Michael R. Morton seeks to intervene in a long-standing Voting Rights Act case involving the League of United Latin American Citizens, District 19 (LULAC) and the city of Boerne, Texas. The case, initiated in 1996, resulted in a consent decree mandating at-large elections with cumulative voting for city council members. In 2009, LULAC and the city jointly moved to modify this decree to implement a single-member-district election system, which the district court granted. Morton, a registered voter in Boerne opposed to this change, filed a motion to intervene, but the district court denied it, citing lack of standing.
On appeal, both the city and LULAC argue Morton lacks standing and that the case is moot. However, the appellate court found that Morton does have standing and that the appeal is not moot. It concluded that Morton has a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court reversed the district court's denial of Morton's motion, affirmed that the district court could modify the consent decree, but determined that it abused its discretion in doing so, as the record did not justify the modification. As a result, the court vacated and remanded the order granting the modified consent decree.
The background details indicate that Boerne adopted a home rule charter in 1995, establishing an at-large election system for its city council, which LULAC contested on the grounds that it diluted minority voting strength, particularly for Mexican-Americans, in violation of the Voting Rights Act.
In December 1996, the city and LULAC reached a settlement that transitioned city council elections from a numbered-post system to an at-large cumulative voting model. A consent decree was issued by the district court, allowing elections under this new system. In 1997, a Hispanic council member was elected, later re-elected unopposed in 1999 and 2001, but faced opposition and was defeated in 2003. Since then, no Hispanic candidates have run for the council. On December 2, 2009, the city council voted 3-2 to pursue a change to single-member districts, with Michael R. Morton opposing the shift. An ordinance was passed establishing five single-member districts, but the change was not submitted to voters as required by Texas law, leaving the original at-large system intact.
On December 9, 2009, the city and LULAC filed a joint motion to modify the settlement agreement to adopt single-member districts, asserting that the cumulative voting system had failed to achieve desired outcomes. The district court reopened the case and adopted the modified consent decree on December 11, 2009, without providing specific reasons or findings. Morton sought to intervene against this decree but was denied standing on March 17, 2010. Concurrently, the city sought preclearance from the DOJ, which was granted on March 8, 2010. The city and LULAC filed a joint motion to dismiss on April 14, 2010, which the court granted on April 19. Morton appealed both the denial of his intervention and the dismissal of the case, leading to the consolidation of his appeals. The district court's dismissal rested on the conclusion that Morton lacked Article III standing, a determination subject to de novo review.
Morton seeks to challenge the amended consent decree jointly requested by LULAC and the city, necessitating him to demonstrate Article III standing, which comprises injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The district court found that Morton failed to show injury in fact, arguing he presented only a generalized grievance rather than a specific, concrete injury. The Supreme Court has established that a generalized grievance regarding government actions does not satisfy the requirements for Article III standing. However, it is contended that Morton has articulated a concrete injury—specifically, that the modified consent decree undermines his voting rights under the Boerne city charter, which entitles him to vote for all city council members elected at-large, rather than just the council member for his single-member district. This deprivation is akin to a recognized injury for standing, as seen in League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, where the court acknowledged the dilution of voting power in judicial elections as sufficient for standing. The excerpt also references the procedural history of the LULAC No. 4434 case, highlighting the en banc court’s findings on voting rights violations and the subsequent dispute involving judges opposing a proposed consent decree, ultimately affirming their standing to object.
Wood and Entz possess standing as voters, as their injury—loss of the right to vote for judges with general jurisdiction—mirrors the injury Morton faces in being deprived of voting for city council members. This aligns with the standing established in LULAC No. 4434, confirming that Morton’s injury meets the Article III injury-in-fact requirement. The district court's reliance on Lance v. Coffman is misplaced, as the plaintiffs in Lance did not face a deprivation of voting rights for any office, contrasting with the current case and LULAC No. 4434 where voters are denied their pre-existing voting rights. Thus, the Lance decision does not undermine the standing of Wood, Entz, or Morton. Morton also satisfies the causation and redressability requirements for standing; his injury is directly traceable to the modified consent decree agreed upon by LULAC and the city. Invalidation of this decree would restore Morton’s voting rights, effectively redressing his injury. The city raises a mootness concern regarding potential DOJ intervention under the Voting Rights Act, but the DOJ has already precleared the change to a single-member-district system, which suggests Morton may still receive effective relief.
The city contends that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is likely to view changes to the voting system as diminishing minority voting strength in Boerne, which could lead the DOJ to deny preclearance. If this occurs, the city argues, Morton would be unable to receive effective relief, rendering his claims moot. However, a case is not deemed moot if there remains a concrete interest in its outcome and effective remedies are available. The mootness doctrine, rooted in Article III, prevents federal courts from issuing advisory opinions. The city also references 'prudential mootness,' suggesting that certain 'anticipatorily moot' cases may be dismissed under this concept, as noted by the Ninth Circuit. Despite this, the court finds it unnecessary to adopt prudential mootness since it can provide effective relief to Morton if he prevails.
The case is not moot because, per Riley v. Kennedy, if the modified consent decree is invalidated, the city can revert to its previous at-large voting system without needing DOJ preclearance. In Riley, the Supreme Court ruled that a law invalidated by a state court is considered null and void from the outset, which means reverting to prior practices does not constitute a 'change' requiring preclearance. The current situation parallels Riley's circumstances: Morton has contested the modified consent decree promptly, Boerne has conducted elections under the new system during the litigation, and the court is vacating the modified consent decree.
The challenge is occurring in federal rather than state courts, but this does not affect the reasoning established in Riley. Consequently, the city is not required to obtain preclearance under section 5 to revert to at-large city council elections as previously practiced. The case remains active in federal court, not moot.
Morton seeks to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows intervention if the applicant has a timely interest related to the case and existing parties do not adequately represent that interest. Four criteria must be met for intervention as of right: timeliness of the application, a relevant interest in the case, the potential for impairment of that interest through the action's disposition, and inadequate representation by current parties.
The court finds that Morton meets all four criteria for intervention. The timeliness of his application is evaluated de novo since the district court did not address it. Morton filed to intervene four weeks after the city and LULAC's joint motion to modify the consent decree, which is considered a reasonable timeframe. Neither the city nor LULAC claims to have suffered prejudice from the delay. Conversely, Morton would face significant prejudice if denied intervention, as he lacks another avenue to contest the modified consent decree. He asserts that the decree does not comply with legal requirements, highlighting that a consent decree must be a suitable response to established illegality and must not permit what cannot be achieved independently by the parties. Without the modified consent decree, the city would need voter approval to alter its charter regarding district elections.
Morton cannot seek to invalidate the modified consent decree through a separate federal lawsuit due to a lack of independent federal cause of action. State courts also lack authority to vacate federal court consent decrees. Therefore, Morton's only option to oppose the decree is by intervening in the current case, and his inability to do so would cause significant prejudice. The analysis of timeliness factors shows that they either favor Morton or are neutral, leading to the conclusion that his motion to intervene satisfies the first requirement of Rule 24(a)(2).
Morton has a sufficient interest in the modified consent decree because it impacts his right to vote for all five city council members, satisfying the second requirement of Rule 24(a)(2). The third requirement is also satisfied, as the outcome of the case could impede Morton's ability to protect his voting rights given he lacks other procedural avenues to challenge the decree. The fourth requirement is met because existing parties, LULAC and the city, do not adequately represent Morton's interests, as they oppose the relief he seeks.
Morton also argues that the district court should reverse its denial of his intervention motion and grant judgment in his favor, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction to reopen the case. He asserts that no continuing case or controversy existed between LULAC and the city at the time the court reopened the matter. However, precedent indicates that federal courts have the authority to modify existing injunctions and consent decrees in response to changing circumstances. Morton claims the case became moot following the 1996 settlement between LULAC and the city, which produced the original consent decree, rendering any further claims based on that controversy non-justiciable.
Morton argues that the agreement between LULAC and the city on their joint motion to reopen the case and modify the consent decree rendered the case moot, thus depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. However, established judicial precedent affirms that federal courts possess inherent equitable authority to modify their decrees, including consent decrees. The Supreme Court has articulated that courts can adapt injunctions to changing conditions, regardless of whether they were entered through litigation or consent. The power to modify persists because injunctions necessitate ongoing supervision and the court's willingness to enforce equitable relief.
The argument for mootness, if accepted, would obstruct courts from modifying consent decrees in situations where parties agree to changes, leading to impractical outcomes. For example, if a consent decree established voting districts based on outdated census data, parties could not adjust the districts with new data without the case being deemed moot, leaving the outdated decree in place indefinitely. This outcome would contradict Supreme Court rulings regarding the modification of consent decrees.
The importance of a district court's ability to modify a consent decree in response to changing circumstances is emphasized, particularly in light of the increase in institutional reform litigation since *Brown v. Board of Education*. Such decrees often remain in effect for long periods, increasing the likelihood of significant changes. The district court has the authority to modify its injunction based on these changes, even if initially entered by consent, as affirmed in *Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail*. However, the court concluded that the specific modification of the consent decree in question was improper.
Consent decrees fall under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows modifications if enforcing the decree is no longer equitable or for other justified reasons. The court determined that the parties (LULAC and the city) did not demonstrate that modification was justified under the flexible standard set forth by the Supreme Court. The process for modification involves a two-step test: first, the moving party must show a significant change in conditions or law that makes compliance substantially more onerous or unworkable, and second, the proposed modification must be appropriately tailored to these changed circumstances. The change must be significant, and not merely a matter of convenience, with considerations also including whether the decree is fulfilling its intended purpose. The court emphasized the necessity for ongoing willingness to adapt the decree to ensure it meets its goals, referencing the precedent set in *United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp*.
In United Shoe, the Supreme Court affirmed that a modification of an anti-trust decree may be justified if the moving party demonstrates that the initial remedy has failed, with no new factual or legal changes. The burden of proof lies with the moving party, whether they seek to lessen obligations, impose a new remedy, or vacate the decree. The Rufo decision cited United Shoe, promoting a flexible approach for modification requests. Courts have consistently referenced United Shoe post-Rufo, affirming that modifications can occur due to changed circumstances or failure to meet the decree's aims. In the case at hand, LULAC and the city argued for modification based on the ineffectiveness of cumulative voting to prevent vote dilution as per the Voting Rights Act. However, their claims, including the limited electoral success of minority candidates since the decree's implementation, did not sufficiently demonstrate that the decree had failed or that significant changes warranted modification. The district court must assess the evidence to determine if the moving party has met its burden, particularly regarding the election outcomes for protected class members.
The district court must evaluate evidence to determine if remedies for vote dilution are effective. The evidence presented only pertained to one candidate, who had mixed electoral outcomes, providing insufficient basis to conclude that minority voters supported her in losing elections or that vote dilution influenced her losses. There was no evidence of other minority-preferred candidates or their decisions not to run due to perceived barriers under the voting scheme. While the Rufo standard allows for flexibility in modification motions, the court requires substantial evidence of changed circumstances to justify such modifications. The joint motion from LULAC and the city lacked necessary supporting facts or affidavits, and the court failed to utilize available options for further evidence or hearings. Consequently, the district court's approval of the motion without adequate evidence was deemed an abuse of discretion, as LULAC and the city did not fulfill the initial burden of the Rufo test. The ruling mandates the district court to allow additional filings and proceedings to properly assess the modification of the consent decree. The appellate court reversed the denial of Morton’s intervention motion, vacated the modified consent decree, and instructed the district court to conduct further proceedings aligned with this opinion.
