Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; June 5, 2014; New York; State Appellate Court
On September 11, 2001, the claimant, a former emergency medical technician, attempted to assist in rescue efforts at the World Trade Center. Initially, he went to a triage center at Chelsea Piers, then accessed ground zero unauthorized to search for survivors. He was not affiliated with any volunteer organization during this time and did not participate in rescue operations after September 12, 2001. In March 2010, he registered with the Workers’ Compensation Board as a volunteer for benefits related to injuries from exposure to dust and toxins at the sites. A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) awarded him benefits for gastroesophageal reflux disease, depression, anxiety, chronic rhinitis, and sinusitis. However, the World Trade Center Volunteer Fund contested this decision, arguing he did not qualify as a 'volunteer' since he lacked proof of acting under an authorized agency's direction. The Board upheld this view, stating he did not meet the criteria of 'first response emergency services personnel' as defined in a 2006 order. The appeal by the claimant noted that Workers’ Compensation Law article 8-A was designed for easier claims filing for those affected by the September 11 attacks. It emphasizes that a 'volunteer' might qualify for coverage if they provide satisfactory evidence of participation in the relevant operations and suffer from qualifying conditions. The Board's denial was based solely on the lack of affiliation with a recognized rescue entity, neglecting to address the necessary time, location, and activity components of the statute. The court is reminded that the interpretation of statutes should reflect the Legislature's intent, focusing on the statute's clear language.
Workers’ Compensation Law § 161 does not define "volunteer," nor does article 8-A address this term. The plain meaning of "volunteer," which is a person who performs services willingly and without pay, is derived from statutory interpretation. Importantly, there is no stipulation that a volunteer must serve under an authorized rescue entity or volunteer agency, making the Board’s imposition of such a requirement inconsistent with the statute's language. Legislative history supports this interpretation, as, post-September 11, 2001, Congress allocated funds for claims related to first response emergency services personnel, but no enabling legislation specified the volunteer definition used by the Board. The Board issued Order of the Chair No. 967 in 2003, defining "first response emergency services personnel" to include those serving under authorized entities, a definition that has been consistently applied to deny claims from individuals not affiliated with such entities. Despite the enactment of Workers’ Compensation Law article 8-A in 2006, which acknowledged the issue, the Board continued to require affiliation with authorized entities for benefits eligibility, a stance contradicted by prior legislative proposals that defined "volunteer rescue worker" as one who serves under authorized direction.
The absence of specific language in Workers’ Compensation Law article 8-A indicates that the Legislature intentionally rejected a more restrictive definition of "volunteer" that was initially proposed. Prior cases reinforce this interpretation. The Board's reliance on orders that deny benefits to volunteers not affiliated with authorized rescue entities is problematic, as the Board lacks the authority to alter enacted legislation. Consequently, the Board's decision to deny benefits based on this affiliation requirement is not supported by statutory language or legislative history and cannot be upheld. However, the claimant must still meet the statutory criteria regarding time, location, and activity to be eligible for benefits. The matter is remitted to the Board for further examination of these criteria. The decision is reversed without costs, and the Board is directed to proceed in accordance with this ruling. Any arguments for requiring affiliation to prevent frivolous claims should be addressed through legislative amendments.
