Jennifer Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State University, College of Veterinary Medicine

Citations: 5 F.3d 177; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24394; 1993 WL 368830Docket: 92-3360

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; September 23, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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Jennifer Kissinger appealed a district court's decision denying her request for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 after she sued Ohio State University's College of Veterinary Medicine to modify its curriculum due to her religious beliefs. Upon enrollment, Kissinger was informed that the use of live animals in training was essential and objections would not excuse her from classes. During her second year, she requested an alternative to the required veterinary surgery course, Operative Practice, which involved anesthetizing and operating on live animals. After her request for an alternative was initially acknowledged but not promptly addressed, she eventually refused to participate in the course. The College informed her that withdrawing from Operative Practice would hinder her progression and require her to petition for readmission. Kissinger alleged ridicule from faculty during her attempts to seek an alternative curriculum and filed a lawsuit citing violations of her constitutional rights, privacy rights regarding her academic records, and multiple legal theories. An alternative curriculum was eventually proposed, but Kissinger objected to it. The parties settled, after which she sought attorneys' fees, which the district court denied, leading to the current appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Ohio State was not legally obligated to alter its curriculum to accommodate her religious beliefs.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, district courts can award attorneys' fees to a "prevailing party" in lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although such awards are discretionary, they are typically granted when a plaintiff prevails, as established in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. A plaintiff who settles a § 1983 case may qualify for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party if they receive redress and are legally entitled to it, according to Johnston v. Jago.

On appeal, Kissinger argued for attorneys' fees based solely on her claim that Ohio State violated her religious rights, despite raising multiple other issues in her complaint. The court determined that Ohio State's curriculum did not infringe on her free exercise of religion, referencing Employment Division v. Smith, which upheld a general law not aimed at specific religious practices. The court applied a three-part analysis from Smith to Kissinger's claim.

First, Ohio State's curriculum was deemed generally applicable, as no other student was exempt from the requirement to pass Operative Practices and Techniques. Second, there was no indication that the curriculum targeted any particular religious belief; it was implemented for educational purposes, contrasting with cases where laws specifically targeted religious practices. Thus, the court concluded that Ohio State's curriculum did not violate Kissinger's religious freedoms.

Ohio State did not have a system of exemptions allowing students to graduate without completing its surgical requirements. Kissinger claims some students proceeded without passing Operative Practices and Techniques, but fails to demonstrate that any student graduated without meeting this requirement. Consequently, the court finds no evidence that Ohio State maintained a system of exemptions for those who did not complete the necessary course. The curriculum applied uniformly to all veterinary students and was not tailored to specific religious practices, thus not violating Kissinger's right to freely exercise her religion.

Kissinger argues that the cases of Smith and Vandiver necessitate a strict scrutiny standard for her free-exercise claims because her complaint also cites violations of other constitutional provisions alongside the Free Exercise Clause. However, the court clarifies that a state regulation does not violate the Free Exercise Clause solely based on the inclusion of other constitutional rights, nor does it logically follow that the legal standard would change depending on such inclusion. The court will not apply a stricter standard than that used in Smith for evaluating generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause.

Additionally, the case is distinguished from Wisconsin v. Yoder, where compulsory school-attendance laws were found to potentially infringe on religious exercise. Unlike the parents in Yoder, Kissinger voluntarily chose Ohio State, aware of the curriculum requirements, and cannot demand changes to accommodate her preferences. The court emphasizes that public educational institutions have significant discretion in establishing curricula that align with their educational objectives, reinforcing that ruling in favor of Kissinger would undermine this principle.

Kissinger was not legally permitted to compel Ohio State to exempt her from the course Operative Practice and Techniques. Consequently, based on the second prong of Johnston v. Jago, 691 F.2d at 286, Kissinger is ineligible for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The district court's decision is upheld. This conclusion is further supported by Justice Souter's concurrence in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, which critiques the breadth of the hybrid claim distinction in relation to free speech and associational rights. Souter argues that if hybrid claims merely involve the implication of another constitutional right, the exception could undermine the Smith rule, as it would encompass situations like the peyote-smoking ritual that implicate both free exercise and other constitutional rights. Conversely, if hybrid claims require a litigant to secure an exemption from a neutral, generally applicable law under a different constitutional provision, then the Court's mention of the Free Exercise Clause in hybrid cases would be unnecessary.