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Robinson Saw Mill Works, Inc. v. Speilman
Citations: 265 A.D.2d 604; 696 N.Y.S.2d 277; 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10346
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; October 14, 1999; New York; State Appellate Court
Appeals were filed from multiple orders of the Supreme Court in Sullivan County regarding a case initiated by plaintiffs Aaron I. Robinson and David E. Robinson against defendants State Wide Recycling, Inc., Franco Rotondo, Reno Rotondo, and Paul Rotondo. The case stemmed from the unlawful discharge of approximately 3,373.13 tons of construction and demolition debris onto the plaintiffs' property, allegedly violating statutes and regulations. The plaintiffs sought damages for remediation costs, expert testing expenses, counsel fees, and punitive damages. The Supreme Court issued a default judgment against the defendants due to their failure to comply with discovery notices and a prior conditional order. The court subsequently denied the defendants' motion to vacate the default judgment and assessed damages at $284,760.28, along with counsel fees of $26,240.92 awarded to the plaintiffs. The appellate court affirmed the Supreme Court's decisions, finding no abuse of discretion. The record demonstrated that the defendants’ default was willful and contumacious, as they failed to respond to discovery requests and did not comply with multiple court orders, including a requirement to retain new counsel after their previous attorney withdrew due to nonpayment. Despite the defendants eventually obtaining counsel, they did not meet the compliance deadlines set by the court, prompting the plaintiffs to seek a default judgment. Defendants’ failure to comply with a Supreme Court order was primarily due to their negligence in securing new counsel after being aware since March 1997 that their previous attorney would not continue without payment. Despite a personal circumstance involving their current counsel on January 6, 1998, this did not excuse their overall pattern of delay and noncompliance, which suggested willful misconduct. The Supreme Court's default judgment against the defendants was justified, as they did not provide a reasonable excuse for their default when seeking to vacate the judgment. The court's determination of plaintiffs’ damages was supported by evidence and did not contradict the weight of the evidence. Moreover, defendants failed to preserve their argument regarding plaintiffs' entitlement to counsel fees due to a lack of appropriate challenge in the lower court. The judgment and orders were affirmed without costs.