United States v. Charles Lawrence Amos

Citations: 984 F.2d 1067; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 435; 1993 WL 5930Docket: 92-6116

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; January 14, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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Charles L. Amos was indicted on July 24, 1991, for possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government sought enhanced penalties under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Amos filed a motion to suppress incriminating statements made after his arrest, which the district court denied. He entered a conditional guilty plea on January 17, 1992, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. Prior to sentencing, Amos challenged the government's notice regarding enhanced penalties under the ACCA, but his objections were overruled. He was sentenced to 235 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal, Amos argued that his prior second-degree burglary conviction should not qualify as a "violent" felony under the ACCA, that he should have received a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and that the motion to suppress should have been granted. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, including the finding that Amos's prior conviction was a qualifying "violent" felony and the denials of the motion to suppress and the reduction in offense level. The factual background included Amos's escape from jail, theft of firearms and cash, and subsequent arrest where he initially provided a false identity before admitting his crimes.

Trooper Askren testified that the Defendant appeared coherent, cooperative, and not under the influence of substances, despite having noticeable needle tracks on his arm. On July 3, 1991, Special Agent Dennis Laughrey transported the Defendant for processing on federal firearms charges, during which the Defendant provided details about his escape and theft. Following his arraignment on August 14, 1991, the Defendant was held in custody and charged on November 28, 1991, for damaging property in the Oklahoma County Jail. He allegedly attempted escape on February 16, 1992, leading to charges of escape and additional damage. Consequently, a probation officer applied a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice and denied a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.

The Defendant contested the trial court's use of a prior second degree burglary conviction to enhance his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), arguing it did not constitute a "violent felony" since it lacked serious potential risk of injury. However, the ACCA defines a "violent felony" as any crime punishable by more than one year in prison, which includes burglary. The government cited the Defendant's 1980 conviction for burglarizing a business as a qualifying offense. The Supreme Court, in Taylor v. United States, affirmed that Congress included all burglaries as predicate offenses for sentence enhancement, regardless of whether they involve the risk of physical injury.

Burglary is categorized as a "violent felony" under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), as it often poses a risk of injury or involves career criminals, despite not inherently requiring force against a person. The Supreme Court clarified that any crime meeting the basic elements of unlawful entry with intent to commit a crime qualifies as burglary for enhancement purposes. Consequently, the defendant's conviction for burglarizing Miami Auto Sales satisfies this definition, validating the district court's classification under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).

Regarding the denial of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the determination is reviewed for clear error, granting deference to the district court's findings. Initially, the defendant received a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but following an attempted escape from custody, a revised presentence report adjusted this by applying an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice. The defendant argued that his admissions of guilt justified the reduction and claimed that the obstruction adjustment was improperly based on conduct not directly hindering the investigation of his federal offense. He contended that the escape attempt was unrelated to the original charges and should not influence the acceptance of responsibility assessment.

The court rejected the Defendant's argument regarding the obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, noting that an attempted escape while awaiting sentencing qualifies as conduct warranting this enhancement. The court clarified that a direct relationship between the offense and the obstructive conduct is not necessary for the enhancement to apply. As the obstruction enhancement does not affect the offense level directly but is linked to the acceptance of responsibility reduction, the court found the denial of the reduction proper. Application Note 4 to Guideline 3E1.1 indicates that conduct resulting in an obstruction enhancement typically shows a lack of acceptance of responsibility, and the court did not view the case as extraordinary enough to allow adjustments under both guidelines. Furthermore, the Defendant failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to establish entitlement to the acceptance of responsibility reduction, which is not guaranteed simply by entering a guilty plea. The court emphasized that the sentencing court's decisions regarding acceptance of responsibility are given significant deference. Evidence of the Defendant's attempted escape supported the conclusion that he had not withdrawn from criminal conduct, justifying the denial of the reduction. Regarding the denial of the motion to suppress evidence, the court will uphold the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and the evidence is assessed favorably towards the government. The Defendant claimed that statements made to law enforcement violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

The district court determined that the Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights before confessing to law enforcement, with no evidence of misconduct or coercion by Special Agent Laughrey. The court applied the same standard for voluntariness to both the waiver and the confession, requiring the government to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that these were voluntary. The court assessed the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, noting that an express waiver is strong evidence of validity. The "Waiver of Rights" form and the circumstances of the interrogation were considered, leading the court to find no indications of mistreatment or coercion. The Defendant was deemed capable of understanding his rights, which he could have invoked at any time. The district court ruled that the confession was admissible and rejected the Defendant's claims regarding Agent Laughrey's failure to secure a written waiver and alleged misconduct. The court found that Agent Laughrey had reiterated the Defendant's rights before the conversation, and that the Defendant had initiated the discussion without any coercive tactics employed. After a thorough review, the district court's factual conclusions were upheld as not clearly erroneous, leading to the affirmation of its decision to admit the evidence of the Defendant's admissions to Agent Laughrey. The ruling was upheld by Judge John W. Lungstrum.