Margaret P. Gilleo v. City of Ladue Edith J. Spink, Mayor of the City of Ladue Thomas R. Remington, as Member of the City Council of the City of Ladue George L. Hensley, as Member of the City Council of the City of Ladue Gale S. Johnston, Jr., as Member of the City Council of the City of Ladue Robert A. Wood, as Member of the City Council of the City of Ladue Robert D. Mudd, as Member of the City Council of the City of Ladue George Fonyo, as Member of the City Council of the City of Ladue

Citations: 986 F.2d 1180; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2767Docket: 92-2232

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; February 21, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court's ruling that the City of Ladue's sign ordinance is unconstitutional, affirming the permanent injunction against its enforcement while modifying the award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, Margaret P. Gilleo. The ordinance, which prohibits most signs in the city, includes specific exceptions and is justified by the city on grounds of preserving community beauty, ensuring resident safety, and maintaining property values. Gilleo challenged the ordinance after placing a “For Peace in the Gulf” sign in her window, leading her to file a federal complaint asserting a violation of her First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in Gilleo's favor and granted her summary judgment. The appellate court's analysis centers on whether the ordinance is "content-neutral" or "content-based," referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, which found similar regulations unconstitutional due to their preferential treatment of commercial speech over noncommercial speech and the city's improper selection of debate subjects.

Ladue's ordinance prioritizes commercial speech over noncommercial speech and discriminates among types of noncommercial speech, categorizing it as a "content-based" regulation in line with precedents such as Metromedia and various circuit court decisions. The Supreme Court's subsequent writings necessitate analysis of the "secondary effects" doctrine, which allows a content-based regulation to be considered content-neutral if justified by a desire to mitigate undesirable secondary effects unrelated to speech content. Ladue claims its ordinance aims to address secondary effects like visual blight, unsafe conditions, and decreased property values caused by excessive signage. However, it fails to demonstrate that the prohibited signs contribute more to these secondary effects than the permitted signs, undermining its argument. The ordinance's selective treatment of certain signs suggests a focus on content rather than legitimate secondary effects, which further weakens its justification. Consequently, the ordinance's provisions do not meet the criteria for the secondary effects doctrine. Since content-based restrictions face strict scrutiny, requiring them to serve a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored, Ladue's interests, while substantial, do not rise to the level of compelling to justify the ordinance.

The "narrowly-drawn" requirement mandates that content-based restrictions must be the least restrictive alternative available. The court concluded that Ladue's ordinance fails this standard and is thus unconstitutional, affirming the district court's ruling. The district court also rightly rejected Ladue's backup plan regarding sign size, as neither party contested its constitutionality. 

In terms of attorneys' fees, Gilleo was awarded $74,813.45 under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which included a 15% enhancement for contingency representation. However, the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Burlington v. Dague indicates that such enhancements are not allowed under specific fee-shifting statutes, including § 1988. Consequently, the court vacated the 15% enhancement, reducing the total fee award to $65,055.00.

Overall, the court affirmed the permanent injunction against Ladue's ordinance, highlighting its favoritism towards commercial speech over noncommercial speech and certain types of noncommercial speech over others. The ordinance's definitions included a wide range of sign types, with specific exceptions detailed for allowed and prohibited signs, noting that while the ordinance is viewpoint neutral, it remains content-based, which is problematic under First Amendment standards.

Ladue's argument regarding the Supreme Court's "secondary effects" doctrine's impact on the precedential value of the Metromedia decision is met with skepticism. Ladue claims its ordinance aims to prevent the proliferation of signs, allowing exemptions only for those that are inherently limited in number or necessary for public safety. However, Ladue has not adequately substantiated this rationale, particularly in relation to the ordinance's restrictions on the content of signs. While the ordinance limits the number of signs for commercial businesses, churches, and schools, it does not clarify why content restrictions are also necessary. This is reminiscent of the Metromedia case, where the Court noted a lack of explanation for why noncommercial billboards posed a greater risk to safety or aesthetic concerns compared to commercial ones.