Perez v. Park Madison Professional Laboratories, Inc.

Citations: 212 A.D.2d 271; 630 N.Y.S.2d 37; 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2216

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; July 20, 1995; New York; State Appellate Court

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The appeal examines whether the defendants, including Dr. Ing Yann Jeng and Park Madison Professional Laboratories (Eastern Women’s Center), failed to secure the plaintiff's informed consent prior to an abortion procedure that led to a malpractice claim. The plaintiff, a 24-year-old woman who was 17 weeks pregnant, sought an abortion after consulting a gynecologist who referred her to Planned Parenthood due to his inability to perform a second-trimester procedure. Upon visiting Planned Parenthood, she received a list of facilities, chose the Center, and attended an appointment where she completed medical history forms, underwent tests, and reviewed a six-page informational packet detailing the abortion procedure and associated risks.

After reviewing the materials, she met with a counselor who discussed abortion alternatives and procedure details. The plaintiff signed a consent form, acknowledging understanding the risks and affirming her choice to terminate the pregnancy. The form stated that she understood the procedure's nature, risks, and that she could not change her decision after the insertion of dilators. The procedure began on March 3, and Dr. Jeng completed it the next day without further discussion. Following the procedure, the plaintiff experienced severe bleeding and was diagnosed with a perforated uterus, leading to her malpractice lawsuit against the clinic and Dr. Jeng, alleging malpractice in procedure execution and lack of informed consent.

The plaintiff alleges a lack of informed consent regarding an abortion procedure, claiming she was an improper candidate due to religious beliefs, should have been dissuaded from the procedure, and that the defendants failed to intervene. Initially, the court granted summary judgment for Dr. Jeng, stating his first contact with the plaintiff occurred after the procedure had begun. However, this decision was reversed upon reconsideration due to disputed facts regarding the timing of Jeng's contact and the procedure's irreversible nature.

The court clarified that there is no specific statutory requirement for informed consent in abortion cases beyond the general Public Health Law 2805-d, which mandates that providers disclose risks and alternatives as a reasonable practitioner would. To succeed in her claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable person in her position would have opted against the procedure if properly informed of the risks.

The court established that the plaintiff was informed of potential risks, including hemorrhage and perforation, and failed to refute evidence that she received and read informational materials provided by the clinic. The plaintiff's claims of psychological harm, including guilt and depression, stem from the act of undergoing the abortion itself rather than from the manner in which it was performed. Despite these claims, the records show that the plaintiff was warned about the emotional risks associated with abortion. Therefore, even if she argued that knowledge of these psychological risks was necessary for a fully informed decision, the court found no factual dispute regarding her awareness of these risks, warranting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The case differs from Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center, as there was no negligent misinformation influencing the plaintiff's decision to undergo the abortion.

Plaintiff was fully informed about her pregnancy status and the implications of the abortion, distinguishing her case from Martinez, where the plaintiff was misled about fetal disabilities. She cannot claim to have been persuaded into a needless abortion based on her convictions since she consented with full knowledge of her medical condition and the associated risks. Changes in her convictions post-procedure do not impose liability on the defendant. The plaintiff's argument for mandatory counseling during a 'crisis pregnancy' is deemed unconstitutional, aligning with the Supreme Court's decision in Akron v Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, which ruled against statutory requirements that could discourage abortion. Evidence shows plaintiff was adequately advised of risks and alternatives, giving informed consent. The claim of negligence against Dr. Jeng for not reiterating risks is unfounded, as he is permitted to rely on the informed consent obtained by the clinic previously, without the obligation to reassess consent upon his initial treatment of the plaintiff.

Defendant Jeng, as the physician of record, had a personal obligation to obtain informed consent from the plaintiff, regardless of his delegation of preliminary procedures. The extensive counseling provided by clinic personnel ensured that the plaintiff had sufficient information to make an informed decision about the procedure. The issue of whether the abortion was reversible at the time Jeng first saw the plaintiff was deemed irrelevant to whether informed consent was obtained. The court found that defendants fulfilled their obligation, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiff's consent was fully informed. Consequently, the order from the Supreme Court, Bronx County, which had granted the plaintiff's motion for renewal and denied Jeng's motion for partial summary judgment regarding the second cause of action, was reversed. Jeng's motion was granted, and the plaintiff's second cause of action, claiming a lack of informed consent, was dismissed without costs.