Tenny v. Blagojevich

Citations: 659 F.3d 578; 2011 WL 3726281Docket: 10-3075, 10-3076, 10-3077, 10-3078, 10-3106, 10-3140, 10-3169

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 25, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed consolidated appeals involving inmates from Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois who challenged the pricing of commissary goods. The plaintiffs, seven inmates, alleged that current and former officials of the Illinois Department of Corrections and the former Governor violated a statutory cap on commissary mark-ups, which is set at 25% over cost (35% for tobacco). The Illinois Auditor General uncovered violations of this cap in audits conducted in 2006, noting that the Department had imposed an additional mark-up on already maximized prices. Despite recommendations to adjust pricing practices, the Department persisted with the unlawful mark-ups.

The plaintiffs filed grievances, all of which were denied, and subsequently initiated lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the cases for failure to state a claim, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked a federal constitutional right to commissary access or specific prices for items, and did not address the Illinois constitutional claims. The appeals court affirmed the district court's decision, reasoning that there was no pre-deprivation process that could have prevented the alleged deprivation, and the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a lack of adequate post-deprivation remedies.

Plaintiffs allege that the Department violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by depriving them of a property interest—specifically, the state-created right to a cap on commissary item mark-ups—without due process. A procedural due process violation requires state action that deprives a plaintiff of a protected property interest without due process. A protected property interest is defined by legitimate claims based on existing rules or state law. The plaintiffs' argument draws heavily from the Germano case, where retired deputies claimed their property interests were violated due to county policy requiring higher premiums than active deputies pay for group health insurance, which was against Illinois law. 

The plaintiffs argue that inmates similarly hold a property interest in the statutory cap on commissary prices. The Attorney General references Ashley v. Snyder, which concluded that Illinois prison regulations do not create substantive interests protected under the Due Process clause, suggesting that if Ashley were an independent interpretation, it would negate the plaintiffs' claims. However, Ashley followed Sandin v. Conner, which addressed liberty interests but did not rule out property interests. 

Assuming for argument's sake that a property interest exists, the case hinges on whether the statute capping commissary markups was intended to benefit inmates or merely guide prison operations. The Attorney General argues that the principles of Sandin should apply to statutory property interests as well. The court does not resolve this issue, as it is deciding the case on different grounds. Even if a protected property interest exists, the Germano analogy weakens the plaintiffs' claim, as Germano found the county's actions to be random and unauthorized, thus not requiring any pre-deprivation hearing per relevant case law.

The court ruled that the county's actions in contravention of state law were unauthorized and could not have been prevented through any pre-deprivation hearing, meaning that no process given to the plaintiffs could validate the county's ability to charge retired deputies different rates. The case was dismissed for reasons similar to those in Germano, primarily questioning whether the Department’s pricing policy could lead to a deprivation that necessitated a pre-deprivation process. The plaintiffs proposed that implementing notice-and-comment rulemaking might fulfill due process, but the court rejected this, arguing it could not legitimize unlawful actions by the Department. 

The plaintiffs contended that the Attorney General should have approved pricing policy changes, but the court indicated that such a mandate would improperly enforce compliance with state law. The court stated that where meaningful pre-deprivation review is unfeasible, adequate post-deprivation remedies could meet constitutional due process standards. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that these post-deprivation remedies were inadequate, which undermined their claims. Although they alleged a lack of viable post-deprivation remedies, they had utilized the prison grievance process and had the opportunity to present their case to the Department. 

The court noted that the Illinois Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of policies, but this does not negate the existence of other judicial avenues for the plaintiffs. Other Illinois courts can adjudicate claims challenging prison policies, as illustrated in the Hadley case, which granted injunctive relief against illegal medical co-payment charges for indigent inmates.

Relief for the plaintiffs regarding the commissary mark-up policy, which may lead to monetary awards if deemed illegal, is deemed adequate despite its complexity. The plaintiffs have sufficient post-deprivation remedies available in state court, which undermines their constitutional due process claims. The essence of the case pertains to a substantive violation of Illinois law related to excessive mark-ups, rather than procedural issues regarding property deprivation. The court emphasizes that federal jurisdiction does not extend to enforcing state law compliance, referencing the Eleventh Amendment and related case law. Even if a protected property interest existed, the remedy for any violation of state law falls within state court jurisdiction, not constitutional grounds. Consequently, the plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims are dismissed, while the independent state constitutional claims remain unaddressed. The cases are remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice.