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Air Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl

Citations: 663 F.3d 27; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23923; 2011 WL 6004383Docket: 11-1088

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; December 1, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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An appeal has been filed regarding the denial of a motion to dismiss two claims against Stephen M. Carl, a Principal Maintenance Inspector with the FAA, on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiffs Air Sunshine, Inc. and its owner Mirmohammad Adili allege that Carl and other federal defendants improperly delayed critical certifications and inspections, infringing on their constitutional rights and harming their business, for which they seek $7 million in damages. 

While the magistrate judge dismissed most claims, the two Bivens claims related to procedural due process and retaliation for First Amendment activity were allowed to proceed. Carl appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The court confirmed that, in such interlocutory appeals, well-pleaded facts in the complaint are accepted, but legal conclusions are not. The complaint's allegations stem from three primary factual scenarios involving testing and inspections of aircraft, with the focus on the procedural due process claims concerning the inspection of aging C402 aircraft. Ultimately, the court found the allegations inadequate to overcome the Iqbal pleading standard and reversed the decision, directing entry of judgment for Carl.

The First Amendment retaliation claim involves multiple incidents related to Air Sunshine's operations and interactions with the FAA. In late 2005, Air Sunshine leased three SAAB 340 aircraft, which required FAA proving runs before use. By July 2008, these runs had not been conducted, prior to FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector Carl's involvement in August 2008. During a meeting on October 8, 2008, Carl informed Air Sunshine that the proving runs were contingent upon corrections to their operating manual, which Air Sunshine contends were outside Carl's purview. Air Sunshine criticized FAA inspector Yvette Hau-Lepera, a friend of Carl's, for delays in certification, claiming this criticism led to retaliatory actions by Carl.

Subsequent communication from Carl included a request for additional time and a letter with repetitive inquiries, which Air Sunshine interpreted as an intimidation tactic intended to delay the proving runs further. Despite a meeting on November 14, 2008, suggesting imminent proving runs, a later email from Carl's assistant indicated procedural compliance issues with Air Sunshine's submissions. By December 22, 2008, Carl required Air Sunshine to choose between the SAAB proving tests and inspections of their C402 aircraft, which were also under regulatory scrutiny for aging compliance. Air Sunshine's economic hardship escalated, culminating in the absence of certification for the SAAB 340 aircraft and significant damage to their business operations. The C402 inspections, requested in July 2006, remained unfulfilled by the expiration date of December 8, 2008, despite Air Sunshine's repeated requests for inspection.

Carl had no involvement with Air Sunshine prior to August 2008, and no details were provided regarding his actions. Air Sunshine’s scheduling authority expired automatically on December 8, 2008. Following this, Carl informed Air Sunshine that an extension was not possible and that it had lost its scheduling authority. Despite this, he later indicated that his assistant would conduct an inspection of Air Sunshine’s fleet, but subsequently stated that a team would be needed instead. Air Sunshine then hired a former FAA inspector for the inspection, but Carl refused to accept it pending approval of a manual revision, which Air Sunshine contended was unnecessary. Consequently, the inspection was never completed, leading to Air Sunshine's loss of scheduling authority and inability to bid for government contracts.

In relation to a ferry permit, Air Sunshine requested permission to ferry an aircraft for repairs on August 25, 2008. After three days, Carl incorrectly stated that FAA regulations prohibited ferrying the aircraft, delaying the permit issuance until October when he inspected the aircraft. This delay caused Air Sunshine to incur a loss of $45,000 per month in revenue and corrosion damage to the aircraft.

The denial of Carl's motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The standard for qualified immunity involves a two-part test: determining if the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutional right and whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation. A right is clearly established if a reasonable officer would recognize their conduct as unlawful under the circumstances.

Air Sunshine's claims did not meet the necessary pleading standard. To survive a motion to dismiss for a Bivens claim, the complaint must allege that each government official defendant, through individual actions, violated the Constitution. It must provide sufficient factual matter for the claim to be plausible on its face, moving beyond mere possibilities of unlawful action. While courts accept factual allegations as true, this does not extend to legal conclusions or conclusory statements.

A court does not accept as true allegations that are overly speculative or lack factual support, as established in Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset. Air Sunshine has two claims on appeal: a Bivens claim regarding the C402 inspection process as a deprivation of property without due process, and a Bivens claim alleging retaliation for complaints made during an October 8 meeting. Regarding the procedural due process claim, Carl argues that the complaint fails to adequately state such a claim or overcome qualified immunity, a position the court agrees with. The court does not address whether Air Sunshine can bring a procedural due process claim under Bivens, noting that such claims are generally disfavored. 

To establish a valid procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must identify a protected interest and demonstrate a deprivation without adequate process. Air Sunshine's complaint does not allege a deprivation by Carl, as the actions attributed to him occurred after the deadline for the C402 inspection process on December 8, 2008. Consequently, there is no plausible causal connection. The specific allegations against Carl—regarding the impossibility of extending the deadline and his conflicting statements about the inspection—fail to establish personal responsibility or authority over the decisions made. Additionally, the relevant regulation allows for discretionary extensions only in cases of unforeseen scheduling conflicts, which are not alleged in the complaint. Thus, Air Sunshine's claims are deemed insufficient as a matter of law, as discretionary benefits are not protected entitlements under the Due Process Clause.

Allegations against Carl are dismissed due to a lack of factual support for procedural due process claims. Carl's decision to require a team for inspection, rather than allowing his assistant to proceed alone, falls within his authority and does not constitute a procedural due process violation. The complaint fails to specify critical details, such as the timing of the private inspection, the submission of results, or reasons for Carl's refusal, rendering the assertions insufficient under the Iqbal standard. Carl’s actions align with lawful conduct, further undermining the complaint. Similarly, no viable First Amendment retaliation claim is presented. The complaint does not establish that any conduct was constitutionally protected or that Carl’s decisions were motivated by Air Sunshine’s criticisms during an October 2008 meeting. The expiration of the inspection process is not attributable to Carl's actions, leading to the conclusion that the retaliation claim lacks merit.

Carl's refusal to grant the ferry permit occurred before the October 8 meeting, which precludes any claim of retaliatory motive linked to comments about Hau-Lepera. The complaint states that Carl denied the permit starting August 28, 2008, and only conducted an inspection in October 2008, without specifying the inspection date. No plausible facts suggest that any delay after the October 8 meeting was retaliatory. Additionally, Air Sunshine's allegations regarding the SAAB 340 proving tests do not substantiate claims of retaliation. The delays described, beginning in August 2007 and extending into 2009, align with standard procedural requirements set by the FAA and do not indicate improper actions by Carl. Air Sunshine failed to demonstrate compliance with FAA procedures or to challenge Carl's stated reasons for the delays, which included non-compliance with FAA regulations. The complaint lacks factual support for claims of discrimination or retaliation, particularly since Air Sunshine had been awaiting proving runs for over a year before Carl's involvement, further undermining the retaliation claim. The absence of comparative facts regarding other companies' certification processes also weakens Air Sunshine's position. Overall, the allegations do not provide a sufficient basis to infer that Carl's actions were motivated by retaliation.

Air Sunshine's allegations of wrongdoing lack the necessary factual context, leading to a failure to establish a claim of retaliation. Consequently, Carl is entitled to qualified immunity, and the magistrate judge's contrary ruling is deemed erroneous. Air Sunshine opted to pursue claims under Bivens, which are only applicable in limited circumstances when no other remedy exists for alleged constitutional violations. However, Air Sunshine had alternative legal options, such as claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, which allows for judicial review of agency actions causing legal harm. The court determined that a lawsuit seeking $7 million in damages against individual federal employees based on the presented pleadings is not viable. The judgment is reversed, favoring Carl on the basis of qualified immunity, and costs are awarded to Carl.