People v. Yu-Jen Chang

Citations: 92 A.D.3d 1132; 939 N.Y.2d 596

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; February 22, 2012; New York; State Appellate Court

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Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree stalking and second-degree aggravated harassment after a jury trial. The charges arose from his extensive email communications to his former wife between January 2005 and August 2006, which violated directives to stop sending non-visitation-related messages. Despite some references to visitation, the emails predominantly consisted of personal attacks and accusations against the victim. The court previously found the defendant had committed a family offense based on this conduct. Following his conviction, he received a one-year jail sentence and a no-contact order of protection for the victim and their children.

The defendant challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the Supreme Court's Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) part to hear and sentence him for unindicted misdemeanors. The case was initially filed in Brunswick Town Court, which had jurisdiction, and it was properly transferred to the Supreme Court IDV part. The New York Constitution allows the Supreme Court to hear any case that other Unified Court System courts can hear, and the Court of Appeals has upheld the IDV parts' authority over unindicted misdemeanors following proper transfer.

Additionally, the defendant's claim of being improperly allowed to proceed pro se was rejected. He had knowingly waived his right to counsel after thorough inquiries by the Supreme Court regarding the risks of self-representation. After discharging his retained counsel, he opted to represent himself and consistently refused offers for assigned counsel or to promptly retain an attorney, despite repeated warnings about his lack of legal skills. On the trial date, he chose to accept stand-by counsel to assist him while maintaining control over his defense.

Defendant expressed confusion regarding the role of stand-by counsel, prompting the court to repeatedly clarify that the counsel's function was limited to providing legal advice, and that hybrid representation was not permitted. The court informed the defendant that assigned counsel was available to represent him, emphasizing the potential harm to his defense from proceeding pro se, which the defendant consistently rejected. The court was aware of the defendant's educational background and legal experience, having previously observed him represent himself in family court matters. Despite the defendant's constitutional right to self-representation, it was determined that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The court found that the defendant's conduct, while challenging, did not obstruct the fair disposition of the charges. The court rejected the defendant's claim that it erred by not ordering a mental health evaluation, stating that a defendant is presumed competent unless there are reasonable grounds for doubt. The court exercised its discretion appropriately, having observed the defendant's behavior, which, while at times argumentative, did not indicate incapacity. After the trial, the defendant discharged stand-by counsel, and although a mental health evaluation was ordered as part of the presentence investigation, the defendant failed to cooperate. The court ultimately imposed a sentence, taking into account the psychiatric report that suggested a possible mental health diagnosis, finding no error or abuse of discretion in its actions.

The prosecutor's reference to the defendant's prior bad acts during opening statements constituted an error, as it occurred without a pre-trial ruling in accordance with People v Molineux. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the defendant's violations of protection orders were inadmissible but permitted limited testimony about the underlying facts. Despite the prosecutor's initial misstep, this error was deemed harmless due to overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, negating any significant probability of an acquittal. Additionally, the defendant had himself introduced related material during cross-examination, waiving any claim of prejudice. The court issued a five-year order of protection against the defendant, which was determined to be permissible and not an abuse of discretion, given the nature of the crime and the defendant's ongoing harassment of the victim. The ruling was affirmed by the concurring judges.