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Hoag v. Chase Pitkin Home & Garden Center
Citations: 252 A.D.2d 953; 675 N.Y.S.2d 724; 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8445
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; July 8, 1998; New York; State Appellate Court
Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Plaintiffs initiated a negligence action against Chase Pitkin Home and Garden Center, which subsequently filed a third-party action against Tilepak America, Inc. Following depositions of the plaintiffs and Chase Pitkin representatives, a stipulation of discontinuance of the third-party action was executed by Chase Pitkin and Tilepak under CPLR 3217(a)(2). Plaintiffs then moved to compel Tilepak to comply with their pre-stipulation discovery demands, including document production and deposition of a Tilepak representative. The Supreme Court denied this motion, concluding that the term “all parties” in CPLR 3217(a)(2) referred specifically to Chase Pitkin and Tilepak, thus not necessitating the plaintiffs' attorney's signature on the stipulation. The court determined that plaintiffs had neither a claim against Tilepak nor an interest in the third-party action, invalidating their discovery demands against Tilepak as a party. While recognizing that a stipulation of discontinuance under CPLR 3217(a)(2) typically requires a party with an interest to consent, the court found that plaintiffs’ discovery request did not constitute such an interest. However, plaintiffs retain the ability to depose a Tilepak representative and seek documents from Tilepak as a nonparty under CPLR 3101(a)(4), 3106(b), and 3120(b). The appeal was heard by Justices Lawton, Hayes, Pigott, Jr., Boehm, and Fallon.