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State of Tennessee v. Justin Antonio McDowell
Citation: Not availableDocket: E2020-01641-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; April 14, 2022; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Justin Antonio McDowell was convicted by a Knox County jury on multiple charges, including two counts of possession of cocaine and methamphetamine with intent to sell within a drug-free zone (Class A felonies), unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon (Class B felony), and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Class D felonies). The trial court merged two firearm convictions and imposed a thirty-year sentence to be served at 100%. McDowell appealed, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient for his convictions; (2) the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained following an unlawful detention and warrantless searches of his car and motel room; (3) the admission of drug evidence was improper due to an unbroken chain of custody not being established; and (4) he deserved a sentence reduction based on post-sentencing changes to drug-free zone laws. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgments. The convictions stemmed from police responding to a report of a man with a gun threatening someone in a motel parking lot, leading to McDowell's detention and searches that uncovered drugs, cash, and firearms. McDowell's pretrial motions to suppress the evidence were based on claims of unlawful detention and searches without a warrant or consent. During the suppression hearing, the State contested McDowell's standing to challenge the searches, as he claimed the car involved belonged to his girlfriend, who was not present during the police response. The Defendant admitted he did not have "primary possession" of the car on the night in question but had a key in a motel room he rented with Ms. Andrews, where they had stayed for about a month. He paid for the room weekly and stated that both he and Ms. Andrews had keys and were the only occupants. He acknowledged having clothing and shoes in the room during the police search and mentioned Ms. Andrews likely had some belongings there as well. The Defendant had driven the car a few days prior to January 24, 2019, and claimed he drove it that morning; he noted that the car had flat tires that day due to Ms. Andrews but said the tires were inflated when police arrived. When officers sought permission to search the car, he denied consent, stating, "The car is not mine for you to search." The trial court found that he had standing to challenge the searches of both the car and the motel room. On January 24, 2019, Officer Dylan Williams responded to a report regarding the Defendant, who allegedly had waved a gun and threatened someone. Upon arrival at the motel, Officer Williams found the Defendant on a balcony, approached him, and requested to speak. After a pat-down for weapons, the Defendant explained that arguments with his girlfriend or ex-girlfriend were related to her attempting to slash the tires. Officer Williams requested consent to search the car, to which the Defendant allegedly agreed without objection. During the search, Officer Williams discovered a baggie containing suspected crack cocaine in the driver's door pocket, although no gun was found. The Defendant resisted when officers attempted to arrest him after discovering the cocaine. Additionally, a motel maintenance employee informed Officer Williams about two incidents involving the Defendant and the woman, including one with a knife, prompting management to request the clearing of the Defendant's room due to safety concerns. Officer Williams testified that other officers assisted an employee in changing a room key to prevent access to a motel room. His police vehicle and uniform were equipped with recording devices, which KPD policy mandated to be activated during public interactions. The in-car recording, played in court, captured audible exchanges between Officer Williams and the Defendant shortly after Williams arrived, although visuals were not recorded. The motel employee reported seeing the Defendant by a car, claiming he had a gun and retrieving it from the vehicle. When Officer Williams inquired about weapons in the car, the Defendant responded negatively. Following a brief period of arguing, an officer asked the Defendant to accompany him to the motel room, expressing a desire to locate the gun. Approximately five minutes elapsed from the initial interaction to the request to search the car. After the Defendant consented to the search, a struggle ensued within thirty seconds, during which officers instructed him to sit down. Less than two minutes later, officers discovered crack cocaine, prompting the Defendant to assert that the car was not his. Video evidence showed the Defendant being placed on the trunk of a patrol car shortly thereafter. Officer Williams indicated that the Defendant mentioned a woman who had caused a disturbance but did not reference a gun. He acknowledged a segment of the recording that might have been silent due to his microphone being turned off, though he couldn’t recall this action. Officer Williams clarified that he did not complete the crime scene evidence log, noting that no evidence was listed from a gold Chevrolet Impala, while crack cocaine was documented as found both in the car and a shoe box in the motel room. He explained that the cocaine from the car was entered into the "online Watson system," separate from the evidence log. Officer Williams confirmed that he and fellow officers discussed their suspicion that the Defendant had placed a gun in a motel room before their arrival, acknowledging they lacked legal grounds to enter the room at that time. He mentioned informing his sergeant about the Defendant’s history of violent felonies, including homicide, and uncharged allegations of involvement in an unrelated shooting. Williams indicated he might have referred to the Defendant when mentioning that motel management was “kicking him out” and expressed hope the gun would be found in the room, adding that they planned to escort the Defendant to retrieve his belongings. Williams also stated he asked a colleague to accompany the Defendant to secure the room while he remained downstairs, as other officers went with a maintenance employee to check the room. Various documents related to the incident were submitted as exhibits. Ben Wolever, an InTown Suites employee, testified that he recognized the Defendant and witnessed a disturbance on January 24, 2019, where a woman damaged a car's tires. He reported hearing the Defendant claim, "I’ve got a gun. I’ll show you," and then observed him walking across the parking lot with a black gun. Following this, Wolever called 9-1-1 due to the motel’s prohibition against firearms and instructions to remove disruptive individuals. He informed the officers that he needed the Defendant removed from the property, clarifying he could not identify the type of gun he saw. Wolever described the motel's eviction policy, which allowed for removal based on firearm possession or disturbances. He explained the protocol for securing a room, which involved knocking, using a master key to enter, ensuring no one was inside, and locking the windows before using a cancel key to prevent other keys from accessing the room. He noted the cancel key could be applied without entering the room and that he could only lock windows from inside. Mr. Wolever testified to observing a handgun in plain sight on a dresser in the Defendant’s motel room when he opened the door. Officers initially stood outside the room while he secured the window and used a cancel key, taking less than three minutes. Later, KPD Officer Christopher Medina arrived to find the Defendant in custody. Mr. Wolever requested Officer Medina to check the guest room for safety as he shut it down, leading to Medina witnessing the handgun on a table from outside the room. Both officers then conducted a safety sweep to ensure no one else was present. Officer Medina confirmed they did not touch anything and called for backup. Video evidence was referenced during the testimony. The defense submitted an affidavit from James Berry, who claimed he witnessed an altercation involving the Defendant but never saw him with a gun and stated that police did not speak to him before handcuffing the Defendant. The trial court credited Officer Williams' testimony, which included a report of a disturbance involving a gun and Mr. Wolever's claim of seeing the Defendant with a weapon. Officer Williams interacted with the Defendant, who stated the altercation was over and confirmed knowledge of a gold Impala. When asked about the car's contents, the Defendant denied having anything inside but consented to a search, during which Officer Williams found what appeared to be crack cocaine. The court concluded that the search was lawful and based on the Defendant's consent, noting his cooperative demeanor and indication that the issue was solely with a woman. The trial court acknowledged the Defendant's privacy interest in his motel room but determined that Mr. Wolever was not acting as a state agent. The court noted that the officers did not request Mr. Wolever to open the room; rather, he invited them for safety reasons. While the officers had a legitimate interest in the room’s contents, they were legally positioned on the balcony outside the room, where the Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The court credited testimonies from Officer Medina and Mr. Wolever, confirming that a gun was visible when Mr. Wolever opened the door. The officers secured the room after ensuring it was unoccupied and obtained a search warrant, leading the court to find no constitutional violations and deny the motion to suppress the evidence. Subsequently, the Defendant's motion to reconsider was denied due to its untimeliness and introduction of new issues not previously raised. The court characterized the reconsideration motion as effectively a new motion to suppress, filed just before the trial and thus non-compliant with Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2). In its order, the court reiterated findings from the suppression hearing: the State's witnesses were credible, the Defendant was briefly detained based on reasonable suspicion connected to a weapon investigation, and he consented to a search of his vehicle, which led to probable cause regarding controlled substances. The motel employee opened the room independently, while officers observed a gun in plain view from outside. The search was limited to confirming no one was inside, followed by obtaining a search warrant. Testimony from Mr. Wolever indicated he had known the Defendant for about two months and reported witnessing the Defendant with a gun during a dispute, as well as the motel's prohibition on firearms on the premises. Mr. Wolever testified that following an initial disturbance involving the Defendant, the general manager ordered that the Defendant be removed from the property if any further incidents occurred. Upon the arrival of law enforcement, Mr. Wolever identified the gold Impala from which he observed the Defendant emerging with a gun and informed the officer of the Defendant's presence on the motel property at around 7:00 p.m. He denied telling the officer that he had not seen a gun. Mr. Wolever requested an officer to check the Defendant’s motel room while he secured the area. Upon entering the room, he noticed a gun in plain sight on a dresser. Two officers accompanied him to ensure no one was inside, while Mr. Wolever checked that the windows were locked and then secured the room. KPD Officer Dylan Williams testified that on January 24, 2019, he responded to a report of a man brandishing a gun and making threats at InTown Suites. Upon arrival, he spoke with Mr. Wolever, who pointed out the Defendant on a second-floor balcony, although Mr. Wolever stated he had not seen a gun. Officer Williams asked the Defendant to come downstairs, where the Defendant explained that a woman, identified as his ex-girlfriend, had created a disturbance and attempted to slash the tires of the Impala. The Defendant was cooperative but nervous and did not disclose having a firearm. Officer Williams, believing there was a likelihood of a gun being in the Impala, sought permission to search the vehicle, to which the Defendant agreed, mentioning the car belonged to the woman involved in the incident. During the search, Officer Williams discovered a bag believed to contain crack cocaine in the driver’s door pocket. He described it as a ripped corner baggie, typical for drug resale. After determining the need to arrest the Defendant, an altercation ensued as the Defendant resisted handcuffing. Officers struggled to subdue him, eventually forcing him against a car to secure the cuffs. Officer Williams then placed the suspected crack cocaine into a drug evidence envelope for later processing by Investigator Phil Jinks. Officer Williams indicated that Takale Andrews was listed on the hotel receipt and owned the Impala. On January 24, 2019, Officer Christopher Medina responded to a disturbance at InTown Suites, leading to the escorting of a complainant to a motel room due to reports of violence and weapons. Upon entry, Medina observed a gun on an end table and conducted a safety sweep before securing the room. KPD Investigator Phillip Jinks later arrived, had officers secure the room, and obtained a search warrant. The search revealed a loaded Glock semi-automatic handgun, a small baggie of marijuana, and a razor blade with white residue, suggestive of crack cocaine use. No typical drug paraphernalia was found. A substantial amount of methamphetamine (approximately one ounce) was located in a drawer near the handgun and the Defendant's ID, indicating distribution rather than personal use. A shoebox containing about $2800 in cash, corner baggies with crack cocaine and methamphetamine, and an FN 9-millimeter handgun was also discovered. Additional items included a large quantity of sandwich bags, a key to the Impala, and women's clothing. A Room Agreement identified both the Defendant and Takale Andrews as occupants. Jinks did not check Andrews' criminal history for firearm possession eligibility and noted a handwritten note referencing another room, as well as a cell phone box, which is commonly associated with drug distribution activities. Photographs documenting the field testing and weighing of suspected drugs were admitted as exhibits. Investigator Jinks confirmed adherence to KPD protocol for handling suspected controlled substances, detailing that he packaged two bags of suspected crack cocaine from both a car and a motel room in separate plastic bags, labeled them according to their recovery locations, and placed them in a single drug envelope. This envelope was sealed with evidence tape to indicate any tampering. After testing by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI), the evidence was resealed and marked. Jinks noted that the drug evidence remained sealed except for his preparation for testimony. He compiled a single Property Inventory Report for all items recovered during the searches, stating that no separate report was made since all items originated from the same incident. Although he suspected a bag near a firearm contained marijuana, it was not tested due to TBI policy, which also affected the testing of the suspected crack cocaine from the car. Jinks opined that the crack cocaine from the car was likely derived from the larger piece found in the motel room and was intended for redistribution. He did not conduct field tests on the marijuana or crack cocaine. Jinks believed that the quantity, packaging, razor blade, cash, absence of paraphernalia, and presence of firearms indicated the Defendant intended to distribute the drugs, noting the proximity of Bearden High School to the location of the incident. TBI Crime Laboratory Special Agent Noah Hamlett testified to receiving and analyzing the sealed evidence, identifying three substances: 9.89 grams of cocaine base, 2.53 grams of methamphetamine, and 27.67 grams of methamphetamine, all classified as Scheduled II controlled substances. The defendant received two substances: a yellow, rock-like substance weighing 1.83 grams labeled “car,” which he did not test due to its similarity to 9.89 grams of cocaine base, and a bag of plant material he also did not test. He acknowledged that CBD in plant form resembles marijuana. The evidence submittal form lacked specific location details for each item, though the items labeled “car” and “room” had notations on their inner bags. A KUB Geographic Information Systems employee confirmed that the entire InTown Suites property was within a 1000-foot radius of Bearden High School, which was operational on January 24, 2019. The parties agreed that the defendant had a prior felony conviction from September 17, 2009, barring him from firearm possession. The jury found him guilty of multiple counts, including possession of cocaine and methamphetamine with intent to sell within a drug-free zone, firearm possession after a felony conviction, and firearm possession during a dangerous felony, while acquitting him of misdemeanor marijuana possession. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found him guilty of unlawful firearm possession related to his violent felony history. The trial court merged certain firearm convictions and imposed a thirty-year sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence to support his convictions. The sufficiency of evidence is reviewed by considering whether a rational jury could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, utilizing the strongest view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences, without reweighing or reevaluating evidence or witness credibility. A crime can be established through direct or circumstantial evidence. The standard of review for criminal convictions is consistent, regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, as established in State v. Sutton and further clarified by subsequent cases. The identity of the perpetrator is crucial in any crime and can be established solely through circumstantial evidence. This identity is a factual question determined by the jury, which also assesses the weight and implications of circumstantial evidence. In this case, the Defendant faced charges for two counts of possession of cocaine and methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone. Under T.C.A. § 39-17-417, it is illegal to manufacture, deliver, sell, or possess controlled substances with intent to do so. Violations occurring near schools incur higher penalties. The Defendant challenged the evidence of his possession of cocaine found in a shoebox in his motel room. He argued that the presence of women’s clothing and a previous altercation with a woman sharing the room suggested he did not possess the drugs. However, possession can be actual or constructive. To prove constructive possession, it must be shown that the individual has the power and intent to control the drugs. The evidence, viewed favorably for the State, indicated that 9.89 grams of crack cocaine was found in a shoebox, alongside items like a razor blade and plastic bags indicative of drug dealing, and approximately $2,800 in cash. Additionally, firearms were discovered in the room, supporting the inference of drug-related activity. The Defendant rented a motel room where drugs were found. Evidence indicated that a woman left after an argument with the Defendant, who remained outside the room when officers arrived. A jury could reasonably conclude that the Defendant had actual or constructive possession of the drugs. The conviction for Count 1 was supported by precedents showing possession in similar circumstances. In Count 2, the Defendant was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, despite arguing that the State lacked laboratory testing evidence for the substance found in a car door pocket. However, testimony from investigators indicated that the substance visually matched known cocaine and was packaged similarly to illicit drugs. The Defendant demonstrated knowledge of the car's contents and permitted officers to search it, despite claiming it belonged to someone else. Additionally, drugs and cash were found in his motel room, along with a key to the car. Evidence sufficed to demonstrate the Defendant's intent to sell or deliver the cocaine base. In Count 3, the Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver over twenty-six grams of methamphetamine. The Defendant contends that the State did not establish his possession of drugs, highlighting that he shared a motel room with a woman who may have had motives against him. However, evidence presented included a substantial bag of methamphetamine weighing 27.67 grams found in a drawer alongside a firearm and the Defendant's ID. This quantity exceeds typical personal user amounts. Additional evidence included firearms, plastic bags, other drugs, and significant cash in the room. The woman authorized to stay there had left, leaving the drugs with the Defendant. The jury believed the State’s evidence, and it is deemed sufficient to uphold the Defendant’s drug-related convictions, which occurred in a drug-free zone, a point unchallenged by the Defendant. Regarding firearms offenses, the Defendant was convicted of three counts. In Count 4, he was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm due to a prior felony conviction. Evidence showed two handguns were located in the motel room, one visible near the entrance when police responded. The Defendant, who was outside the room rented in his name, had previously waved a gun during an altercation, as testified by a witness. The parties acknowledged his prior felony convictions for aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter, affirming sufficient evidence for this conviction. In Count 5, the Defendant was convicted for possessing a firearm with intent to be armed while committing or attempting a dangerous felony, specifically regarding drug offenses. Evidence supporting this included his possession of firearms while dealing cocaine and methamphetamine, demonstrated by statements about having a gun and retrieving it during an argument. The evidence was adequate to support this conviction. In Count 8, he was again convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during dangerous felony commission, considering his prior felony status. The offense in Count 8 mirrors that in Count 5, with an increased statutory mandatory minimum sentence of five years instead of three if the defendant is found to have a prior felony conviction. Evidence presented by the State, including the defendant's prior convictions for aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter, supports the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during a dangerous felony. The defendant's motions to suppress evidence from a warrantless search of his vehicle and motel room are denied, with the court agreeing with the State that no constitutional violations occurred. The trial court’s fact findings on the motion to suppress are upheld unless evidence strongly contradicts them. The credibility of witnesses and evidence evaluation are within the trial judge's purview. The defendant argues his seizure by Officer Williams was unlawful, but the State maintains it was justified due to reasonable suspicion of a gun-related threat. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, presuming warrantless actions are unreasonable unless they meet specific exceptions. The document outlines established exceptions to warrant requirements in warrantless searches and seizures. The State must prove that a warrantless search is justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. There are three levels of police-citizen interactions: 1) full-scale arrest (requires probable cause), 2) brief investigatory detention (requires reasonable suspicion), and 3) brief encounter (no objective justification needed). Only the first two interactions qualify as a "seizure" under the Constitution. In this case, both the Defendant and the State agree that the initial encounter was an investigatory detention, which necessitates reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances. This includes evaluating the public interest, the nature and scope of the intrusion, and the objective facts relied upon by the officer, which may consist of observations, information from fellow officers, and patterns of criminal behavior. Officer Williams responded to a report involving an armed individual and spoke with Mr. Wolever, who claimed to have witnessed the Defendant arguing and stating he had a gun. There was a discrepancy regarding whether Mr. Wolever saw the gun; however, the trial court did not resolve this issue. The evidence indicated that Mr. Wolever identified the Defendant, who was then approached by Officer Williams for questioning. The interaction lasted approximately five minutes, during which the Defendant was patted down for weapons. No officers drew their weapons during this investigatory detention. The trial court concluded that the Defendant was justifiably detained based on reasonable suspicion regarding a threatening individual with a weapon, and the record supports this determination. Officer Williams had reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was involved in a dispute while armed. His investigation was brief, focused on assessing the Defendant's potential threat. The trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence from a warrantless search of the car was upheld. The Defendant claimed he did not consent to the search in a clear and voluntary manner, but the State argued that valid consent was given. Consent for warrantless searches can be provided by either the defendant or someone with common authority over the vehicle. The legal standard requires that consent must be unequivocal, specific, and free from coercion, evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. During the brief detention, Officer Williams questioned the Defendant about the car's contents. The Defendant's responses were non-assertive, and the recording indicated no contradiction to Officer Williams' account. The Defendant's arguments regarding unlawful detention and the nature of the consent were rejected, and the court found that the Defendant did indeed consent to the search. Claims of being held against his will were unsupported by the record. Ultimately, the trial court's determination that the Defendant consented to the search was upheld, and he was not entitled to relief on this issue. The Defendant contends that the trial court mistakenly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his motel room, arguing that officers, with assistance from Mr. Wolever, created a false sense of danger to facilitate an unlawful investigation and gain entry to the room. In contrast, the State asserts that the court acted appropriately because the officers accompanied Mr. Wolever to the Defendant's room at his request, to help secure it during the eviction process. The court recognizes that while a motel guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their room, this expectation does not extend to common areas of the motel. The court references several precedents to support this position. It distinguishes between areas where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists and those where it does not, citing cases such as Stoner v. California and State v. Torsaunt Lamont Shanklin. The Defendant's claim that the officers and Mr. Wolever conspired to create a pretext for entering the room requires reevaluation of witness credibility, which is the trial court's responsibility. The trial court found the State's witnesses credible and determined that the officers did not collude with Mr. Wolever to enter the room without a warrant. Mr. Wolever testified that he was instructed to evict the Defendant following a second incident, which prompted him to call the police for assistance. He indicated that motel guests could be removed for possessing firearms or engaging in disturbances. Officer testimonies further corroborated that Mr. Wolever informed them of management's desire to evict the Defendant for safety reasons, and the officers did not request Mr. Wolever to open the room to conduct a search. The court determined that the Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the breezeway where Officer Medina observed a handgun, thus upholding the denial of the motion to suppress evidence based on the plain view doctrine. Regarding the admission of drug evidence, the Defendant claimed that the trial court erred by allowing it without sufficient proof of the chain of custody and in denying a mistrial after Agent Hamlett discussed the drugs' packaging. The State argued that the Defendant waived these objections because he did not make a contemporaneous objection or request a mistrial at the time of evidence admission. Although the Defendant mentioned chain of custody concerns during the suppression hearing, those claims focused on unconstitutional searches rather than chain of custody issues. At trial, no objections were raised at the time the drug evidence was introduced. The trial judge confirmed that no adequate objection had been made and found a proper chain of custody had been established. The defense later sought a mistrial in a motion for a new trial but did not request it during the trial when the issue arose. The court reiterated that timely objections must be made, and specific grounds must be stated unless obvious from the context, leading to the conclusion that the Defendant was not entitled to relief on this matter. A trial court is not obligated to exclude evidence or give limiting instructions to the jury without a timely objection from the opposing party. Timely objections serve three primary purposes: they allow the judge to rule on evidence admissibility before jury introduction, prevent "sandbagging" by ensuring objections are raised promptly rather than on appeal, and provide the evidence proponent the chance to present it through an alternative method if needed. A mistrial is intended to rectify damage to the judicial process when impartiality is compromised, with the burden on the moving party to demonstrate its necessity. To seek a mistrial, the party must promptly inform the court; failing to do so results in waiving the issue unless plain error is established. Various cases illustrate that a contemporaneous objection or motion is generally required to preserve issues for appeal regarding mistrial denials, though there are exceptions. The Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36 clarifies that no relief is granted to a party responsible for an error or who did not take reasonable steps to mitigate its effects. In this context, the defense failed to raise the chain of custody issue during pretrial proceedings or object at the time the drug evidence was admitted, only addressing it later in a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the court considered on its merits. It is emphasized that the preferred practice is for parties to object at the time evidence is presented. If the court had agreed with the defense's late challenge regarding the chain of custody, it had the option to allow the State to present additional evidence or to strike the evidence if the concerns remained unresolved. The issue was raised prior to jury deliberations, and the court will examine the admissibility of the evidence on its merits. The Defendant did not request a mistrial during the trial, even when the court suggested it as a potential remedy, and it is noted that a mistrial cannot be declared after a jury verdict has been accepted. Consequently, the review of the denial of a mistrial is limited to plain error examination under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a). Tennessee Rule of Evidence 901 requires that evidence be authenticated for admissibility, demonstrating sufficient proof to establish that the evidence is what it claims to be. The State must present an unbroken chain of custody to prove the reliability of tangible evidence. While each link in the chain should be established, the State is not required to eliminate all possibilities of tampering or to call every witness who handled the evidence. If the State fails to prove the chain of custody, the evidence may still be admitted if identity and integrity can be shown by other means. Chain of custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion. In this case, Officer Williams located a baggie of crack cocaine during a search and followed protocol for securing the evidence, transferring it to Investigator Jinks, who confirmed the proper handling of additional drugs found during a search of the Defendant’s motel room. The evidence related to crack cocaine found in a car and a room was properly handled and documented. Each baggie was placed in separate plastic bags labeled “car” and “room” and subsequently sealed in a drug envelope, which was transported to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) for testing. Agent Hamlett confirmed that the chain of custody was maintained, and the evidence remained sealed until the trial. The Defendant challenged the accuracy and consistency of witness testimonies regarding the labeling of the evidence. However, the law does not require absolute certainty in the chain of custody, and the State presented sufficient evidence to show proper handling and testing. The trial court found the chain of custody adequate and admitted the drug evidence. In addressing the Defendant's claim for a mistrial, it was noted that the Defendant failed to make a timely motion for one. Five factors determine whether an error can be classified as “plain error” without an objection: clarity of the record, breach of law, adverse effect on a substantial right, lack of tactical waiver, and necessity for justice. All five factors must be met for plain error to be recognized, and if one factor fails to be established, complete consideration of all factors is unnecessary. A mistrial is warranted only when manifest necessity arises, indicating that no feasible alternatives to halting the proceedings exist. The trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a mistrial, and its decision will only be overturned if there is an abuse of that discretion. In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting drug evidence, and the absence of evidentiary error eliminated any manifest necessity for a mistrial. The Defendant failed to demonstrate a breach of a clear legal rule or that a substantial right was adversely affected, nor did he establish the presence of plain error that would warrant relief. Regarding sentencing, the Defendant sought a reduction based on amendments to the Drug-Free Zone enhancement statute that occurred after his offenses but before the motion for a new trial. The State contended that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to grant such a reduction. The court had sentenced the Defendant under the previous version of the statute, which mandated a higher sentence for offenses near school property and required the full minimum sentence to be served. The amendments made the classification enhancement permissive and replaced the minimum service requirement with a rebuttable presumption. The Criminal Savings Statute stipulates that offenses must be prosecuted under the law in effect at the time of the offense. Following the amendments, the Defendant argued for resentencing, claiming the enhancement no longer applied. However, the trial court denied this request, stating that the Criminal Savings Statute does not allow for the application of new statutes after judgment has been entered, and noted that the judgments had become final more than thirty days prior to the motion. Thus, the court concluded it could not apply the amended statute to the Defendant's case. The Defendant correctly argues that the judgments were not final due to the timely filing of a motion for a new trial, which was later amended to include a request for resentencing. A trial court's order becomes final thirty days post-entry unless a notice of appeal or post-trial motion is filed. However, the Criminal Savings Statute does not apply to defendants sentenced before an amendment to a criminal statute takes effect. The Defendant contends that the amendments related to the theft grading statute differ from those concerning the Drug-Free Zone statute, but the court finds no distinction. The Drug-Free Zone statute serves as an enhancement statute, much like the grading of theft offenses based on property value. The supreme court has established that defendants sentenced prior to any favorable amendments are not entitled to those benefits. The intermediate appellate court is bound by this precedent and, despite the Defendant's policy concerns regarding potential delays in litigation during legislative sessions, affirms the trial court's judgments.