Hirras v. Natl RR Psngr Corp

Citation: 39 F.3d 522Docket: 92-05753

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; January 7, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Sandy Diana Hirras filed a lawsuit against her employer, Amtrak, claiming a hostile work environment due to gender-based discrimination, resulting in emotional distress. The district court dismissed her claims under Title VII, state law intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Hirras alleged she faced verbal abuse, threatening phone calls, and obscene graffiti after being hired as a ticket clerk. Amtrak contended that the harassment stemmed from unrelated issues involving a passenger arrest and stated that it took measures to investigate the threats through law enforcement. The district court ruled that Texas law does not recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress and that the intentional infliction claim was preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA). It also dismissed the Title VII claim, stating it fell under the RLA's arbitration provisions. Hirras appealed all dismissals, arguing her Title VII claim should be heard in federal court, citing precedent that challenges the applicability of the RLA to her case. The court, however, found the dismissal appropriate, affirming that the ruling was final and appealable since no further amendments to the complaint were feasible.

The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hirras's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, noting that Texas does not recognize this tort, referencing Boyles v. Kerr. Under Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), disputes between employees and carriers regarding grievances or agreements on pay, rules, or working conditions can be submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB). Minor disputes, which may arise from the employment relationship but are independent of collective bargaining agreements, fall under NRAB's exclusive jurisdiction. Courts are inclined to classify disputes as minor when there is ambiguity. 

In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court ruled that an employee must arbitrate claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) if agreed upon in an employment contract. The Court clarified that agreeing to arbitration does not waive substantive rights under the statute, but rather shifts the resolution to an arbitral forum. It dismissed concerns that arbitration would undermine the ADEA's purpose, arguing that as long as claimants can effectively vindicate their rights in arbitration, the statute's objectives remain intact. Congress has not explicitly banned arbitration for ADEA claims, even with recent amendments.

Gilmer's argument was deemed inconsistent with the ADEA's endorsement of flexible claim resolutions, particularly supporting out-of-court arbitration as congruent with Congressional intent. The Supreme Court's ruling in Gilmer affirmed that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) mandates the enforceability of arbitration agreements in commerce-related contracts. Subsequent case law, including Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, established that Title VII claims can also be subjected to compulsory arbitration under the FAA, dismissing public policy objections. This precedent extends to Hirras's Title VII claim, which is also governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) arbitration provisions. The analysis does not involve preemption between Title VII and the RLA but focuses on reconciling their respective interests. The 1991 Civil Rights Act encourages alternative dispute resolution methods, including arbitration for Title VII disputes. Hirras's claim, rooted in her employment relationship with Amtrak, qualifies as a minor dispute under the RLA, thus falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB). The court concluded that requiring Hirras to arbitrate her claim through the RLA procedures serves both statutes' interests effectively.

Hirras argues against the arbitration of her Title VII claim, asserting that the cases of Gilmer and Alford do not apply to her situation due to several distinctions. First, she claims she did not waive her right to pursue discrimination claims in federal court by signing an arbitration agreement, unlike the plaintiffs in those cases. Second, she contends that the collective bargaining agreement's anti-discrimination clause does not permit the union to waive her right to a Title VII action. Third, she notes that Gilmer and Alford were influenced by pro-arbitration policies under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), while her case falls under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).

However, it is emphasized that the duty to arbitrate arises from the RLA, which provides a stronger basis for requiring arbitration of her Title VII claim compared to the FAA. Hirras also argues that the outcome should be guided by Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., but the court distinguishes this case from Gilmer based on four key points: 

1. The Gardner-Denver cases involved whether arbitration of contract claims prevented judicial resolution of statutory claims, not the enforceability of arbitration agreements for statutory claims.
2. Labor arbitrators in those cases had limited authority and were not authorized to adjudicate statutory claims, while Gilmer had agreed to arbitrate his discrimination claim.
3. The concern of collective representation versus individual rights was present in Gardner-Denver, but Gilmer's case did not involve such tension.
4. The Gardner-Denver cases were not decided under the FAA, which supports a liberal policy favoring arbitration.

The court concludes that the distinctions support applying Gilmer to Hirras's case rather than Gardner-Denver. Additionally, it notes that the RLA allows for arbitration of statutory claims similarly to the FAA and that RLA arbitrators possess the competence to resolve discrimination claims. Hirras also references Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. v. Buell, regarding the right to pursue damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), but the court maintains that her situation is more aligned with Gilmer.

The Court ruled against the railroad's assertion that damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) were unavailable if the injury stemmed from an issue that could be arbitrated under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The Court clarified that FELA claims do not need to follow RLA arbitration procedures. Distinguishing the case from Buell, the Court emphasized that FELA was designed to provide federal remedies for railroad workers injured due to employer or employee negligence. Amtrak's argument, which limited Hirras's ability to pursue Title VII damages to NRAB processes, was noted as differing from the FELA framework. Unlike FELA, Title VII encourages arbitration for resolving employment discrimination disputes.

The Court referenced Bates v. Long Island R.R., where the Second Circuit found that Rehabilitation Act claims did not require arbitration under the RLA, highlighting that sometimes arbitration inadequately protects employee rights. However, the Court criticized this reliance, noting that the Supreme Court had already dismissed similar public policy arguments against arbitration. It stated that the RLA does require statutory discrimination claims to be arbitrated.

The Court also dismissed Hirras's reliance on various cases, establishing that Amtrak did not argue RLA preemption of Title VII. The discussion included Morales, which clarified that state law claims intertwined with collective bargaining agreements might be considered minor disputes under the RLA. Hirras's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was determined to be inextricably linked to her employment conditions, necessitating interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of Hirras's claim due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction was affirmed.