Denice Twigg appealed the United States District Court's summary judgment favoring Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (HBC) on her claims of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), as well as FMLA interference. The Tenth Circuit, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, found that Twigg did not provide sufficient evidence to support her retaliation claims, concluding that HBC did not terminate her employment in response to her complaints about race discrimination or her FMLA leave. The court affirmed that HBC demonstrated Twigg's termination was for failure to adhere to its notice-of-absence policy, unrelated to her FMLA leave. Twigg was employed by HBC from 1997 until her termination in 2008, working as a Media Production Specialist. Throughout her employment, she raised concerns about the treatment of a coworker, Teresa Cole, whom she believed was subjected to racial discrimination by their supervisor, Sharon Schlegel. HBC had a clear FMLA policy communicated to employees, detailing their responsibilities for reporting absences, which Twigg failed to comply with. The judgment of the district court was thus affirmed.
Twigg received a copy of HBC’s attendance policy during her 1996 orientation, which states that an employee's absence for three consecutive working days without proper notification is grounds for termination. In 2004, she took six weeks of approved FMLA leave for elective cosmetic surgery without experiencing any retaliation upon her return. In 2008, Twigg requested FMLA leave starting February 20 through April 17 for bunion surgery, claiming that Ealey and Sade approved her absence and the out-of-office email notification indicating her expected return on April 18.
Her FMLA request included a "Certification of Health Care Provider" from Dr. Joseph Lickteig, who diagnosed her condition and indicated a recovery period involving non-weight-bearing work. However, he did not specify her inability to perform essential job functions. On February 21, HBC's HR assistant, Amber Cotton, prepared a memorandum approving Twigg's FMLA leave only through February 29, 2008. Although Cotton testified she mailed this approval, Twigg claimed she did not receive it but learned on February 25 that her leave was limited to that date. Nita Long, responsible for HBC's FMLA program, acknowledged that Dr. Lickteig's certification lacked a specified duration, leading her to decide the leave duration based on her experience and the doctor's indication that Twigg could perform non-weight-bearing work.
Long and Cotton were questioned regarding the adequacy of Dr. Lickteig’s medical certification for Twigg. Long considered the certification sufficient, noting it indicated Twigg could perform non-weight-bearing work, implying that Twigg could work as long as she avoided being on her feet. Cotton concurred, stating that “incomplete or inadequate” certification would render decision-making impossible, which she did not believe applied here. HBC has a protocol for addressing insufficient certifications, which includes notifying employees and requesting clarification; however, Twigg was never informed that Dr. Lickteig’s certification was lacking. Consequently, Long approved Twigg’s FMLA request based on her interpretation of the certification, expecting Twigg to provide further information if necessary.
HBC provides short-term disability benefits covering 75% of an employee's income for up to 12 weeks. Twigg had purchased supplemental benefits from MetLife in 2004. When she applied for FMLA leave due to bunion surgery in 2008, she also sought supplemental short-term disability benefits. HBC typically aligns FMLA leave approvals with MetLife's short-term disability approvals, trusting MetLife's thorough medical evaluations.
On February 26, 2008, Twigg inquired about her FMLA leave being approved only through February 29. Cotton advised her to contact MetLife regarding the short-term disability approval. Twigg was not informed about HBC’s practice of synchronizing FMLA leave with MetLife’s disability approvals. After speaking with MetLife, Twigg learned they were awaiting further documentation from her doctor. On February 28, Dr. Lickteig provided additional medical information, indicating Twigg’s anticipated return-to-work date as April 21, 2008, and noted that she was not ready to return yet. There is no indication that HBC received this information prior to the current lawsuit's discovery phase.
On March 4, 2008, Twigg spoke with Cotton about her short-term disability benefits, claiming Cotton assured her that everything was managed regarding her FMLA leave and that she would be contacted if issues arose; no specific dates were discussed. On March 14, 2008, MetLife informed Cotton that Twigg’s short-term disability benefits were approved until April 1, 2008. On the same day, Cotton issued a memorandum to Twigg stating her FMLA leave was approved from February 20 to April 1, 2008, and noted the short-term disability approval. Though Cotton asserted she mailed this memorandum, Twigg claimed she never received it, similar to a previous memorandum approving her leave through February 29, 2008. Between February 29 and March 14, Twigg’s status was "FMLA pending," meaning she lacked formal approval for her FMLA leave and had no coverage for her absences; however, Sade did not plan disciplinary action during this period, believing the paperwork was delayed.
On March 18, 2008, Twigg emailed her department with an update, indicating she would return in about a month. Twigg testified she did not receive any notice from HBC regarding her leave being approved until April 17, 2008. Aside from the March 4 call and the March 18 email, she did not contact HBC about her leave until her termination on April 7, 2008. On April 1, Sade emailed Cotton expecting Twigg to return to work, noting she had not heard of any extension of Twigg's short-term disability. Cotton responded that Twigg had not applied for an extension beyond April 1. Twigg did not report to work on April 2, 3, or 4, nor did she notify her supervisors, resulting in three consecutive unreported absences, violating HBC's Rules of Conduct. Despite the presumptive discipline being termination, Sade had discretion to consider circumstances before deciding on termination. On April 7, 2008, Sade terminated Twigg via certified mail for violating Rule 11 of HBC’s Rules for Personal Conduct. The letter was first attempted for delivery on April 9 but was not picked up by Twigg until April 17. Sade explained that Twigg's past performance evaluations indicated she would receive a low rating, resulting in her placement on a Performance Improvement Plan upon her return from leave.
Twigg received a low performance rating due to her declining work performance, excessive tardiness, and failure to log onto the phone system, which contributed to the decision for her termination. On April 11, 2008, Dr. Lickteig confirmed Twigg's recovery from surgery and provided her with a back-to-work slip for April 21. After notifying her supervisors of her intended return, HBC's HR head, Candye Daughhetee, contacted Twigg regarding her status. On April 16, MetLife closed Twigg's disability claim for lack of medical information but subsequently extended her benefits after receiving Dr. Lickteig's fax the following day. Twigg received her termination letter on April 17 and learned during a conversation with Sade that her FMLA leave had not been approved beyond April 1. Sade expressed that she did not want Twigg back due to her previous performance and attitude issues. Despite MetLife extending Twigg's benefits, Sade maintained that this did not influence her decision to terminate Twigg. On April 28, 2008, Twigg filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor, leading to an investigation, which included a final conference on October 20, 2008, to discuss Twigg's potential reinstatement.
Long's deposition revealed her denial of a conference with an investigator regarding the reinstatement of Ms. Twigg. She confirmed her role as the decision-maker against reinstatement, citing the decision was based on Twigg's prior termination for failure to report, which Long deemed justified due to Twigg's lack of communication with the company. Twigg subsequently filed a lawsuit against HBC on December 28, 2008, alleging three claims: retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for defending a black coworker, retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and interference under the FMLA. After a pretrial conference, HBC sought summary judgment on all claims. The district court, on April 21, 2010, ruled that Twigg failed to establish a prima facie case for her retaliation claims under both § 1981 and the FMLA, as well as for the interference claim, resulting in a summary judgment in favor of HBC. Twigg appealed, arguing genuine issues of material fact existed regarding her claims. The appellate review will apply a de novo standard, assessing whether there is a genuine dispute over material facts that would warrant a summary judgment. Twigg's first argument on appeal is that her termination was retaliatory in nature due to her complaints about the treatment of her coworker, Teresa Cole. The court recognizes that retaliation claims under § 1981 align with those under Title VII, requiring the plaintiff to show that retaliation influenced the employment decision, with options for proving this through direct evidence or the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Under the McDonnell Douglas/indirect approach, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating: (1) engagement in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would perceive the employer’s action as materially adverse, and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. If successful, the employer must then provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action. The plaintiff must subsequently prove that this reason is a pretext for retaliation. Although the direct/"mixed motives" and McDonnell Douglas approaches are distinct, a plaintiff can argue that their evidence supports both. The plaintiff must ultimately convince the factfinder that retaliation was a "motivating factor" or that the employer’s reason is unworthy of belief.
In Twigg's case against HBC, she claimed a mixed motives theory of retaliation under 1981 but was barred from relying on it due to its absence in the pretrial order. The district court concluded that Twigg failed to provide evidence of HBC’s retaliatory intent, leading to an analysis under the McDonnell Douglas framework, where she could not establish a prima facie case. On appeal, Twigg argued solely for the mixed motives approach, contending that her evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment under that framework. However, the appellate review focused only on the direct/"mixed motives" theory, and it was determined that Twigg did not present evidence directly establishing HBC’s retaliatory intent, undermining her theory.
Twigg's circumstantial evidence included: (1) HBC’s alleged false reason for her termination, (2) the temporal proximity between her discrimination complaints and her termination, (3) inconsistencies in HBC’s explanations for her termination, and (4) deviations from standard company procedures. Each piece of evidence was to be evaluated in support of her mixed motives claim.
Kathy Sade, the manager who terminated Twigg, asserted that Twigg was fired for failure to report to work or notify HBC of absences for three consecutive days, violating company policy. Twigg argues this reason is false based on three points: (1) her supervisor approved an out-of-office message indicating her absence until approximately April 28, 2008; (2) a HR assistant confirmed Twigg’s FMLA leave was processed; and (3) Twigg communicated her status to her department via email, indicating she would return in about a month. However, Twigg fails to connect the alleged falsity of Sade’s explanation to any retaliatory motive for her termination related to Twigg's complaints of race discrimination, as falsity evidence alone does not establish retaliatory intent. Additionally, Twigg’s claim of temporal proximity between her complaints of discrimination and her termination does not demonstrate Sade's retaliatory mindset, especially since intervening events may provide legitimate reasons for the termination, thereby weakening any inference of retaliation.
Twigg's unreported absences occurred after her discrimination complaint and before her termination, which weakens her argument based on temporal proximity. She claims Kathy Sade provided inconsistent reasons for her termination, citing the notice-of-absence policy in the termination letter while referring to performance issues in her deposition. However, the court suggests that Sade's comments do not demonstrate a true inconsistency since performance issues were considered but not presented as an independent reason for termination. The court notes that inconsistencies are typically used to indicate pretext but require evidence of bad faith or dishonesty, which Twigg does not provide.
Furthermore, Twigg argues that HBC's refusal to retract her termination after MetLife approved her short-term disability benefits deviates from normal procedures. However, she fails to connect this procedural deviation directly to HBC's retaliatory motives against her discrimination complaint. While such irregularities can support claims of pretext, they do not inherently prove retaliatory intent. Ultimately, Twigg's arguments regarding unreported absences, inconsistent explanations, and procedural deviations do not sufficiently establish that her termination was retaliatory in nature.
The excerpt evaluates Twigg's claims of retaliation against HBC regarding her termination. It indicates that there is insufficient evidence to support the assertion that HBC acted with a retaliatory motive or deviated from standard procedures in handling FMLA leave and short-term disability benefits. HBC's practice of approving FMLA leave coinciding with MetLife's approval of disability benefits does not imply that it retracted terminations post-factum. Twigg failed to demonstrate that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that HBC’s actions were driven by prohibited motives.
The document further explains that while Twigg's evidence may suggest pretext, it falls short under the direct or "mixed motives" framework, which requires more substantive proof that the decision-maker acted with discriminatory intent. The cited cases illustrate instances where plaintiffs successfully demonstrated direct retaliatory motives through explicit references to complaints or discriminatory actions by employers. In contrast, Twigg's evidence does not establish such a direct connection to HBC's alleged animus, rendering her arguments regarding deviation and retaliation unconvincing.
Twigg's retaliation claims against HBC are affirmed in favor of HBC, as she failed to demonstrate retaliation under both the direct/"mixed motives" framework and the McDonnell Douglas/indirect framework for her 1981 retaliation claim. For her FMLA retaliation claim, Twigg alleges that her termination on April 7, 2008, the refusal to retract her termination, and the refusal to rehire her were due to her exercising FMLA rights. The FMLA prohibits discrimination against individuals opposing unlawful practices under the act. Although Twigg asserts a mixed-motive theory for her FMLA retaliation claim, the district court found her evidence insufficient under both frameworks. The court highlighted that, even if a mixed motive analysis applied, Twigg must provide evidence that retaliation was a motivating factor in HBC's employment decisions, which she did not adequately demonstrate. Her FMLA claim closely mirrors her 1981 claim, relying on similar circumstantial evidence with slight factual distinctions regarding HBC's intent to retaliate for her FMLA leave.
Twigg’s additional factual nuances do not overcome the deficiencies in her evidence regarding her claims of FMLA retaliation. First, Twigg disputes a statement made by Sade during a phone call on April 17, 2008, regarding the approval of her FMLA leave, suggesting it was false. However, Twigg fails to connect this alleged falsity to Sade’s decision to terminate her based on FMLA leave, which weakens her argument as evidence of falsity can only prove retaliation indirectly.
Second, Twigg references Nita Long’s deposition where Long stated she would not rehire Twigg based on her decision regarding FMLA leave, which Twigg interprets as inconsistent with HBC's practice of aligning FMLA approval with MetLife's short-term disability decisions. However, Twigg does not provide an alternative explanation for this inconsistency, and her argument is more about a deviation from company procedure, which also only supports an indirect inference of retaliation.
Lastly, Twigg emphasizes the temporal proximity of Long’s refusal to rehire her during the Department of Labor’s investigation of Twigg's complaint, suggesting a retaliatory motive. Nonetheless, close temporal proximity alone cannot directly establish retaliatory intent; it merely casts doubt on the employer's stated reasons. Consequently, these nuances do not provide a direct link to retaliatory animus, and both her FMLA and § 1981 retaliation claims rely solely on pretext evidence, leading to the district court's proper summary judgment in favor of HBC.
Twigg alleges that HBC unlawfully interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by terminating her employment while she was on FMLA leave. The FMLA entitles qualified employees to up to twelve weeks of leave due to a serious health condition. Under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), it is unlawful for employers to interfere with an employee's right to FMLA leave. To succeed in an FMLA interference claim, an employee must prove entitlement to FMLA leave and that the employer's actions, such as termination, interfered with that right. However, FMLA is not a strict liability statute; an employer is not automatically liable for terminating an employee simply because they are on or have requested FMLA leave. An employee can be dismissed if the termination would have occurred regardless of the FMLA request or leave. The burden of proof rests with the employer to demonstrate that the dismissal would have taken place irrespective of the FMLA leave request.
In this case, the district court ruled against Twigg, finding she could not establish her entitlement to FMLA leave due to inadequate medical certification, that HBC did not interfere with her leave since it approved six weeks despite her doctor's advice, and that her termination was due to a violation of company policy rather than her FMLA leave. On appeal, Twigg argues that a fundamental error affected the district court's analysis.
Twigg claims that Dr. Lickteig’s certification, submitted for her FMLA leave request from February 28 to April 17, 2008, was "incomplete" because it lacked specific information on the duration of her needed absence and did not address her ability to perform essential job functions. Twigg argues that this incompleteness triggered HBC's obligations under 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d), which requires employers to inform employees of any deficiencies in their certifications and provide an opportunity to rectify them. Twigg contends that HBC's failure to do so estops the employer from disputing her entitlement to FMLA leave, implying that her termination for absences related to this leave was unlawful. In contrast, HBC maintains that the certification was not "incomplete" but rather did not support Twigg’s leave request, arguing that a violation of § 825.305(d) does not prevent them from contesting leave entitlement. HBC further claims that Twigg’s interference claim fails because her termination was due to a violation of the company’s absence policy, unrelated to her FMLA leave. The discussion does not resolve whether the certification was incomplete or if HBC’s violation of the regulation results in estoppel, but concludes that Twigg’s FMLA interference claim would fail as HBC demonstrated she was dismissed for reasons not tied to her FMLA rights, supported by precedent from the Bones case.
On July 23, Bones's boyfriend submitted an FMLA leave request to Honeywell's medical department, which included a doctor's certification stating that Bones was unable to work. However, on July 27, before the request was processed, Honeywell terminated Bones for missing three consecutive workdays without notifying her supervisor. Bones subsequently sued Honeywell, claiming interference with her FMLA rights due to her termination while on FMLA-protected leave. The court reviewed the case and upheld the district court's summary judgment in favor of Honeywell, affirming that an employer is not liable under the FMLA if the termination is based on a policy violation unrelated to the FMLA leave request.
The court acknowledged that while Bones was assumed to be entitled to FMLA leave, Honeywell provided evidence that her termination was due to a breach of its absence policy. It concluded that compliance with company policies, including notice of absences, is mandatory for all employees, including those requesting FMLA leave. The ruling emphasized that failure to follow notice-of-absence policies can justify termination, regardless of the employee’s FMLA leave status. The court referenced similar cases, reinforcing that employers can terminate employees on FMLA leave for noncompliance with absence notification requirements, as these policies serve legitimate business interests.
The plaintiff in the case of Bones did not contest the legality of Honeywell's absence policy enforcement beyond asserting that the absences were protected under the FMLA. Consequently, the court did not explore scenarios where an employer's reliance on an absence policy might be questionable, such as discriminatory enforcement or conduct that could prevent the employer from enforcing the policy. Similarly, Twigg's challenge to HBC's notice-of-absence policy mirrors that of Bones, thus these scenarios remain unaddressed. It is established that Twigg did not receive formal FMLA leave approval beyond April 1, 2008, and failed to report her absences on April 2, 3, and 4. HBC provided documentation and testimony showing her termination was due to this lack of proper notice. Twigg did not present evidence to counter HBC’s rationale nor did she challenge the policy's enforcement legitimacy. She claimed her termination was due to exercising FMLA rights, but this argument is negated by the Bones case, leading to the conclusion that no reasonable juror could link her termination to her FMLA request. Thus, the district court's summary judgment in favor of HBC regarding Twigg’s FMLA interference claim was upheld. The court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment on all of Twigg’s claims.
