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Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr. v. The City of Seal Beach Seal Beach Police Department

Citations: 5 F.3d 536; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30367; 1993 WL 340449Docket: 92-55529

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 7, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 indicates that non-published dispositions are not precedential and should not be cited except under specific legal doctrines. In the case of Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr. v. The City of Seal Beach and the Seal Beach Police Department, Franceschi appealed a summary judgment in favor of the defendants regarding a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The appeal, heard on August 31, 1993, and decided on September 7, 1993, was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.

Franceschi's Fourth Amendment claim centered on whether Officer Chauncey had reasonable suspicion to stop him for driving without a valid license. The court found that reasonable suspicion existed, supported by prior citations from other officers and confirmation from the DMV regarding Franceschi's expired license. The court distinguished this case from prior decisions regarding pretextual stops, emphasizing that Chauncey cited Franceschi for the infraction based on objective facts.

Additionally, Franceschi argued that a potential ticket quota policy constituted a substantive due process violation. However, the court concluded that even if such a policy existed, he failed to demonstrate any constitutional injury resulting from it, as the citation was justified by reasonable suspicion and did not rise to the level of police behavior that "shocks the conscience."

Franceschi did not sustain a constitutional injury from the alleged quota policy, validating the district court's decision to deny partial summary judgment on this matter. Additionally, Franceschi's procedural due process claim was found to lack merit. The district court's approval of the defendants' motion for summary judgment has been upheld. The case was deemed appropriate for resolution without oral argument, as per Federal Rules and Ninth Circuit guidelines. The government argued that Franceschi's subsequent guilty plea established probable cause for his stop, but the court emphasized that justification for a warrantless search or seizure must exist at the time of the incident. Furthermore, Franceschi's vendetta claim was dismissed because personal animosity from an individual, Chauncey, does not constitute a governmental policy or custom under section 1983, as clarified by relevant case law.