed, as it did not constitute a violation under section 1983, which is specifically for federal constitutional or statutory breaches. Additionally, prosecutors are granted absolute immunity for actions directly associated with the judicial process. The second claim involved Kohl's arrest, alleging it occurred without probable cause, accusing Casson of advising Siebe in preparing the arrest warrant affidavit, which was then presented to the Jefferson County Clerk-Magistrate.

Prosecutors possess absolute immunity when initiating prosecutions and presenting cases, as this conduct is closely tied to the judicial process. This immunity is linked to the official function, not the position held, and the official must demonstrate the applicability of this immunity for the specific function. The determination focuses on whether advising police on an arrest warrant affidavit and presenting that affidavit to a judicial officer are protected under absolute immunity. 

The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the degree of immunity for presenting an arrest warrant affidavit, but related cases provide insight. In Burns, the Court affirmed absolute immunity for prosecutors presenting evidence in support of a search warrant, indicating such actions are judicial and integral to the criminal process. Conversely, prosecutors do not hold absolute immunity when advising on interrogation techniques or warrantless arrests. 

In Malley v. Briggs, the Court clarified that seeking an arrest warrant is only covered by qualified immunity, suggesting no tradition of absolute immunity exists for those whose complaints result in an arrest warrant. Thus, it is concluded that prosecutors are absolutely immune when presenting evidence for an arrest warrant application, as this action mirrors the advocacy seen in search warrant hearings. Both acts are judicial and essential to the prosecution process, reinforcing the notion that immunity should remain consistent throughout such proceedings.

The Court's decision in Malley is distinguished based on the different roles involved; Malley concerned the prosecutor's function of vouching for the truth of a complaint leading to a warrant. A prosecutor loses absolute immunity when transitioning from presenting testimony to vouching for affidavits, paralleling the police officer’s situation in Malley. In Kohl's case, if Casson only appeared before the clerk-magistrate with Siebe, he retains absolute immunity. However, if Kohl's allegations assert that Casson advised Siebe on the affidavit's preparation and presented it as true, this conduct falls under the scrutiny of qualified immunity, as established by the Supreme Court.

Kohl claims constitutional harm from an arrest warrant lacking probable cause. Police officers are granted qualified immunity unless the warrant application is so deficient that a reasonable belief in its validity is unreasonable. The same standard applies to Casson since his actions resemble those of a police officer seeking a warrant. The determination focuses on whether he had an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.

The affidavit in question, purportedly adopted by Casson, contained facts that could support a probable cause finding, including Kohl's presence at relevant locations during the theft and discrepancies regarding his motel accommodations and financial situation. While the facts do not definitively establish probable cause, they provide enough support for reasonable disagreement on the existence of probable cause. Therefore, even if Casson vouched for the affidavit's truth, he is entitled to qualified immunity for presenting it to the clerk-magistrate.

Kohl accuses Casson of advising Siebe to improperly withhold money seized during his arrest. However, Casson is granted absolute immunity for retaining the money, as it was potential evidence necessary for a possible trial. Following the district court's order for Kohl's release and the return of the money, Casson acted appropriately within his prosecutorial duties. Siebe is also entitled to qualified immunity regarding the affidavit for Kohl's arrest warrant, which was deemed to have sufficient probable cause. Furthermore, Siebe is not liable for retaining the money, as he acted under Casson's direction while the prosecution was active.

The district court's dismissal of Kohl's claims against the city, county, and other officials in their official capacities is reviewed de novo. The court concluded that Kohl failed to establish a pattern of unlawful arrests or demonstrate that the city and county were aware of previous misconduct, justifying the dismissal of his complaint. All factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and viewed favorably toward the plaintiff, according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit clarified the standards for municipal liability claims in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's heightened pleading requirement, emphasizing that plaintiffs need only provide a short and plain statement of their claims, allowing for a liberal approach to notice pleading as mandated by the Federal Rules. The dismissal of the complaint against the defendants was upheld, despite potential inconsistencies with Leatherman, because Casson and Siebe acted reasonably based on the probable cause available to them when obtaining a warrant for Kohl's arrest. As a result, there was no causal link between Kohl's arrest and any alleged inadequacy in the defendants' training. Additionally, Kohl's Eighth Amendment claim regarding excessive bail was dismissed because none of the defendants had the authority to set his bail, eliminating any causal connection to the alleged deprivation of his rights. The decision highlights the necessity of establishing a direct causal relationship between municipal policies and constitutional violations for successful claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Kohl alleges in Count IV that the city, county, Casson, and Siebe violated his due process rights by depriving him of property and liberty. However, he does not specify what due process he was denied. His complaint acknowledges that he received preliminary hearings regarding the arrest warrant and was released accordingly. Additionally, he had a hearing concerning the police department's detention of his money, which was returned to him following a district court order. Consequently, the complaint fails to establish a due process violation, warranting dismissal of the claim as there is no statutory or constitutional basis for relief. 

Regarding the state law claims, the district court's order primarily addresses the section 1983 claims and does not clarify the status of the state law claims, leading to uncertainty. Therefore, the appellate court refrains from opining on those claims and remands them back to the district court for further consideration. 

The appellate court concludes that Casson and Siebe are entitled to qualified or absolute immunity, reversing the district court's denial of their motions to dismiss. It affirms the dismissal of claims against the City of Fairbury, the County of Jefferson, and other defendants in their official capacities, while remanding the state law claims for further proceedings. The district court's judgment is partially affirmed and partially reversed.