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Selinger v. Selinger
Citations: 250 A.D.2d 752; 672 N.Y.S.2d 913; 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5827
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; May 18, 1998; New York; State Appellate Court
In a matrimonial action, the plaintiff appeals a portion of a May 20, 1997 order from the Supreme Court, Nassau County, which modified the prejudgment interest provision of the parties’ amended divorce judgment from February 19, 1997. The appellate court reverses this modification, reinstating the original prejudgment interest provision, and grants costs to the plaintiff. Previously, a decision on October 15, 1996, had awarded the plaintiff prejudgment interest on her distributive share of marital property from the action's commencement date, May 10, 1991, but did not specify the interest rate. The Supreme Court has the discretion to set this rate under CPLR 5001(a). Both parties had proposed similar amended judgments with a 9% interest rate from May 10, 1991, to February 25, 1997, but the court signed the defendant's proposal. Subsequently, the defendant sought to reduce the interest rate to no more than 5%, arguing that the stock transferred to the plaintiff had appreciated by the time the amended judgment was entered, rendering the 9% interest a windfall for the plaintiff. The court finds this argument unpersuasive, as it does not meet any criteria for relief under CPLR 5015(a) and is insufficient for exercising the court's discretionary power to modify the judgment. The court emphasizes that the prejudgment interest aims to indemnify the plaintiff for the nontransfer of the stock from the start of the action to the judgment's entry. The defendant's claim regarding the stock's increased value was irrelevant to the interest awarded. Furthermore, the defendant was aware of the stock's value at the time he submitted the judgment proposal, making his later objection to the interest rate inappropriate. The court concludes that he cannot modify a judgment he himself drafted simply because he now perceives a different rate would have been better for him. The decision is affirmed with the concurrence of the justices on the panel.