United States v. Roberto Zamora

Citation: Not availableDocket: 10-30092

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; October 26, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

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Roberto Zamora and Fletcher Freeman, Jr. appeal their convictions for drug trafficking, stemming from their involvement in the Chapa-Duran drug trafficking conspiracy, which operated from 2002 to 2006. The conspiracy, led by Mexican fugitive Francisco Chapa-Duran, transported drugs from Mexico to Houston, Texas, and then to Columbus, Georgia, utilizing modified vehicles for concealment and employing non-participants’ names to register these vehicles to avoid detection. Zamora and Freeman were found guilty of various charges: Zamora for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; Freeman for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Freeman, who worked in trucking and lived in Columbus, Georgia, was identified as a recipient of drugs transported by the conspiracy. Testimonies from several witnesses, including former members of the conspiracy, linked Freeman to drug transactions, indicating he received drugs at his home and facilitated payments for them. The court ultimately affirmed their convictions, confirming Freeman's significant role in the conspiracy's Georgia operations.

Roberto Zamora was arrested on April 4, 2006, in Houston after police monitored his residence at 2118 Fulton Street, following a reliable tip from a confidential informant regarding potential drug activity. Police corroborated details of the informant's tip, observing a garage covered by a tarp and three vehicles outside. Zamora and his brother, Leobardo, were seen arriving in a red Lincoln Navigator. Witnesses testified that Leobardo changed shirts after entering the residence, while Roberto was seen parking the Volkswagen in a manner suggesting he wanted to conceal activity in the carport. After leaving the residence at 11:09 a.m., the Navigator was stopped by police for a traffic violation and drug investigation. A search revealed Leobardo had an outstanding warrant, while Roberto did not. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the Navigator, but no drugs were found. 

Roberto consented to a search of 2118 Fulton Street at 11:58 a.m., leading to the discovery of cocaine, a money counter, drug ledger, packing materials, marijuana, and a firearm. A subsequent search warrant executed on the Volkswagen uncovered four kilograms of cocaine, with modifications indicating its use for drug trafficking. Evidence indicated that the Volkswagen had links to a previous drug conspiracy. Later, Roberto admitted knowledge of the drugs in the Volkswagen but claimed his brother was unaware. After this admission, police read him his Miranda rights for the first time, and he ceased further communication.

On March 11, 2009, both Roberto Zamora and another individual named Freeman were indicted on charges related to drug conspiracy and possession of a firearm in connection with drug trafficking. During pretrial proceedings, Zamora sought to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his residence. The district court initially suppressed the firearm found as Zamora had not been read his Miranda rights prior to making the statement that led to its discovery.

The district court ruled that the gun was admissible in evidence, asserting the government would have found it inevitably, despite ordering the suppression of Zamora’s statement regarding the gun. Leobardo Zamora was indicted but is not part of these proceedings; references to "Zamora" pertain to Roberto Zamora. The trial lasted four days, with forty-one witnesses, primarily law enforcement and members of the Chapa-Duran organization. Evidence presented included drug deliveries, the traffic stop of Zamora, and a notebook with Zamora’s fingerprints, suggested to be a drug ledger containing the nickname 'Gordo,' linked to a customer of Chapa-Duran. A Volkswagen tied to drug trafficking was also found outside Zamora’s residence. During cross-examination of the case agent, it was revealed that Freeman had a criminal history but had never been convicted. Both defendants moved for acquittal due to insufficient evidence, which was denied. The jury convicted them on all counts; Zamora received a total of 180 months, while Freeman was sentenced to 210 months for his convictions. Appeals were filed, with Zamora challenging the denial of a downward sentence adjustment, which became moot after receiving the mandatory minimum sentence. He also contested the admission of evidence from 2118 Fulton Street, arguing it stemmed from an unconstitutional traffic stop. The constitutionality of traffic stops is assessed based on whether the officer had reasonable suspicion at the outset, which can be informed by reliable information from a confidential informant.

Factors influencing the determination of reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop include: the informant's credibility and reliability, the specificity of the tip, the verifiability of the information by officers, and whether the tip pertains to recent or stale activity (United States v. Martinez). If a stop is justified, the next step involves assessing whether the officer's actions were appropriate in relation to the initial circumstances (Pack). A detention based on reasonable suspicion should not exceed the time necessary to fulfill the purpose of the stop (Jenson). 

In the case of Zamora, police had two justifications for the initial vehicle stop: first, the vehicle had a canceled rear license plate and a missing front plate, which constituted clear traffic violations; second, reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking was supported by an informant's tip and police surveillance at 2118 Fulton Street, believed to be associated with the Zamoras. The informant had a history of reliability, and the tip was corroborated through police observations at the residence, received on the same day as the investigation, thus not stale. The Zamoras' suspicious behavior near the residence further bolstered the reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.

Following the initial stop, the officers questioned the Zamora brothers about the license plate issues and conducted a computer check. After these inquiries, the traffic violation no longer justified Roberto Zamora's detention; however, the ongoing reasonable suspicion regarding drug trafficking permitted the use of drug-sniffing dogs. The alert from the dogs provided probable cause to search the vehicle, although no drugs were found. The brief detention for additional questioning between 11:45 a.m. and 11:58 a.m. was deemed reasonable, as the primary focus remained on the suspected drug trafficking at 2118 Fulton Street, rather than the vehicle itself.

The absence of drugs in the Navigator did not render the officers' additional questioning unreasonable, thus upholding Zamora's Fourth Amendment rights. The district court's admission of evidence from 2118 Fulton Street was appropriate. Zamora's challenge regarding the lack of a requested venue instruction was examined under an abuse of discretion standard. A jury instruction on venue is necessary only if the requested instruction is legally correct, not covered in the overall charge, and addresses a critical point affecting the defendant's defense. Venue is not in issue if the government presents sufficient evidence that is not contradicted by the defendant. In this case, the government established that overt acts of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy occurred in the Western District of Louisiana, and Zamora did not dispute this evidence, indicating that venue was not contested. Thus, the district court's denial of Zamora’s venue instruction was not a reversible error. 

Additionally, Zamora's motion for judgment of acquittal was reviewed de novo, with the focus on whether a rational juror could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence favorably for the prosecution. The government must demonstrate an agreement to violate narcotics laws, the defendant's knowledge of that agreement, and voluntary participation for a conspiracy charge. Zamora argued insufficient evidence to prove his involvement in the conspiracy or use of a firearm in a drug trafficking offense, but the appellate court does not assess the weight of evidence or witness credibility, allowing jurors discretion in interpreting evidence to reach their verdict.

A jury can infer the existence of a conspiracy agreement from testimony and circumstantial evidence without needing an express agreement; a tacit mutual agreement is sufficient. Mere presence at a crime scene or association with conspirators does not imply participation. Francisco Chapa-Duran's drug trafficking conspiracy is uncontested, but Zamora claims he was unaware of it and did not participate. However, evidence supports the jury's conviction of Zamora for knowing participation in the conspiracy. Two key pieces of evidence were presented: 

1. Zamora's Volkswagen was previously owned by members of Chapa-Duran's organization, modified for drug transportation, and found containing cocaine outside Zamora's residence. Zamora acknowledged knowing about the cocaine, indicating potential involvement in the conspiracy.

2. A drug ledger found in Zamora's home bore his fingerprints and recorded illicit transactions, including the name 'Gordo,' a known customer of Chapa-Duran. This connection further suggests Zamora's participation in drug trafficking.

The circumstantial evidence from both sources was strong enough for the jury to infer Zamora's knowledge and involvement in the conspiracy, leading the district court to deny his motion for acquittal.

Additionally, Zamora argued that the firearm found in his residence was not possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking. For a firearm to be considered possessed in relation to a drug crime, factors such as the type of drug activity, accessibility and nature of the weapon, whether it was stolen, its loaded status, and its proximity to drugs or drug profits are evaluated.

Zamora was found to have possessed a firearm in connection with drug trafficking based on several key pieces of evidence. The gun was located in his residence, supporting the conclusion of possession. Additionally, four kilograms of drugs and drug paraphernalia were found nearby, indicating drug trafficking activity at the location. The loaded handgun, easily accessible under a bed and commonly used in drug trafficking, further supported this conclusion. The proximity of the firearm to drug-related items reinforced the jury's findings that Zamora used the gun to further drug trafficking.

Freeman's appeal regarding the denial of a mistrial due to a witness's mention of his "criminal history" was also addressed. The court found that the testimony was isolated, vaguely related to the charges, and its impact was mitigated by subsequent clarifications. In a trial with extensive evidence linking Freeman to a major drug trafficking organization, the brief mention of his criminal history did not significantly influence the jury's verdict. Therefore, the district court's decision to deny Freeman's motions for both a mistrial and a judgment of acquittal was upheld. The judgments and sentences from the district court were affirmed, with no reversible errors found.