Boundary Drive Associates v. Shrewsbury Township Board of Supervisors

Citations: 81 Pa. Commw. 7; 473 A.2d 706; 1984 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1265Docket: Appeals, Nos. 1229 C.D. 1983 and 1281 C.D. 1983

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; March 8, 1984; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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Boundary Drive Associates appealed a decision from the York County Court of Common Pleas that upheld a ruling by the Shrewsbury Township Zoning Hearing Board, which denied Boundary's request for a 'validity variance' and rejected its challenge to certain zoning ordinance provisions. The key issues include the board's denial of the variance and the validity of the agricultural zoning regulations, along with the fees provision of the ordinance.

Boundary purchased a 43-acre agricultural tract in 1975 before any zoning ordinance existed, and subsequently filed a 72-lot subdivision plan, which was approved by default due to the township's inaction. After the township adopted its first zoning ordinance in 1976, classifying Boundary's land as agricultural, it formally approved the subdivision plan in 1978 but withheld assistance for sewer services. In 1980, Boundary sought a 'validity variance' and challenged the zoning provisions concerning agriculture and fees.

The board denied Boundary's variance request, asserting that the history surrounding the earlier subdivision plan did not create the necessary hardship to justify the variance under the current plan. To qualify for a 'validity variance,' Boundary needed to demonstrate that the zoning ordinance was confiscatory and deprived them of reasonable use of their property, as outlined in the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code. Boundary failed to provide sufficient evidence for this claim.

The board reinforced the importance of preserving agricultural land, noting that 78% of the township's land was highly suitable for agriculture and that the township aimed to protect agricultural viability. The board upheld specific zoning provisions that included minimum lot sizes, limitations on the number of dwellings, and restrictions on new dwellings based on soil quality. Ultimately, the trial court affirmed the board's decision on the variance and agricultural zoning, while declaring a portion of the fee provision invalid.

Boundary argues that the zoning scheme, which limits the number of permitted dwellings based on soil type, is unreasonable, irrational, arbitrary, and discriminatory. Zoning ordinances are generally presumed valid, placing the burden of proof on the challenger to demonstrate otherwise, as established in Schubach v. Silver. The Supreme Court's ruling in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. outlines that a zoning ordinance is valid if it promotes public health, safety, or welfare, and the means are substantially related to these ends. 

In assessing the current case, the court must determine if the zoning scheme rationally relates to agricultural preservation, balancing community benefits against landowner rights. The ordinance allows a specific number of dwellings based on the size of the tract without a straight-line increase in dwelling numbers, and it mandates that dwellings be situated on less productive soils to preserve prime agricultural land. The ordinance’s effective date prevents repeated divisions of land into smaller parcels that could each qualify for additional dwellings. 

The ordinance differs from a previously rejected ordinance in the Hopewell case, which permitted a uniform maximum of five residential plots regardless of tract size. The current ordinance’s link between permissible dwellings, tract size, and soil quality is justified, as allowing greater density with larger tracts could jeopardize the availability of prime agricultural land. While smaller tracts may have higher residential density, this is based on reasonable grounds to prevent excessive residential development on larger parcels. The court concludes that the provisions of the ordinance are rationally related to agricultural preservation goals and do not produce irrational or discriminatory outcomes.

The township has cross-appealed a trial court ruling that invalidated §14.30 of its ordinance, which allows the township to charge appellants for costs associated with hearings before the Zoning Hearing Board. The trial court based its decision on the precedent set in Appeal of Martin, asserting that section 1008(2) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code mandates the township to cover the costs of providing a transcript of the board's proceedings to the reviewing court. The township argues that the existence of a fee schedule justifies its position, unlike in Martin where no such schedule was present. However, the court concluded that the validity of section 1008(2) does not depend on the existence of a fee schedule, affirming the trial court's decision to impose transcript costs on the township.

Additionally, the document outlines the conditions under which a pending application is deemed approved if a governing body fails to act within a specified timeframe. It details the requirements for obtaining a variance, including proof of unique physical characteristics, lack of development possibility under current ordinances, and demonstrating that the hardship was not self-created. The ordinance also permits zoning provisions for the protection of natural resources and agricultural land. Specific regulations regarding single-family dwellings in the A-Agricultural District are stipulated, including limits on the number of permitted dwellings based on parcel size, as well as soil characteristics necessary for residential lots. The township maintains that the validity of certain sections of the ordinance need not be assessed as the challenge primarily targets the ordinance's overall validity rather than Boundary's subdivision plan. The ordinance also delineates a fee structure for appeals to the Zoning Hearing Board, requiring a deposit to cover associated costs. Section 1008(2) mandates that the board must provide the court with all pertinent records upon appeal.