United States v. Coleman

Citations: 655 F.3d 480; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17645; 2011 WL 3687870Docket: 10-3205

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; August 24, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Keahmbi Coleman appeals his sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), arguing that a violation or attempted violation of Ohio's third-degree burglary statute (O.R.C. 2911.12(A)(3)) does not qualify as a "violent felony." The court finds that such burglary or attempted burglary, involving an "occupied structure," poses a risk of physical injury comparable to generic burglary, thus categorizing it as a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause (18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 

Coleman was arrested after a domestic dispute, during which police discovered an unloaded firearm frame in his pocket. Although he claimed to have retrieved it for safety reasons, he was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)). He pled guilty, and the district court enhanced his sentence based on three prior burglary convictions from 2002 and 2005. The district court determined these convictions, while non-generic, still qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA’s residual provision due to the associated risk of physical injury. Consequently, Coleman received a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, which, despite being severe given the circumstances, was deemed appropriate based on his criminal history. Coleman's sole argument regarding the ACCA's applicability was unsuccessful, affirming the requirement for a minimum sentence for individuals with three prior violent felony or serious drug offense convictions.

Coleman pled guilty to third-degree burglary and attempted burglary under Ohio law in 2002 and 2005. The Ohio burglary statute, O.R.C. 2911.12(A)(3), qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it meets the residual clause definition, as established by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Scoville. The statute prohibits trespassing in an "occupied structure" with the intent to commit a crime, where "occupied structure" is broadly defined to include various types of dwellings and vehicles. Coleman contends that trespass in an "occupied structure" should not be considered inherently violent under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). However, the "categorical approach" confirms that the elements of the offense align with the criteria for violent felonies without examining specific conduct. Although the Ohio statute encompasses a broader range of structures than the "generic burglary" definition, it still presents a risk of physical injury akin to that posed by generic burglary. Thus, violations of Ohio's third-degree burglary statute are recognized as violent felonies due to the serious potential risk of physical harm involved.

The risk of injury associated with burglary arises from the potential for confrontations between a burglar and third parties, such as occupants or police officers. An "occupied structure" is broadly defined to include locations where people are likely to be present, making the burglary of such structures categorically risky. This risk must be compared to the risks posed by specific enumerated offenses to determine if it is "roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree." Ohio’s third-degree burglary statute, while broader than the generic definition, is similar in kind since it replaces "building" with "occupied structure," highlighting the inherent risks. The statute outlines various forms of occupancy, indicating that the presence or likelihood of an innocent person encountering a burglar leads to potential violent confrontations. Consequently, all three of Coleman’s prior convictions are classified as violent felonies under the residual clause of 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Additionally, the risk associated with attempted burglary is deemed equal to that of completed burglary, as attempts often involve outside interference that may heighten the danger. Previous rulings affirm that attempted burglaries are just as violent as completed ones for classification purposes.

The excerpt addresses the interpretation of Ohio's third-degree burglary statute, clarifying that the "presence or likely presence" of another person is not a required element for the crime, but a factor indicating whether a structure is "occupied." Coleman argues that this absence means the offense does not pose a serious risk of physical injury. However, the text distinguishes between the lack of a statutory requirement and the inherent risks involved in burglary, particularly the potential for confrontation with occupants or others. It emphasizes that the occupation of a structure itself increases the likelihood of such confrontations, regardless of the type of dwelling. The discussion also refutes Coleman's argument that his conviction should be vacated due to alleged procedural flaws regarding post-release control notification, clarifying that Ohio law only invalidates the improperly imposed post-release control term, not the entire sentence or conviction. The court affirms the district court's judgment, underscoring that under the categorical approach, the risks associated with trespassing in an occupied structure align with the risks of generic burglary.