Gude v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: S22A0406

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; June 1, 2022; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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This opinion is subject to potential modifications from motions for reconsideration, editorial revisions, and will be officially published in the Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on June 1, 2022, in case S22A0406, involving Marquayvian Gude, who was convicted by a Fulton County jury for malice murder and related charges in the shooting death of Devontavious McClain. Gude's appeal includes claims of insufficient evidence for his convictions, trial court errors in admitting evidence, and procedural issues regarding his motion for immunity under OCGA 16-3-24.2. The court affirmed the convictions.

Evidence presented at trial indicated that McClain was reported missing on April 21, 2013. His mother described his vehicle, a silver 2004 Chevrolet Impala LS. On June 14, 2013, police located the vehicle hidden behind an abandoned apartment complex, where they found McClain's decomposed body in the trunk. The vehicle matched McClain's description, and forensic investigation linked the body to a gunshot wound deemed homicide. Cell phone records revealed a communication between Gude and McClain, suggesting McClain was on his way to meet Gude, whom he had met via an online dating application while posing as a woman. Gude's residence was close to the site where the vehicle was found and the last known location of McClain’s phone.

On July 4, 2013, police executed a search warrant at Damien Gude's residence, discovering a roll of black duct tape similar to that found in the car of the missing McClain. Gude's father, Damien, and his former girlfriend, Santrice Washington, recalled seeing Gude driving McClain's car during the last week of April 2013, coinciding with McClain's disappearance. Both witnesses reported a strong, foul odor emanating from the car's trunk, which Washington suspected was from a dead body. Gude attributed the smell to mildew from water in the backseat. Washington also mentioned that she had seen Gude with a black handgun and noted that one of her two rolls of duct tape was missing. Damien corroborated that he had seen Gude with a black gun but stated that Gude had never confessed to murder or sought his help in disposing of a body.

After his arrest, Gude, after receiving Miranda warnings, told police he met McClain online, expecting a woman, and when realizing McClain was male, refused sexual advances. He claimed McClain became aggressive during their encounter, leading Gude to shoot him in self-defense. Gude admitted to later attempting to use McClain’s debit card, with bank records showing declined transactions shortly after McClain’s death.

At trial, Gude testified that he shot McClain after being sexually assaulted. He recounted that he informed Damien and his sister about the shooting, and Damien helped him dispose of McClain’s body using a tarp and duct tape. They transported the body to an abandoned apartment complex and disposed of it in the bushes, taking McClain’s wallet and cellphone. Gude contended that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his convictions for malice murder, armed robbery, and firearm possession during a felony, arguing that not all reasonable alternative explanations for his actions were disproved by the prosecution.

Gude argues that the trial evidence did not eliminate the reasonable hypothesis of self-defense following being “catfished,” sexually assaulted, and falsely imprisoned by McClain. However, the court determined that a rational jury could find Gude guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In assessing the evidence, the court emphasized that it must be viewed favorably for the verdict, disregarding conflicts and the credibility of witnesses, leaving such determinations to the jury. The evidence established that McClain died from a gunshot wound, and Gude admitted to meeting McClain, being in his car, and shooting him. Gude and his father later found McClain's phone and wallet in the car, and bank records indicated use of McClain’s debit card after the shooting. Although Gude claimed self-defense due to McClain's alleged sexual advances, the jury could reject his self-serving account. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support charges of aggravated assault and felony murder. Furthermore, Gude's actions post-shooting, including attempts to conceal the crime, were contradicted by evidence and witness testimony. The court upheld that Gude's testimony and other evidence supported the jury's verdicts for malice murder, armed robbery, and firearm possession during a felony, noting that the evidence was not solely circumstantial, as it included Gude’s admissions and actions surrounding the incident.

The evidence presented at trial was deemed sufficient to uphold Gude's convictions under due process and OCGA 24-14-6. Gude contended that the trial court improperly admitted an "in-life" photograph of McClain via testimony from McClain's mother and erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. The photograph was introduced after McClain's mother, during direct examination, described her inability to retrieve her son's body due to decomposition. Gude's counsel objected to the mother identifying the photograph, claiming it was prejudicial and irrelevant. Despite this, the trial court overruled the objection, stating that the mother's testimony was necessary as she was the last to see McClain. On appeal, Gude reiterated that the photograph lacked relevance and was more prejudicial than probative. The court clarified that under OCGA 24-4-402, relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or other concerns per OCGA 24-4-403. The court acknowledged that while photographs of victims can be relevant to establish their death, caution must be exercised to prevent undue prejudice. In this case, the photograph showed McClain alone against a neutral background, aligning with previous rulings that allow such evidence under specific conditions.

The trial court denied Gude’s motion for a new trial, concluding that the emotional response of McClain's mother during her identification of McClain in a photograph did not significantly impact the trial's fairness. The court noted that her emotional testimony was consistent throughout and that the photograph's probative value, although minimal, was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, particularly as the State only introduced one photo. In contrast, a previous case found cumulative prejudice from multiple photos. 

Gude's argument regarding a mistrial due to McClain's mother’s emotional testimony was also rejected. The court emphasized that no evidence suggested the mother became hysterical or made prejudicial comments. Moreover, motions for mistrial must be made promptly, and Gude failed to object contemporaneously to the emotional display he later complained about.

Lastly, the court permitted testimony from McClain's sister, Shaniki, regarding her perception of McClain's emotional state based on text messages exchanged on the night of his death. Gude argued this was hearsay and inadmissible as lay opinion. However, the court found no abuse of discretion, allowing Shaniki to testify about her perceptions, as she and McClain had a close relationship and shared personal confidences.

Shaniki's testimony regarding her perception of McClain's emotional state, inferred from their text message exchange, was challenged by defense counsel as being inadmissible hearsay. The court clarified that Shaniki's testimony pertained to her perception, not McClain’s actual state of mind, leading to the witness expressing that McClain seemed “maybe scared or upset.” The text messages themselves were not admitted into evidence, thus Shaniki's impressions were permissible under Rule 701(a), which allows lay witness opinions based on personal perception. The trial court’s decision to allow her testimony was upheld as it was rationally based on her relationship with McClain. 

Additionally, Gude argued that the trial court erred by permitting an officer's opinion on Gude’s statements during an interview. The exchange included questions about the likelihood of suspects providing partial truths. The defense objected, claiming the officer's testimony encroached upon the ultimate issue of the case. The court opted to address the objection after hearing the question, indicating a procedural approach to the defense's concerns. Overall, the trial court's discretion in both instances was deemed appropriate, with no abuse of discretion found.

The witness stated that not disclosing the presence of a body in a trunk is not unusual, suggesting that admitting to such an act is more difficult than admitting to killing. Defense counsel objected, claiming the witness's statement called for speculation; however, the court overruled the objection. The witness described the act of placing a body in a car as "cold." After a third objection from the defense regarding this testimony, the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the witness's comment, emphasizing the presumption that juries follow curative instructions. The court noted that a new trial is not warranted unless it is evident that the instruction did not mitigate the prejudicial effect of the comment. The trial court's immediate curative instruction was deemed sufficient, and Gude's claim that it was inadequate was rejected.

Additionally, Gude argued that the trial court erred in ruling that he did not timely seek immunity from prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2, as he made this request orally near the trial's conclusion. He contended that he had met the burden of proving that he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary for his defense. Under OCGA 16-3-24.2, a person using justified force is immune from prosecution, with specific conditions outlined in OCGA 16-3-21 regarding the use of force in self-defense. The court highlighted that while immunity motions are typically filed before trial, OCGA 16-3-24.2 does not explicitly mandate pretrial filings.

A trial court is required to consider an immunity motion filed before trial, as established in State v. Remy. However, even if Gude's motion for immunity was timely, he did not demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying it on the merits. The defendant bears the burden of proof under OCGA 16-3-24.2, needing to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the use of deadly force was necessary for self-defense. The trial court reviews evidence favorably to its ruling and accepts its findings if supported by any evidence. In this case, Gude needed to prove he reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent harm. The trial court's order did not explain its reasoning for denying Gude's motion but implied disbelief in his account of events, which influenced its decision. The court was entitled to reject Gude’s self-serving testimony and conclude he failed to prove justification for immunity. Consequently, the trial court's denial of Gude's motion for immunity was affirmed, with all Justices concurring.