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Greenpoint Savings Bank v. Guiliano

Citations: 238 A.D.2d 472; 656 N.Y.S.2d 646; 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4106

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; April 21, 1997; New York; State Appellate Court

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In a mortgage foreclosure case, the plaintiff, Greenpoint Savings Bank, appeals an order from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, which granted the defendants Frederick and Isabella Catalano's cross motion to dismiss the complaint and later modified this decision regarding the property in question. The February 21, 1996 order, resulting from a reargument, vacated the prior dismissal of the complaint in its entirety and instead dismissed it only as to Frederick and Isabella Catalano, concluding that Greenpoint's mortgage was validly encumbering only Virginia Guiliano's half interest in the property acquired by Sheriff’s deed.

The dispute centers around the former marital home of Frederick and Isabella Catalano. In a related action initiated by Isabella Catalano in 1987, the court previously ruled that a deed transferring Frederick’s interest to Hilary House Properties (owned by Virginia) was null and void due to a restraining order in the divorce proceedings. Subsequent court decisions ordered the cancellation of these deeds, maintaining that the wrongful transfer by Frederick invalidated those transactions.

Despite these prior rulings, the Supreme Court later determined that Greenpoint's mortgage encumbered Virginia's interest, as it was not affected by the previous decisions regarding the invalid deeds. The court affirmed that Greenpoint, although not a bona fide mortgagee due to the void nature of Frederick's conveyance, maintained a valid mortgage on Virginia's interest in the property. The appeal from the September 1, 1995 order was dismissed as it was superseded by the February 21, 1996 order, which was affirmed without costs or disbursements. The judges concurred in the ruling.