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County of Fayette v. Cossell
Citations: 60 Pa. Commw. 202; 430 A.2d 1226Docket: Appeal, Nos. 1254 C.D. 1980 and 1908 C.D. 1980
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; June 25, 1981; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court
The County of Fayette appeals a decision affirming a chancellor’s order that dismissed the county's complaint seeking an injunction against the Cossells' operation of an automobile recycling center on their property. The property, purchased by the Cossells in January 1978, is located in an M-1 Light Industrial Zone where such operations are prohibited. However, the chancellor found that prior to the zoning ordinance, Mr. Rose, an adjacent landowner, had used 40% of the property to store junked automobiles, which established a nonconforming use that the Cossells could continue. The zoning ordinance defines nonconforming use as any lawful use existing at the ordinance's effective date that does not conform to district regulations. The county argued that Mr. Rose's use was unlawful due to trespassing, but the court disagreed, asserting that zoning regulations focus on the physical use of land rather than ownership methods. Since the record did not indicate that the storage of junked automobiles was unlawful prior to the ordinance, the court concluded that Mr. Rose's possession was the only unlawful aspect. The court also noted that zoning law does not resolve private disputes over real estate interests, and that nonconforming use is unaffected by the user’s title or possessory rights. The existence of a nonconforming use, once established, runs with the land, allowing continued use independent of individual ownership. The zoning ordinance lacks an administrative process to determine the validity of a nonconforming use, allowing the appellees to assert this defense in the equity action. However, the county contends that the Cossells cannot claim any rights to expand their junkyard use beyond what was operated by Mr. Rose prior to the ordinance. This position is supported by the requirement in Section 603(b) of the ordinance, which mandates a zoning hearing board proceeding for any extension of a nonconforming use. The trial court incorrectly classified the Cossells' operation of a recycling center as a "natural expansion" of the junkyard without determining whether Mr. Rose's prior use encompassed the entire area now utilized by the Cossells. Due to the absence of factual findings on the scope of the original use, the appellate court cannot resolve the county’s argument regarding expansion. The case is remanded for the trial court to ascertain whether the county has demonstrated that the use expanded beyond its original scope as of October 1968. If so, that expanded use may be subject to an injunction, while the Cossells can pursue administrative approval for that expansion. The trial court's decision not to impose an injunction on the nonconforming use as of October 16, 1968, is affirmed, while the remainder of the decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.