George Kabeller, Inc. D/B/A Zephyrhills Parachute Center v. James B. Busey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration Leonard E. Mudd, Director, Office of Airport Safety and Standards, Federal Aviation Administration Stephen A. Brill, Manager, Airports Division, Southern Region, Federal Aviation Administration James E. Sheppard, Manager, Airports District Office, Orlando, Federal Aviation Administration and Richard M. Owen, Airports Plans and Programs Manager, Airports District Office, Orlando, Federal Aviation Administration

Citations: 999 F.2d 1417; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32691Docket: 92-8696

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; May 18, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the complaint filed by George Kabeller, Inc., operating as Zephyrhills Parachute Center, against various officials from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The plaintiff alleged that the City of Zephyrhills unlawfully discriminated against it by granting a more favorable lease to another skydiving business, Skydive City, Inc. After filing multiple complaints with the FAA regarding this alleged discrimination, the FAA determined that the City was in compliance with federal law.

Following these administrative proceedings, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia seeking a declaratory judgment and mandamus to compel FAA action on the discrimination claim. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court granted this motion, referencing the Telecommunications Research Action Center v. FCC case, which established that when a statute assigns review of agency actions to the Court of Appeals, any related lawsuits must be exclusively reviewed by that court. The Eleventh Circuit found no error in the District Court's ruling and upheld the dismissal.

The statutory provision relevant to the District Court’s review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) actions allows for court review of orders from the Board or Secretary of Transportation, except those involving foreign air carriers requiring presidential approval. The District Court determined that it would not be just to transfer the case to the Eleventh Circuit because FAA actions were not final, and the circumstances did not justify a mandamus remedy. The plaintiff is appealing two issues: whether the District Court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and whether it erred in refusing to transfer the case.

The appellant argues that the District Court erred in deciding it lacked jurisdiction over his discrimination complaint against the City. He claims that a prima facie case obligated the FAA to investigate and hold a hearing according to 49 U.S.C.App. 1482(a) and FAA Order 5190.6A, which mandates prompt acknowledgment and investigation of complaints. The appellant contends that the FAA’s delay violated this order, asserting that an agency must adhere strictly to its own rules, as established by case law. He cites precedents indicating that departures from statutory authority and failure to follow procedures warrant judicial review, even if a jurisdiction withdrawal statute applies. The appellant maintains that the FAA's failure to act in accordance with its regulations constitutes grounds for judicial relief, suggesting there may still be some federal question jurisdiction in the District Court despite statutory restrictions on review.

Appellant contends that under 49 U.S.C.App. 1486(a), only "orders" from the FAA are subject to review by the courts of appeal, and asserts that the FAA has not issued a "final order" regarding its failure to investigate appellant's complaint, which allegedly violates 49 U.S.C.App. 1482(a). Appellant believes that this inaction should be reviewable in the District Court rather than exclusively in the Court of Appeals. The determination of whether judicial review of the FAA's inaction is limited to the Court of Appeals is a legal question subject to de novo review.

The text highlights that 49 U.S.C.App. 1486(a) states that "orders" from the Civil Aeronautics Board are reviewable by the courts of appeal. The District Court referenced Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, which established that if Congress designates a specific forum for judicial review, that forum is exclusive. Furthermore, in TRAC, the D.C. Circuit noted that when a statute assigns review of agency actions to the Court of Appeals, any related suit affecting that jurisdiction is also under exclusive review by the Court of Appeals.

The excerpt compares the current case to TRAC, where the jurisdictional issue involved whether a petition to compel agency action could be filed in the circuit or district court. It emphasizes the absence of a "final order," defined as one that imposes obligations or denies rights. The TRAC Court resolved similar jurisdictional issues under the All Writs Act, allowing circuit courts to address unreasonable delays to protect their future jurisdiction.

The court aligns with the TRAC reasoning, asserting that exclusive appellate jurisdiction applies here as well, and concludes that the current situation does not fall within the limited exceptions for allowing district court review, since judicial review is not completely foreclosed under 49 U.S.C.App. 1486(a).

The District Court appropriately differentiated the case from Graham v. Caston, which involved a statute that entirely removed agency action from judicial review. In contrast, the National Housing Act explicitly states the Secretary's decisions regarding reimbursement are not subject to judicial review, but the current case allows for appellate court review. The exception identified in Graham applies only when agency actions clearly deviate from statutory authority and would otherwise escape review; such a scenario is not present here since Congress has authorized judicial review in the Court of Appeals.

The appellant's reliance on Jean v. Nelson is misplaced. The en banc panel in Jean was concerned with systemic abuses by agency officials, whereas the current case does not present similar allegations. The precedents of Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith and Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson emphasized that systemic issues, not standard agency decisions, could invoke district court jurisdiction. The current record lacks evidence of systemic abuse, supporting the conclusion that jurisdiction lies exclusively with the Court of Appeals under Section 1486(a).

Ultimately, the District Court correctly determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, affirming that the circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction to review FAA actions that could influence future adjudications. Additionally, the District Court's decision to dismiss rather than transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. 1631 was justified, as the FAA action regarding the appellant's claim was still ongoing, and transfer was not deemed "in the interest of justice."

The District Court denied the appellant's request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the case did not involve an extraordinary situation justifying such a remedy as outlined in Kerr v. United States District Court. The court found the delay by the FAA in issuing a final order to be reasonable, referencing precedent that delays of fourteen months or longer were not considered unreasonable. Although the District Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a mandamus judgment, the appellate court concurred with its determination that mandamus was inappropriate even if jurisdiction existed. The use of the All Writs Act in agency matters is rare, and relief is granted only under extreme circumstances. The court affirmed the District Court's decision.

Circuit Judge Fay expressed concern over the FAA's delay in addressing the appellant's complaint, highlighting that the original complaint dated back to October 16, 1990, with subsequent timely responses from FAA offices. Despite being directed to summarize actions by April 19, 1991, there had been no meaningful progress for over two years, reflecting poorly on governmental bureaucracies. Judge Fay emphasized that citizens deserve more timely responses from government agencies.

Jurisdiction for reviewing final actions by the agency lies with the Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C.App. 1486(a). However, the jurisdiction over petitions for writs of mandamus is ambiguous, as highlighted in Telecommunications Research Action Ctr. v. FCC. It is proposed that the district courts maintain jurisdiction under the All Writs Act and established circuit law regarding agency actions deviating from statutory authority, as seen in cases like Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Nelson and Graham v. Caston. In Graham, the court recognized that plaintiffs’ complaints of agency inaction justified district court jurisdiction, as the review of final decisions belonged to the appellate courts. District courts are better suited for handling writ petitions, given their capacity to conduct hearings and make factual findings, unlike appellate courts. The dissent emphasizes the need for governmental agencies to respond to citizens, arguing that timely district court intervention could facilitate compliance by the FAA. The dissenting opinion challenges the majority's view that limits district court jurisdiction, asserting that it contradicts established authority and lacks practical sense.